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Abstract 
This dissertation documents three initial phases of an investigation into intangible 
aspects of new ventures. The assessment of intangibles, which are often present in srart- 
ups, is a topic of recent interest (Stewart 1997, Clement, Harnmerer and Schwarz 1998, 
Shepherd and Douglas 1999, Sullivan 1999, Smart 1999, Boulton et al 2000), particularly 
during the early-stage investment-decision process of technology-based ventures. On one 
hand, investors are challenged to properly assess new opportunities. At the same time, 
entrepreneurs or innovators face the formidable task of comunicating what is, 
sometimes, nothing more than just an "'extraordinary" idea. In such situations, the 
decision to continue with the due diligence process, and finally to invest, is based 
frequentIy on those aspects that are intangible. 
Phase I of the research was a pilot study to eIicit vocabulary fiom investors and 
determine their need to assess intangibles. A group of twelve investment-decision experts 
were interviewed. The interviews were content analysed. The results of the content 
analysis suggest that there is a need on the part of both investors and entrepreneurs to 
improve their assessment of intangibles when making an investment decision. 
Phase II used Repertory Grid, a technique based on personai constnict 
psychology, to identiS intangibles used by experts when assessing or communicating 
new venture opportunities. Five venture capitalisa and five entrepreneurs were 
interviewed. The results reveal a total of 149 constnicts. Principal component analyses 
indicate that each interviewee identified only a few major a r e s  of emphasis in his or her 
thinking. Furthemore, a cluster analysis reveaied that each investor had his or her own 
way of conceiving the intangibies in a given proposal. Next, an extrernity analysis 
identified each person's most meaningfiil constructs. As a result of these analyses, the 
operation of intangibles during the investment-decision process is evident. From this 
phase, what is remarkable is the contribution of Repertory Grid technique to identify 
intangibles assessed by investors and communicated by entrepreneurs. 
Phase III involved the development of a fuzzy expert system as a diagnostic tool to assess 
intangibles in new technology-based ventures. The system was validated with five 
experts in invesûnent-decision making. The results show a promising fiture of this tool 
when used for assisting entrepreneurs and investors to assess venture viability. Finally, 
the results of this research could also open the door for this technique to be applied in 
other areas such as: scientific proposals, requisition of grants, and assessrnent of 
employment candidates. 
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The objective of this research is to aaiculate additional assessrnent criteria for 
technology-based ventures. As a resuit, this study is aimed to help not oniy investors to 
assess some of the new demands but also entrepreneurs to describe such new exigencies. 
We are living in a new economy. Nowadays, technology-based new ventures are 
utged to survive in an economy largely dependent on sophisticated technology, sparkling 
innovation and a constantly changing environment. In this new setting, information fkom 
new ventures is difficult to obtain and interpret. As suggested by Beck (1992), the core of 
this new economy is formed by small technology-based ventures whose key assets are 
intangible. 
Small businesses are making a significant contribution to the global new 
economy. In Canada, for exarnple, small businesses ( f m s  with fewer than 50 employees) 
account for 97 per cent of al1 businesses and in the United States, 94 per cent of al1 
technology-based ventures are small businesses (Pohlmann, 1998). The US Offke of 
Econornic Research reported that small businesses contribute 47 per cent of al1 sales, are 
responsible for 51 per cent of the pnvate gross domestic product, produce 55 per cent of 
al1 innovations, and obtain more patents per sales dollar than large US firms (SBA, 1997). 
Stewart (1995), elaborated some of the factors for the increase in number of 
technology-based new ventures: 
The way in which businesses operate and fùnction has been changed by the 
information age. 
Geographic location and fim size is not longer a limitation due to computers 
and telecomrnunications. 
Globalisation is breaking down barriers to doing business across borders. 
Technology is driving the creation of new products and services. 
The Intemet and its commercial acceptance have created a new platform for 
cornm~cat ions  and a medium for transacting business through electronic 
commerce. 
As reported by Groupe Secor (1998), knowledge-based ventures, a subset of small 
businesses, are considered as being major wealth creators in the new econorny. In these 
ventures, the developrnent, possession and application of knowledge are central to the 
production of particular goods and services. These ventures depend largeiy on knowledge 
derived from innovative science and technology for their core products, and most 
important, they offer high growth potential. These small knowledge-based businesses, 
generally referred to as technology-based ventures, are the focus of this research. In this 
study, technology-based ventures are considered to be a subset of knowledge-based 
businesses. 
Abernathy and Clark (1985), refer to the causal chah of innovation as the process. 
which moves fiom the development of ideas, to the creation of entrepreneurid 
technology-based ventures, to the commercialisation of products or services in new 
indusiries. Moreover, the commercialisation of ideas is the key to the management of 
technological innovation, which is the author's area of research. This thesis focuses on 
part of the causal chab  of innovation: the appraisal of woahiness in new technology- 
based ventures during their early stages of fmancing. 
1.1 Working definitions 
In this thesis, when the terni "venture" is used as the unit of analysis, it will refer 
to cornpanies, which are new and smail, as opposed to established and large. This study is 
focused on technology-based ventures as a subset of small cornpanies. As defined by 
Gulld and Bachher (1 W6), technology-based ventures are '%ose companies intending to 
commercialise a technology for the first time and thereby expecting to denve a significant 
source of sustainable cornpetitive advantage f?om the technology." What is considered an 
intangible aspect of such a venture is one that cannot be readily perceived or is not easily 
appraised at an actual or approximate value. Examples of intangible aspects are 
knowledge, intellectual capital, skills, abilities, beliefs, and ideas, among others (Bachher, 
Diaz de Leon, and Guild, 2000). 
Professional venture capital is defined as funding provided by fimis of full-time 
professionals, known as venture capitalist, who invest alongside management in young, 
rapidly growing or changing ventures that may have the potential to develop into 
significant cornpetitors in large, rapidly growing markets (NVCA, 1999). The invested 
capital, or equiiy, includes the cash invested by founders plus any retained eamings 
generated by the venture. It is often the intent of the investors to develop the venture to 
the point where they can exit their investrnent; an example of an exit strategy is through 
an initial pubiic offering (IPO). As described by Fenn, Liang and Prowse (1995), 
professionally managed venture capital f m s  generally are private partnerships or closely 
held corporations fimded by lirnited partners that includes private and public pension 
fimds, endowrnent funds, foundations, corporations, wealthy individuals, foreign 
investors and the venture capitalists themselves. 
Entrepreneurs who are just starting out typically have very different needs fkom 
those who are already established and ready to expand their ventures. Many investors 
have found that their own skills are better suited to helping one type of venture than 
another. The eady stages include seed, research and development, start-up and frrst stage 
financing (Pratt's Guide to Venture Capital Sources, 1995). At these stages, the 
technology-based ventures thought to have a high proportion of intangible or knowledge- 
based assets (Stewart, 1995). As a result, venture capitdists fid it challenging to make 
investment decisions and estirnate the potential r e m  and risk. This Iack of concrete data 
or assets may help to explain the difficulty faced by early-stage technology-based 
ventures in obtaining financing from investors (Groupe Secor, 1998). 
It is a working assumption of this stlrdy that, while there may be no shortage of 
ideas or capital, there is a shortage of people (entrepreneurs and investors) with the know- 
how to articulate hidden strengths and thereby build technology-based new ventures into 
successful companies (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). 
1.2 Research rationale 
When potential investors assess a business plan, they ofien attempt to focus on its 
financial attributes such as the proposed balance sheet and predicted cash flows. 
However, these financial indicators only approximate and do not reflect accurately al1 the 
possibilities for success that technology-based ventures fiequently offer. Therefore, 
analyses based on traditional assessrnent often lead to the rejection of viable techndogy- 
based ventures (false negatives from the appraisal process). 
Technology-based new ventures often start out with Iittle more than a skeleton 
staff and personal cornputer. As described by Roberts (1 990), many more begin with only 
the entrepreneur's knowledge and passion as inventory. Stewart (1 995) describes this 
more succinctly as "the intangible assets in technology-based ventures may literally walk 
out at the end of the day." These ventures have little or no history or track record, and no 
tangible assets ("bricks and mortar," reai property, plant and machinery). Consequently, 
cornpetitive advantage relies on the skills and experlence of employees, knowledge bases. 
and the expertise of others such as suppliers, distributors, lawyers, accountants, and 
advertking agents (Hall, 1992). 
This research is aimed to answer the following question: How might the 
traditional assesment be augmented to include "soft" estimates of venture viability? In 
other words, how best to assess and cornmunicate intangibles when evaluating investment 
proposals? Recently, some authors have argued that companies should seive to achieve 
success through the development of skills and expertise for the creation of knowledge 
(Nonaka and Konno, 1998). This knowledge factor is difficult :O estimate through a 
typical business plan, and it is m e r  challenging to descnbe within a new technology- 
based venture. In order to contribute in this domain of expertise, this research shows an 
innovative approach to expert knowledge elicitation, one that can yield emerging 
investment cnteria usefkl for assessing new ventures. 
1.3 Research method 
This research describes a method to respond to some of the curent demands 
placed on business plans for new technology-based ventures. The study consisted of four 
main steps: 
1) To eelicit fiom expert investors their articulation of how they assess business 
plans for new technology-based ventures. 
2) To identiQ additional intrinsic characteristics of new technology-based 
ventures and hopefülly enhance the current invesmient decision-making process. 
3) To explore a suitable method such as fuzzy Iogic to incorporate intangibles and 
thereby facilitate the investment decision-making process for new technology -based 
ventures. 
4) To validate the results obtained fiom previous stages. 
1.4 Research objectives 
The study presented in this thesis consists of the following objectives: 
First, to investigate the current need of assessing and communicating intangibles 
of investment opportunities. The author explored this question through a set of 12 
interviews with investors and entrepreneurs in Canada. 
Second, to extract some implicit aspects of decision-making criteria used by two 
different experts: 
Expert investors, who specidise in assessing business plans for new 
technology-based ventures, 
Expert entrepreneurs, who have been successfid at comxnunicating an idea 
trough a business plan. 
To this end, persond constnict theory (Kelly, 1955) was applied through a set of 
ten in-depth i n t e ~ e w s  following the Repertory Grid technique. 
Finally, a third research objective is to explore the application of fuzzy logic 
(Zadeh, 1965) as a tool for assisting the evaluation of intangibles in new technology- 
based ventures. A concept demonstration system was developed and validated with five 
venture capitalists. 
The application of futzy set theory proved to be a suitable approach when dealing 
with approximate or uncertain idormation. This method, also known as fuay logic, 
offers some useful insight for incorporating expert opinion into decisions through 
representations of linguistic logic. For a more detailed explmation on fuzzy set theory, 
please refer to Appendix A. 
1.5 Thesis organisation 
This thesis is organised to descnbe the research carried out in this smdy. Chapter 
two surnmarises important literature in areas such as investment decision-making, 
technology-based ventures, elicitation of knowledge and expertise, and füzzy set theory. 
It also includes a sumrnary of previous studies in these areas of research. Chapter three 
describes the rnethods and analytic techniques used to obtain results from the three stages 
of this study. The results obtained in each of the stages are summarised in Chapter four. 
Chapter five concludes the thesis with a discussion of the results. Chapter six inchdes 
some ideas for future research. 
CC Teaching and the imparting of knowledge makes sense in an unchanging environment. But if there 
is one tmth about modern man it is that he Iives in an environment that is continual1y changing. The 
only man who is educated is the man who has Iearned how to Iearn... How to adapt and change ... 
Who has learned that no knowledge is secure, that only the process of  seeking knowIedge gives a 




Investment decision-making in the venture capital arena has been researched for 
more than 25 years. During this time, many studies have been carried out with the main 
focus of understanding how investors assess investment oppomuiities. For example, some 
researchers have aimed to describe the decision-making process used by investors (Wells, 
1974; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Silver, 1985; Hall, 1989; Fried and Hisrich, 1994). Other 
researchers have focused in identif&ng the decision-making criteria used by investors 
(Poindexter, 1976; MacMillan, Siegel, and SubbaNarasirnha, 1985; MacMillan, Zemann, 
SubbaNarasirnha, 1987; Robinson. 1987; Timmons et al., 1987; Hall and Hofer, 1993; 
Bachher, 1 994; Knight, 1 994; Zacharakis and Meyer, 1 998; Bachher, 2000). 
The decision to invest in a technology-based new venture, however, continues to 
be a challenging task due to the intangible nature of some of the assets of these ventures. 
It is not sqrising then that the assessment of intangibles is an important factor of recent 
interest. In facf as suggested by Stewart (1 997), Shepherd and Douglas (1 999), Sullivan 
(1999), and Smart (1999), traditional approaches to financial assessment based on 
concrete aspects are perceived as less and less reliable and relevmt. Correspondingly, 
there is an increasing interest in the proper assessment and communication of intangible 
aspects. This occurs largely because of the evolution towards a knowledge-based 
economy, one in which intangible factors play a greater role. Stewart (1 997), for 
example, highlighted the importance of intellectual capital. He argued that "knowledge 
has become the prirnary ingredient of what we make, do, buy, and sell." As a result, he 
pointed out, "managing it - fmding and growing intellectud capital, storing it, selling it, 
sharing it - has become the most important economic task of individuals, businesses, and 
nations." Beyond a national perspective, Pope John Paul II affirmed the increasing 
significance of "know-how, technology, and skill" in his 199 1 encyclicd Centesimus 
Annus, writing, "Whereas at one tirne the decisive factor of production was the land, and 
later capital.. . today the decisive factor is increasingly man himself, that is, his 
knowledge ." 
When potential investon assess a business plan, they usually would like to focus 
on such concrete attributes as the proposed balance sheet and predicted cash flows. 
However,   le se financial indicators do not accurately reflect al1 the possibilities for 
success that technology-based ventures fiequently offer. The results of such traditional 
assessments often lead to the rejection of potentially viable technology-based ventures. 
However, when evaluating these investrnent opportunities, expert analysts fiequently face 
approximate or soft data, ofken presented using linguistic terms. For instance, a business 
pian for a state-of-the-art technology could mention a "very attractive market 
opportunity" with the remaining, almost impossible, task of communicating the size of 
such market. In fact, entrepreneurs ofien present only subjective and qualitative 
evaluations through their business plan, estimates that lie at the heart of the decision to be 
made. This is particularly the case for new technology-based ventures in their early 
stages. In many such ventures, the investment opportunity consists of an idea presented 
by a team of energetic innovators who are convinced implicitly of its value. There is no 
convincing explicit balance sheet or predicted cash flow. 
Assessing intangibles is thus a challenging task for investors. Although no prior 
research exists to suggest venture capital "accuracy ratesy' when assessing intangibles, 
anecdotai evidence confinns that this is a most troublesome factor to assess accurately 
(Dubini 1989, Harvey and Lusch 1995). Kometsky et al. (1985: 5) described this 
problem succinctly : "The talent criteria [intangibles], perhaps the most important quality 
a venture capitalist looks for in a portfolio company, is also one of the most difficult areas 
to assess." David Gladstone (1988: 30), when president of a public venture capital h, 
repoited: "The problem with the venture capital business is that when we analyse people, 
o u .  perceptions of others are usually wrong." Smart (1 999) corroborated this fmding with 
the results of his study. He found that venture capitalists fail to achieve an accurate 
human capital valuation in 57 per cent of the deals. That is, investors experience 
significant surprises in their assessrnent of intangibles over half of the time. There is 
d e f ~ t e l y  a need for an accurate method to elicit and mesure some of the intangibles in 
business plans. Indeed, one of the industrial sponsors of this research oEered a statement 
at the outset: "Knowledge-bzsed companies represent this country's best chance to create 
high-wage jobs, build exports and add wealth.. . yet they often have dificulty getting 
funding because their assets are intangible, consisting of people's ideas and innovations'' 
Holger Kluge, CIBC President, 1 995. 
2.1 Repertory Grid 
A review of the literature suggests that Repertory Gnd might be a valuable tool 
for eliciting intuitions and personal experience (Ford et al. 1990; Hisrich and Jankowicz, 
1990). Stewart and Stewart (1982), allude to it as a technique that appears to offer a 
highly relevant framework and methodology for mapping the decisions that investors 
have made in the past4ecisions which, consciously or unconsciously, will affect their 
perceptions and judgements in the future. 
Hisrich and Jankowicz (1990) used Repertory Grid technique to study intuition in 
venture capital decisions. Their study was not particularly focused on technology-based 
ventures nor did it addressed intangible aspects. However, they found that some aspects 
of the investrnent decision used by venture capitalists have been researched less, in 
particular the nature and extent of decisions involving intuition, "personal chemistry," or 
"gut feeling." They emphasised not only the content of venture capitalists' 
constructs-what they actually Say about the proposais used-but also the way investors 
concretise their intuitions about a typical proposal. 
2.1.1 Personal construct theory 
Repertory Grid is a technique developed by George Kelly (1955) based on the 
rationale that people assign significance to al1 phenornena utilising their own consmct 
system. Kelly wanted to develop an investigative technique that wodd remove the 
influence of the investigator 's frame of reference on what was O bserved. Also, he was 
interested in a method that would enable him to make precise statements-and confident 
predictions-about the behaviour of individual people. 
With these concems in mind, Kelly (1 955) developed bis theory of personal 
constmcts over several years. Kelly's theory rests on the assumption that people are 
actively engaged in making sense of, and extending, their experience. According to 
Kelly, the degree to which we understand others-or ourselves-is measured by the 
extent to which we understand how people make sense of their experience. The system of 
hypotheses whkh we begin evolving at birth, and which continues to grow until death, is 
not like a filing cabinet; rather Kelly says it is more like a pair of spectacles, through 
which you get information, but which aIso condition what you see and how you see it. 
Kelly descnbed this as the 'constnict system,' because the word 'constnict' cames with it 
both the sense of having been constmcted or developed fkom experience, and the sense of 
being that through which we construe-or see and interpret-the world. 
The term 'personal constmct" in Kelly's theory refers to the set of models. 
hypotheses, or representations that each person has made about his or her world. Kelly 
invented Repertory Grid interviewing as a way of getting people to reveal their own 
personal models. In other words, Kelly (1955) argued that people actively interpret the 
events around them, and their behaviour needs to be understood in terms of personally 
constmed ideas and explanations of how the world works. Furthemore, Kelly suggested 
that people should not be victims of their biographical history because the ways in which 
they see the worid are open tc  alternative interpretations or constructions. In this sense, 
people have a choice to revise their formerly held assumptions actively. 
To illustrate this point, Kelly (1955) created a metaphor "man is a scientist" (p.4). 
The scientist's ultimate goal was seen in the prediction and control of the universe. To 
this end, the scientist creates working hypotheses, which are then tested via experiment. 
If a hypothesis fails to predict or explain the actual outcome, the scientist will alter tfie 
initial hypothesis in light of the recentIy obtained evidence. Then this new hypothesis will 
be tested again, and should it be verified by empïrical assessment, the hypothesis will be 
considered valid for as long as it continues to predict new outcomes accurately. The 
scientist will, therefore, continuously revise the hypotheses in the general direction of 
increased predictive validity. Kelly argued that people, like scientists, seek to predict and 
control the course of events with which they are involved. While people live in an 
objective reality, they make sense of this reality through subjective interpretations of 
what happens to them. 
Kelly (1955, p. 46) argued that it is a fundamental postulate of persona1 construct 
psychology that "a person's processes are psychologically channeIIed by the ways in 
which he anticipates events." Kelly emphasized that the wording for the fundamental 
postdate was carefully selected, since it was to state the most basic prernise on which the 
theory of personal constnicts was built. From this basic postdate Kelly derived eleven 
propositions or corollaries, which c m  be grouped into three categories. Four corollaries 
refer to the process of construbg (construction corollary, experience corollary, choice 
corollary, and modulation corollary), another four to the structure of constnrct systems 
(dichotomy corollary, organisation corolary, fragmentation corollary, and range 
corollary), and three to the social context of constniing (individuality coroilary, 
commonality corollary and sociality corollary) . 
2.2 Expertise theory 
The expertise literature is concemed with identieing differences in the cognitive 
structures of novices and experts with the goal of understanding the development and 
nature of expertise. Cognitive science research, for example, on the phenomenon of 
expertise shows that novices and experts dif3er along three important dimensions. These 
dimensions c m  be referred to as procedural knowiedge, declarative knowledge, and 
contextual or situational knowledge (Glaser and Chi, 1988). 
Procedural knowledge is used in problem-solving situations. It is knowledge 
about certain actions or manipulations that help the problem solver make transitions fÎom 
one problem state to the next. Experts and novices were shown to d s e r  in the strategies 
they use to solve problems (Frederiksen, 1984). 
,4s described by De Jong and Ferpon-Hessler (1993), contextual or situational 
knowledge refers to problem situations as they typically appear in a particular domain of 
experience. Situational or conditional knowledge helps the problem solver create a more 
accurate representation of the problem by focusing perception directly to the main 
features of the problem. Once these have been identified the probIem solver can draw on 
his or her procedural knowledge to solve the problem. 
Experts, then, gain procedural knowledge within a particular domain or context. 
From a constructivist perspective, experts acquire their expertise, to a large extent, 
through persond expenences. However, as described by Adams-Webber ( 1  993, experts 
find difficulty in comrnunicating this knowledge, even though it is imperative for their 
cornpetence. It shares, therefore, some features with Polanyi's (1966) concept of "tacit 
knowledge." Tacit knowledge is persond knowledge that leads to an understanding of a 
situation or problem, by relying on an awareness of the particulars of the situation 
withouî being able to articulate these. Polanyi (1966) suggested that a person has 
knowledge of these particulars only in a sense that they lead him or her to attend their 
consequences or meaning. WhiIe the person is able to specify their meaning, the 
knowledge of the particulars themselves rernains tacit. 
Declarative knowledge, or conceptual knowledge, on the other h e  is 
knowledge that can be articulated by experts. As qualified by De Jong and Ferguson- 
Hessler (1 993) it is "static" knowledge and is based on facts and principles relevant for a 
particular domain. Declarative knowledge adds to the problem solving process in that it 
provides meaningful information in ternis of laws or principles to be followed. Nonalia 
and Takeuchi (1 995) refer to this kind of knowledge as explicit. 
Kelly (1955) assumed that as people gain more varied experiences, the structure 
of their construct systems would change so as to make more accurate predictions. With 
regard to both investors? and entrepreneurs' constructions about investment opportunities, 
the rxperience corollary suggests that people with varied experiences in the investrnent 
decision-making profession will have developed more fimctional, effective, and efficient 
constructions about detecting successful investment opporhtnities than their more 
inexperienced colleagues. 
As described by Ford et al. (1990), genuine expertise is more than the successful 
accumulation of ''book knowledge." This seems to be the case in most interesting 
domains, for example, in the assessrnent or cornmunication of investment proposals. In 
fact, much of an expert's unique collection of knowledge and skills are of his or her own 
construction. In other words, human experts acquire their expertise not only fiom explicit 
knowledge such as that found in textbooks (Le. widely shared consensual beliefs), but 
also fiom personal experience. Consequently, they construct a repertory of working 
hypotheses or "rules of thurnb," thac combined with their fùnd of book knowledge, make 
them expert practitioners (Agnew and Brown, 1989). 
Several studies have reported that when domain experts are asked to explain how 
they have reached a given conclusion, they ofien construct plausible lines of reasoning 
that have little or no relevance to their actual problem-solving methods (Johnson, 1983; 
Ford et al. 1990). As described by Waterman (2986), the more competent domain experts 
become, the less they are able to descnbe the knowIedge they use to solve problems. 
Thus, the greater their expertise, the more the expertshschemat. or construct systems can 
deviate from those of typical practitioners. As a consequence, experts may not be able to 
verbalise the incremental knowledge responsible for their evolution. One possible 
explanation of this problem is the lack of a shared method for expressing it. In other 
words, each expert has developed a unique collection of functional, but fdlible 
hypotheses (Le.? a personal construct system). In some important respects, these 
hypotheses do not coincide with publicly available dornain knowledge, making it dificult 
to state explicitly (Bradshaw, Ford and Adams-Webber, 1993). But perhaps herein lies 
the most significant facet of expertise. 
From this perspective, Repertory Grid seems to be a tool able to bring the experts' 
self-constructed knowledge to the surface-making explicit the valuable heuristic 
knowledge that experts possess but are frequently unable to articulate. 
This study thus explored the possibility of using the Repertory Grid technique to 
enhance traditional methods for the assessment of business plans. That is, it includes 
estimates of venture viability assessed by expert practitioners. In other words. by eliciting 
experts' knowledge and incorporating it in the decision process we will hopefully 
increase the predictive validity of success for new ventures. For instance, the assessment 
of investment opportunities seems limited by the inability to cornmunicate those aspects 
that are intangible. The study assumed that, to enhance our understanding of this process, 
we should observe not only an investor's perspective but also the expertise of those who 
have been successfd in transmitting the value of a new idea. Thus, it considered two 
kinds of experts: expert investors and expert entrepreneurs. 
2.2.1 Venture capitalists and entrepreneurs 
Venture capitalists are considered experts in new ventwing F-' -îing (Zacharakis 
and Meyer, 1998). In our study, we selected these experts from a group of venture 
capitalists investùig in technology-based ventures in Canada. Professional venture capital 
is defined as the fimding provided by f m s  of such Mi-time professionds. One of their 
objectives is to invest alongside management in new, rapidly growing or changing 
ventures that have the potential to develop into significant cornpetitors in global markets. 
As discussed by T i m o n s  and Sapienza (1992), the successful developrnent of a 
business can be cntically impacted by the interaction of the involved venture capitalists 
with the management team. Interestingly, venture-capital backed start-ups have been 
found to achieve a higher survival rate than non-venture-capital backed business 
(Zacharakis and Meyer, 1998). The expertise of venture capitalists denves from the 
number of business plans and proposais they usually assess, sometimes one hundred or 
more a month, from which they typically invest in only one to Siree ( T h o n s ,  1994). 
This study also includes a second group of experts, successfùl %gh-tech 
entrepreneurs in Canada. Their expertise is based on their experience of successfully 
launching a technology-based venture. The importance of such experts cornes fiom the 
complementary knowledge that they incorporate into understanding some of the current 
demands placed on business plans for new technology-based ventures. 
2.3 Reliability, significance, and validiîy of Repertory Grids 
Considering the broad application of different forms of Repertory Grïds to 
different domains of human expertise, it becomes obvious that the question regarding the 
validity and the reliability of Repertory Gnds cannot be answered (Bannister and 
Fransella, 1986). As mentioned by Smith and Stewart (1 977), fiom a methodological 
viewpoint, it is doubtful if concepts of reliability and validity can be applied to 
ideographic uses of the grid. Kelly himself referred to "reliability" (specifically test- 
retest) of the grid as a measure of how much the person has failed to develop since the 
last time (Ryle, 1975). Slater (1976) illustrates this concept with a convincing argument, 
"the reliabiiity and significance of a grid cannot be investigated by the methods used for a 
battery of tests given to a group of subjects." He elaborates, "The reason is that the theory 
fiom which psychomeflc methods for measuring reliability and significance are denved 
assumes that sarnples c m  be drawn at random fiom an objectively defined population. 
The assumption can be satisfied by the nomothetic [actual] data in a table of test scores 
but not by the ideographic data of a grid.'? Slater M e r  argues that to assess the 
significance of a grid, one should test the nul1 hypothesis by asking this question. --What 
is the probability that 1 would obtain these results by chance alone?" As a step towards 
answering this question, he produced the program GRANNY, which generates random 
numbers for g i d s  of any specified size. For example, one hundred 10 x 10 random grids 
had a first component accounting for an average of 30 per cent of the variance (standard 
deviation 0.0635). Thus, a 10 x 10 expenmental grid whose fwst cornponent accounts for 
more than twice this percentage of the variation is ahnost certainly not random and 
almost certainly has some additional significance. Such is the case with al1 our 
experimental results (see Table 4.4). Notwithstanding these very persuasive arguments, 
some researchers have attempted to assess reliability and validity of the grid in 
conventional terms. For exarnple, Epting (1 975) obtained test-retest reliabilities of grids 
in three areas of O.65,0.62 and 0.64. 
Fransella and Bannister (1 977) also provide a detailed consideration of reliabiliq. 
They argue, "If we consider forms of grid to be attempts to enquire into a person's 
construct system then under what circumstances would we expect stability or change?" 
They conclude, "We should look to the grid no; to repeat the sarne result but to see, when 
it shows change, what it is signifying. In short, reliability is perhaps best seen as merely 
one aspect of validity." 
n i e  validity of the grid itself is also complex to assess. With respect to connnict 
validity, however, there is considerable evidence in the literature that die results obtained 
£iom Repertory Grid studies are consistent with the assumptions underlying persona1 
constmct theory (Adams-Weber? 1979). Perhaps more relevant to the topic of this study is 
the research related to rneasuring predictive validity of grids in management studies. 
Bender (1 976) reports a study in which gids were used to predict the behaviour of certain 
men towards other people. These predictions were then validated against their wiveso 
reports of actual behaviour towards the sarne people. The results were highiy significant 
@ = 0.00006). Fransella and Bannister (1967) attempted to forecast voting preferences 
fiom the results of a grid with ten people known to the subjects as elements. Five 
hypotheses were tested, and the authon concluded, "The Repertory Grid has both 
concurrent and predictive validity when used as a measure of political constniing." 
2.4 Fuzzy set theory 
The Repertory Grid methodology has evolved in the light of application 
experience and now has major differences from that described by Kelly (1955). For 
example, Shaw (1 980) took advantage of the processing power and interactivity of 
computers to introduce on-line analysis and feedback to the person fiom whom the grid 
was being elicited. In expert systems terms, this feedback c m  be seen as highlighting 
correlations that might be spurïous and lead to incorrect rules in later analysis. Shaw and 
Gaines (1986) introduced new forms of analysis of the Repertory Grid based on fiiw set 
theory, which became the basis of d e  extraction. 
Fuzzy set theory, or fuzzy logic, first proposed by Zadeh (1965), represents an 
attempt to constmct a conceptual h e w o r k  for the systemic treatment of vagueness and 
uncertainty both qualitatively and quantitatively (see ,4ppendix A). When Zadeh (1 965) 
introduced the notion of a " f q  set,'' his primary objective was to set up a formal 
framework for the representation and management of vague and uncertain knowledge. 
More than 20 years passed until funi. systems becarne established in indusnial and social 
applications to a larger extent. In the social sciences, fuzzy Iogic was fust applied to the 
problem of social choice and self-organisation in the mid 1970's (Dimitrov, 1976). Diaz 
de Leon (1997) used fuzzy logic to design an expert system that provides guidelines for 
the creation of a multimedia document. His results provide evidence of the ability of 
fuzzy expert systems to provide an effective framework when merging different domains 
of expertise. In the present study the author used fUzzy logic ro mage  the expertise 
provided by investors and entrepreneurs when assessing and communicating investment 
opportunities of technology-based new ventures. 
Moreover, fuzzy logic is suited to studying "subtleties" in social systems because 
of its ability to: 
Deal with vague, ambiguous and uncertain qualitative ideas and 
judgements 
Concentrate on paradoxical and enigmatic aspects of decision situations 
Focus on the margins of any decision making "space" 
Appreciate the uniqueness in any decision-making act- 
Aiso, fuzty logic provides an alternative way of understanding uncertainty. Frorn 
this new way of understanding can be der-ived innovative approaches and strategies for 
working with the uncertainty that so often characterises social systems. This is the case in 
investment-decision making, where information is scarce, ambiguous and incomplete. 
2.4.1 Fuzzy vs- specific or cnsp logic 
The process of articulating a new idea, descnbing the concept for a new product, 
or explaining the notion of a new senice, is fiequently a challenging one. The innovator 
who tries to bring about a new concept often recurs to the use of expressions, analogies, 
anecdotes and metaphors. 
Fuvy set theory, especially its ability to accomodate rnulti-valued logic, is a 
powerful theory for dealing with the area of linguistic logic (Novak, 1995). Linguistic 
logic treats the use of natural language in human thinking, recognizing that human 
inference depends heavily on the structure of natural languages. As discussed by Novak 
(1995), this comection with classical linguistics is an area of ongoing research, and is 
one of the most complex questions in fuuy set theory. 
As is often the case with redistic decision problems, it may be difficult to 
perform measurements on specific (cnsp) variables (Fedrizzi, Fedrini, and Ostasiewic- 
1993). 7 3 ï s  rnay be due to the complexity of the problem under consideration. as well as 
the possible lack of any known measurement procedure. n e s e  problems may be dealt 
with by the application of linguistic values, which express the intensity of these variables 
These liguistic expressions may then be represented as fi!w nurnbers. 
In linguistic logic, a fuzzy set membership is described in tems of 
linguistic qualifiers. Examples of these qualifiers are: highly, very, and somewhat. For 
example, membership in the set of entrepreneurs who are innovative could be described 
in t ems  of highIy innovative, very innovative, or somewhat innovative. By treating a 
variable linguistically, the values of that variable can be generalized by a linguistic label. 
Moreover, linguistic variables present a major advantage: they are much easier for 
humans to express, and as a result have been instrumental in the increasing use and 
commercialisation of fuuy set theory (Dutta, 1993). 
2.4.2 Fuzzy vs. conventionai expert systerns 
F m  set theory is particularly useful when the problem domain is too complex to 
be modelled precisely with the application of conventional techniques. Fuzzy set systems 
can be used to mode1 any continuous system, and in some instances it has been found that 
fuzzy models are more usefui and accurate than conventional mathematical models 
(Dutta, 1993; Kosko and Isaka, 1993). One of the most significant differences between 
fuPy and conventional modelting of systems is that funy models permit the use of 
heuristic d e s  and linguistic variables (Dutta, 1993). 
Business applications of funy set theory have been primarily focused on its 
application to de-based systems, leading to the development of funv-expert systems 
(Hnischka, 1988; Kosko and Isaka, 1993). This has generally consisted of modiQing the 
If - Then statements of the rule base with f b q  linguistic variables, resdting in a system 
with much greater adaptability and robustness than traditional expert systems (Ditta, 
1993). 
2.43 Fuzzy systems vs. case-based reasoning systems 
During the course of this research, the following question came to mind: Are 
investors "matching the case" when assessing new hvesment opportunities? This 
proposition suggests that investors compare new investment opportunities against an 
... 
"ideal case" (Hall, 1992). Their decision then will depend on how good the new case 
resembles or "fits" such an ideal case existing perhaps only in the investors' mind. 
In an attempt to answer this interesting question, a review of extant literahlre in 
the area of case-based reasoning is presented here. A case-based reasoning system (CBR) 
supports decision-makers when solving new decision problems on the bais  of past 
expenence (i.e., previous cases). To assist a decision-maker, the process followed by a 
CBR system is as follows: a previous case similar to the new decision problem (new 
case) is retrieved: the solution of the previous case is rnapped as a solution for the new 
case; the mapped solution is adapted to account for the differences between the new case 
and the previous case; and the adapted solution is then evaluated agaînst hypothetical 
situations (Aamodt and Plaza, 1994)- To aid in future decision-making, feedback of the 
success or failure of the evaluated solution is obtained fiom the decision-maker 
(Montazerni and Gupta, 1997). Thus CBR make it possible to capture and reuse 
knowledge in form of case management. 
CBR systerns have been adopted successfully in support of cornplex decision 
problems w i t b  a variety of decision environments (Leak 1996). However, these CBR 
systems are generally developed in support of specific task domain with Iittle ability to 
share their reasoning processes among other related decision domains. In facto this 
deficiency has been cited to exist for other knowledge-based systems (Hayes-Roth 1997). 
For example, a diagnostic CBR system for repair of AC-Motors is unable to assist a 
designer with the design of a new AC-Motor. Obviously, inability to share embedded 
knowledge among different types of knowledge workers reduces the value of CBR 
systems in the contex? of organizationd knowledge management. This inability is also 
tnie for investment decision-making because new ventures (new cases) are fundamentally 
different £Tom each other. In other words, th is  method would not facilitate the assessrnent 
of the idiosyncrasies of such new ventures. That is, most likely every new investment 
opportunisr will present a different idea, a different market opportunity, different risks, 
and a different environment' but most importantly, different people, thus making it 
difficult to map against others. 
Furthemore, given that the focus of this thesis is in new ventures at their early 
stages of financing, the information available to assess them is not only scarce but also 
vague and imprecise. In these situations, decision-makers are lefi with their intuition or 
gut feeling (Hisrich and Jankowicz 1990; Kosko 1993). Acnially, Kosko (1993) 
advocates that decision-makers use a fuzzy weighted average. He suggests that, when 
making a decision, -we add up a lot of things and weight each thing to some degree, then 
we go with the average or "centroid" or centre of ma& (Kos ko, 1 993 p. 1 76). 
Furthemore, when assessing technoiogy-based new ventures experts analysts commonly 
use linguistic qualifiers thus presenting an opportunîty for f û z q  logic to contribute 
towards communicating the implicit value of such investment oppominities. 
The question still remains are investors making investment decisions, at any time 
by "matching the case?'' Bachher, Diaz de Le6n and Guild (2000) shed some light 
towards answering this challenging question. They studied investment criteria assessed 
by Canadian investors when screening new ventures. Their interesting results highlight 
investors' important criteria to screen new opportunities. For example, they found that 
some investors are interested only in business plans that corne fiorn a tnistworthy source. 
The location of the new venture within a certain geographical region, and the quality of 
the business plan were found to be some of the reasons, among others, to reject an 
investment proposal, regardless of the potential success that such a new venture offers. 
They dso found that investors are attracted mostly by those ventures that fd l  within their 
field of interest. Some venture capitalists invest only in "biotechnology" or 
"telecommunications.' so that when they are presented with an investment opportuniv 
fiom a different area, for instance "software," they fmd it almost uninteresthg (Bachher 
et al. 2000). In light of these results, it seems that iavestors are making decisions by 
"matching the case" only the fmt time they see an investment proposa1 (Hall and Hofer. 
1993). 
Furthemore, the fast Pace of change in technology represents another challenge 
for decision-makers. A recent poll published at GTEC (1998) by an Angus Reid Group 
(commissioned by SAP Canada) surveyed 278 key decision-makers on their concems 
with speed of technology advancements. Some of their results show that "keeping up 
with technology" topped respondents' lists when asked what they consider to be the main 
challenges facing their decisions. In other words, the need to experiment. sample, check 
and re-check opportunities, spread risk, share rewards and seek global markets quickly 
are only a few of the difficulties that investors of technology-based new ventures face. As 
suggested by Mitchell (2000), "Ln technology you need information that quickly becomes 
obsolete. And you need the frarneworks to help identify whether markets are in an early, 
rniddle or late stage and assess the implications. It makes business more exciting than it 
ever was before." Consequently, having an "ideal case" to rnap against seems to be an 
dynamic assessment method. In other words, in the process of moving toward a decision. 
some of the positive impressions of a proposal during the screening stage translate later 
into important reasons to invest (Bachher et al. 2000). As described by Huny, Miller and 
Bowman (1992), some venture capitalists' firms, aimed at gaining new- technology. make 
a fxst investment in a new venture with the objective to gain an irnplicit nght, or option, 
to acquire the new technology at a future point in tune. This option is often exercised by 
making the additional investment required to adopt the new technology. As described by 
Myers (1984), the purchase of a real cal1 option is often the outcome of the fnst-stage 
decision while the outcome of the second is the exercise of this option. Specifically, a real 
cal1 option works analogously to a stock cal1 option in conferring a nght to take füture 
unrestricted action towards capturing an underlying economic opportunity (Bowman and 
Hurry, 1987). 
Perhaps a better way to describe the process of investing in technology new 
ventures is descnbed by Mitchell (2000). He uses the following analogy: 
"Managing technological innovation is not so much about making a bet on the 
future as it is about steenng the process by which we create wealth. In looking to the 
future, you need ultimately to get to the point where you can m&e a significant 
investment To do that you need to gel in the game-and most corporations recognize 
there's a small cost of carryuig a number of new ideas. It's a little bit like a game of poker 
where you have to make a small wager to stay in the game. Very few ideas spring up 
fully developed and market-ready. So over several years, you move ideas along. It's like 
poker, where you pay to see the next card; you make a srnall investment for a little more 
information. As your options become clearer, you bring down the unceaainty to where 
you can make a major investment. That's a very delicate process" (page 1). 
2-4.4 Advantages and disadvantages of f L z q  expert systems 
Severai benefits aïe apparent in the application of fuzzy set theory: 
Systems which utilize fuvy set theory tend to be much more robusf 
having the ability to degrade 'gracefully' when dealing with minor 
variations in the available information. 
The nurnber of fuzzy rules which are required for a particdar inference is 
significantly less than if the inference were based solely on conventional 
rules. 
Systems which are based on fuzs. rules are usually simpler to build and 
maintain. 
The preference structures of decision participants are much easler to 
determine than in other conventional approaches. 
The application of fuvy set theory also has several shortcomings, arnong 
which are: 
Problems in developing membership functions rnay lead to diff~culties 
in application and validity. 
Serious problems may arise in applications due to the sophisticated 
construction techniques or strict assumptions which may be necessary. 
Problems rnay become cornputationdy intractabIe due to 
dimensionality. The nurnber of fuzzy d e s  tends to grow exponentially 
as the number of system variables increases. This leads to trade-offs 
between precision and computationd manageability. 
"Science can puri@ religion from error and superstition, 
Religion can puri@ science from idolatry and false absolutes-" 
-John Paul II, Pope (Karol Wojtyla) 
Chapter 3 
Research method 
This chapter describes the methods used during the three phases of this snidy . The 
objective of the fust phase was twofold: to elicit vocabulary fiom a group of experts in 
the area of investment decision-making and to find evidence of the need for 
comrnunicating and assessing intangibles when evaluating investing proposals. During 
the second phase two separate studies were carried on. The first study focused on 
improving our understanding of the role that intangibles play during the investment 
decision process. The second study used Repertory Grid: a rather new technique extracted 
fiom psychology, to understand the constructs that investors and entrepreneurs use when 
evaluating investment proposals. Finally. the third and last phase of this study consisted 
on the design of a concept demonstration systern based on fuPy set theory. A set of £ive 
interviews concluded a validation of the system providing evidence of the remarkable 
contribution of Repertory Gnd and fuuy logic toward solving this complex problem. 
3.1 Phase 1 
One of the objectives of üi is  thesis was to identifi curent rnethods used by 
practitioners to assess intangibles when making investment decisicns. Also, the study 
focused in eliciting vocabulary from investors and entrepreneurs. That is, this research is 
interested in detecting practitioners' understandings of some of the t ems  and concepts 
defmed by researchers in the area of management of technology. Terms such as 
"absorptive capacity", "core cornpetence," and "strategic intent" are some examples of 
these concepts. The first phase was designed in order to answer some of these questions. 
Specifically, this f i s t  phase was exploratory in nature using a quasi-experimental design 
(CarnpbeIl and Stanley, 1963), in the sense that selection of subjects was non-random. 
Participants were eight venture capitalists and four entrepreneurs, each of them with over 
five years of experience. The entrepreneurs were founders of their companies that range 
in size (measured by annual sales) from $ 5M to $3OM. The participants were 
interviewed in Toronto and Waterloo in Ontario, Canada, 
Data were collected dirough a set of open-ended interviews. During this 
interviews al1 participants were asked with the following list of questions: 
When assessing (or creating) a business plan for a technology-based new venture: 
1. Do you consider any intangible aspects? 
Could you give me some examples? 
How do you measure them? 
2. Do you consider the knowledge of the managing team? 
How about the capacity of the entrepreneur to create new knowledge? 
How do you measure this? 
3. Do you consider the capability of the team to create new products or services? 
How do you measure this? 
4. Ability to assimilate knowledge that is new and extemal to the new venture? 
How do you measure this? 
5. Please describe your ided business plan. 
6.  How many business plans have you received in the 1 s t  six months? 
How many have you rejected/accepted? 
Al1 the responses were analysed ushg verbal think-aloud protocols in order to 
elicit thought processes from the subjects as they answered the questions (Ericsson and 
Simon, 1993). Each subject spent approximately one hour on answering the questions. 
They took the tasks senously and seemed to enjoy thinking through them. For exarnple, 
even though most of the interviewees cornmunicated the importance of intangibles they 
also acknowledge the lack of a method to detect them and measure them. 
3.2 Phase II 
The second phase of this thesis consisted on two different studies. The first study 
focused on answering one of the basic research questions rnotivating this work, "do 
intangibles play a role in the investrnent-decision process of new technology-based 
ventures during their early stages of financing." To this end, this shidy strived on locating 
important intangibles among a large set of investment critena. Correspondingly. the 
second study used Repertory Gnd in order to provide evidence of the capacity of this 
technique to elicit tacit information from experts. This study attempted to answer the 
..- 
second research question, --1s there a method to evaluate some of the intangibles used by 
investors and entrepreneurs when assessing business proposals of new technology-based 
ventures." Kelly ' s (1 9 5 5) Repertory Grid technique made sense for several reasons: 
It could elicit fiom experts, both investors and entrepreneurs, what they 
perceive to be the concrete representations of the domain "intangibles in 
technology-based ventures." 
It could elicit fiom experts some of the repertory of intangibles they 
typically use to assess investment oppomuiities. 
It permitted for the translation of this cornplex and tacit information into 
more tangible and objective cntena. 
The participants in this study were experts in the area of investment decision- 
making in early-stage technology-based ventures. The first group consisted in five 
Canadian venture capitalists. A set of selection criteria was developed in order to identi@ 
the sample for this stage. One of the criteria was to target one venture capitalist per 
venture capital f i  in order to provide independence of observation. Specifically, a 
greater similarity was expected within a venture capital fim as compared to between 
fimis. The sample in this stage was identified fiom the Canadian Vennire Capital 
Association (CVCA) directory. The June 1999 version was the most recent directory at 
the time of data collection, which contained a listing of 60 full members. For each 
member, the directory provides a profile including the size of the fun& managed by the 
venture capital fm, type and stage of preferred investments, as weU as contact 
information and a listing of partners. From this group of investors, the study focused on 
those venture capitalists with the following c haractenstics: 
They had made investments in early-stage technology-based ventures, 
They were Iocated close to Waterloo. 
The total population was reduced to about ten Canadian investors afkr these 
critena were applied. Al1 ten investors were contacted and only five showed interest in 
participating with the study . 
The second group of experts consisted of Canadian entrepreneurs, who have been 
successful at starting their own venture. That is, the study looked for entrepreneurs that 
have experience raising capital from investors. It was a challenge for this study to locate 
people with these characteristics in Canada. Some of them are so busy that it was almost 
impossible to get 30 minutes of their Ume. A snowball sampling technique was used. 
Each entrepreneur was asked to refer others who might be willing to participate in the 
study. Five entrepreneurs agreed to participate in the study. 
As discussed by Keeney and Winterfeldt (1991), when eliciting knowledge to 
design an expert system, the number of experts involved in the knowledge acquisition 
processes should be kept to an effective minimum. For exarnple, Hwang (1999) presented 
a grid-based funy expert system environment using only three experts in his study. Also, 
Garg-Janardan and Salvendy (1 98 8) presented a stmctured knowledge elicitation method 
for building expert systems extractkg knowledge fiom three expert operators. Moreover. 
Abdolmohammadi (1987) suggested the need to rely on a single expert when acquiring 
knowledge. Siegel et al. (1 995) also sdpport this fmding when eliciting decision rules 
fiom experts. More on this topic cm be found in Turban (1988) and CIement and Winkler 
(1 985). 
3.2.1 Fùst study 
The first study was conducted in an attempt to understand M e r  the "tangibility" 
of investment cnteria used to assess technology-based new ventures. That is, the research 
reported in this thesis is a continuation of the investigation descnbed by Bachher et aI. 
(2000). They investigated the decision-making criteria used by Canadian equity 
investor~Business Angels (BAS), Private Venture Capitalists (PVCs), and Investment 
Managers at Public Venture Capital Firms (PVCFs>-to assess investrnent proposals 
from early stage technology-based ventures at two diserent points in tirne: screening 
(first impression) and evaluating (point of investrnent). In their study a total of 60 
investors were interviewed by administering a survey comprising 95 decision-making 
criteria organized in five categories. As an extension of this work, this study was 
interested in increasing our understanding of the importance of intangibles when 
screening and evaluating these ventures. 
The following paragraphs describe the research method used in this first study. 
Each of the 95 criteria, fiom an original survey designed by Bachher (1 994), were 
classified a number of different ways. In the fust case, they were classified as being 
either subjective or objective. In the second case, the classification was either tangible or 
intangible. In the third case, they were classified as being assessable in the present, or in 
the future. These three classification cases were compieted using three separate surveys. 
each being completed by a different group of ten researchers fkom the Department of 
Management Sciences at the University of Waterloo. 
Each criterion was classified as being either one (Le. tangible, objective or assessable in 
the present) or the other (Le. intangible, subjective or assessable in the future) from a 
choice of two options. Six different classifications were probed, using the definitions 
beiow: 
a A subiective criterion irnplies aspects of ventures that are influenced by 
personal feelings, attitudes, opinions or beliefs and are thereby biased. 
An obiective criterion implies aspects of ventures that are NOT influenced 
by persona1 feelings, atîitudes, opinions or beliefs and are thereby 
unbiased. 
A tangible criterion implies an aspect of a venture that can be readily 
perceived, or is capable of being apprised at an actual or approximate 
value. 
An intangible - criterion implies an aspect of a venture that can NOT be 
readily perceived, or is NOT capable of being appraised at an actual or 
a~~rox imate  value. 
Present indicates that the criterion c m  be assessed on information 
currently avaiiable. 
Future indicates that the criterion can be assessed based on information 
that may be avaiiable in the future. 
The survey included a ?-point Likert Scale used for gathering responses on the 
investment criteria. For example, on the Likert Scale "1" represented "Extremely 
Intangible" and "7" represented "Extremely Tangible." Respondents were also given the 
option of selecting "N/AY implying the specific investment critena were not applicable to 
the new venture. 
3 - 2 2  Second study 
The second study used Repertory Grid, as a method to elicit intangibles from 
investors and entrepreneurs. Five venture capitalists and five entrepreneurs were 
interviewed. 
As reported by Smith and Stewart (1977), Repertory Grid has shown a 
tremendous potentid in areas such as "management psychology". It concentrates on the 
individual and the way that he structures his view of his world. Essentially, Kelly (1955) 
developed this technique for investigating his theory of Personal Constnicts. That is, 
Kelly maintained that al1 men behave as scientists, exploring their environment. On the 
basis of these explorations and experïences, we construct a "mental rnap" of our world. In 
other words, our behaviour is determined, to a large extent, by our map. It was an 
objective of this study to furrher our understanding of how investors and entrepreneurs 
construct intangibles in investrnent proposals. That is, this study investigated the 
cognitive maps of expert practitioners in investment decision-making of technology- 
based ventures. 
Furtherrnore, our behaviour is canalised by o u  mental maps, thus we need a 
technique, which renders them objective and explicit. As descnbed by Adams-Webber 
(1979), Repertory Grid was developed to meet this need. Moreover, as suggested by 
Slater (1 976), Repertory Gnds c m  be used on a strictly empincal basis as a general 
methodology . 
Repertory Grid is a technique that has developed dramatically since it was first 
used and there exists now many variations of its procedure. However, the classic case 
incorporates essentid features generally proceeding in five stages: eliciting the elements; 
eliciting the constructs; completing the grid; analysing the grid; and interpreting the 
results. The following paragraphs describe the first three stages of the process. Analyses 
and results of this study are described in the following chapter. 
1. Eliciting the elements 
It was Kelly's (1955) belief that thoughts were made up of two things: the 
elements and the constructs. The elements are objects of people's thoughts. The 
elements can be other people such as, boss, customer, employee; they can be 
objects such as cars, planes, trains and boats; they can be abstract qualities such as 
justice, democracy, anarchy, and tyraxmy. The elements are analogous to the 
towns and villages on a map. The subject area or domain of this study is in 
technology-based ventures. In other words, this research was interested in 
mapping intangibie aspects of these ventures as consû-ucted by investors and 
entrepreneurs. To this end, each interviewee was asked to recall six business 
plans. Such investment proposals, ffom early stage technology-based ventures, 
had to have been assessed or created during the previous 18 months. It is 
important to note that specific details about the ventures remaïned completely 
confidenGa1 since each interviewee was asked only to recail such investments. 
nius, the six business plans became the elements under examination and were 
distributed as foliows: 
Two business plans considered "big hits" 
Two business plans considered "average or marginal" 
Two business plans that were rejected cr where the invesûnent had been 
Iost. 
2. Eliciting constructs 
The constnicts are the qualities that people use to think about the elements. 
Continuing with our previous analogy, constnicts can be seen as the iens through which 
we view our world. In other words, constnicts are andogous to directions on a map. In 
order to elicit each participant's constructs the study used the "triad" method. Each of the 
participant's business plans was codified with a single word representing that venture. 
Then, each code was written on a separate card. Three of the cards (business plans) were 
selected at randorn and presented to the expert who had originaily remembered them. 
Each expert was then asked to distinguish between these plans sa that two of them shared 
an intangible not possessed by the thïrd. The expert codd of course, choose any two 
cards, the choice would depend on the way that he thought of the elements in the triad. 
When the expert had made a choice, he was asked to Say what made two the sarne and 
different to the odd business plan out. This property we cdled a construct. Such 
constructs were categorised by each expert as bipolar attributes in such terms as "good 
management skills/poor management skills," "experienced entrepreneudinexperienced 
entrepreneur," and so for*. 
3. Cornpleting the grid 
Each participant's list of elements and constnicts were then used to produce a grid 
with the elements dong the top and the constructs down the side. Each expert was 
presented with a simple five-point rating scale. Once a constnict had been elicited, the 
expert assigned each of the six plans a value fiom one to five. For example, a value of 
one codd be assigned to a plui in one pole of the constnict, Say "experienced 
entrepreneur." Correspondingly a value of five would be assigned to another element on 
the other pole of the construct, in this case "inexperienced entrepreneur." 
The technique proceeded to elicit al1 M e r  constructs fiom the expert by 
presenting successive fiesh triads of p!ans. Th-? expert could then add important 
constructs that may not have been possible with the random combination of plans being 
presented. Al1 the ratings elicited f?om the expert were stmctured in the form of a matrix 
known as Repertory Grid. 
Figure 3.1 shows an example of a completed Repertory Gnd: how one of the 
respondents construed the six business plans. 
CONSTRUCTS 
Poor market understanding 
Poo r communicat ion skills 
Poor execution on plans 
Poo r t echnical skills 
No previous experience 
Has not been successf ul 
Poo r assim iat ion skills 
Market opportunit y is not "hot" 
1 3 4 3 5 4  Good market underst anding 
1 2 2  4 4 5 4 1 Good communication skills 
1 2 1 4  5 4 4  1 Abilit y t o  execute on plans 
1 1 3 3 2 5 4 ( Good assimilation sklls 
1 2  4  2 2  4  
4  1  5 3 3  4  
4  1 4  4 2 5 
1 4 3 2 5 3  Market opportunity is "hot" 
Good technicalskills 
Revious experience in the business 
Has been successful in the past 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
BQ Hit #2 





Figure 3.1 Example of a repertory grid 
By using a grid rather than a w a l  rating scde, a person's otherwise unconscious 
and implicit repertory of constructs, and the complex relationships between them, can be 
made explicit In contrast to a usual rating scale, the grid, in its original form, also has the 
advantage of not imposing on the respondent to select fkom a limited number of options 
that were all predetennined by the researcher. 
3.3 Phase III 
The third and last phase of diis thesis consisted of the implementation of an expert 
system to heip with the diagnosis of the viability of a new venture. Such expert system 
was expected to address the following issues: 
Utilize the information elicited during the previous phase and organise it, 
providing an efficient framework that wodd facilitate the evaluation of 
intangible aspects immersed in new venture opportunities. 
Permit the combination of different domains of expertise (in this case that 
of investors and entrepreneurs) in order to agree sooner via estimates in 
the assessment of an ùivestment opportunity. 
Provide an environment able to improve the meeting of variables and 
context when assessing new ventures. 
Accept imprecise and incomplete information as an input. 
Offer an ability to work with linguistic ternis. 
With these ideas in mind a fuzzy inference system was implernented. A software 
package called "The F u ~ y  Logic Toolbox" was used to develop the fuay inference 
system described in this thesis. The F m  Logic Toolbox is a collection of functions built 
on the MATLABB numeric-computing environment. Fuay  inference is the process of 
formulating the mapping fkom a given input space to an output space. and the primary 
mechanism for doing this is a list of if-then statements cdled d e s .  Al1 d e s  are 
evaluated in parallel, and the order of the d e s  is unimportant. The d e s  themselves are 
useful because they refer to variables and the adjectives that describe those variables. The 
mapping then provides a basis fkom which decisions can be made, or patterns discemed. 
There are two types of fuvy inference systems that c m  be implemented in the Fuzzy 
Logic Toolbox: Mamdani-type and Sugeno-type. These two types of inference systems 
Vary somewhat in the way outputs are detemined. 
Funy inference systems have been successfully applied in fields such as 
autornatic control, data classification, decision analysis, expert systems, and computer 
vision. Because of its multidisciplùiary nature, fuzzy inference systems are associated 
with a number of names, such as fuuy-nile-based systems, funy expert systems, fuzzy 
modeling, fuzzy associative memory, fuzzy logic controllers, and simply (and 
ambiguously) fuzzy systems. 
The expert demonstration system described in this thesis used a Mamdani-type 
inference system. Mamdani's fuzy inference method is the most commonly seen fuPy 
rnethodology. Mamdani's method was among the fïrst control systems built using fuuy 
set theory. It was proposed in 1975 by Ebrahim Mamdani (1975) as an attempt to control 
a s t e m  engine and boiler combination by synthesizing a set of linguistic control rules 
obtained from experienced human operators. Mamdani's effort was based on Lodi 
Zadeh's (1 973) paper on funy dgonthms for complex systems and decision processes. 
Although the inference pracess described in the next sections differs somewhat h m  the 
methods described in the original paper, the basic idea is much the same. 
Mamdani-type inference, as defmed in the Fuzy  Logic Toolbox, expects the 
output membership functions to be fuvy sets. After the aggregation process, there is a 
fuzy set for each output variable that needs defuzzification. It's possible, and in many 
cases much more efficient, to use a single spike as the output membership function rather 
than a distributed fuzzy set. This is sometimes known as a singleton output membership 
function, and it can be thought of as a pre-defuzzified fuzzy set. It enhances the efficiency 
of the defuuification process because it greatly simplifies the computation required by 
the more general Mamdani method, which finds the centroid of a two-dimensional 
function. Rather &an integrating across the two-dimensional h c t i o n  to find the centroid, 
the weighted average of a few data points was used. 
Several authors have discussed the steps necessary to design a fuzzy system (e.g. 
Cox, 1994; Terano et al. 1994). The general approach to designing fuzzy systems c m  be 
summarised as follows: 
Identifiing input and output variables 
Defining the fuzzy sets associated with these input and output variables 
Deveioping the d e  base defuiing the relationships between the variables 
Determining the appropriate defuzzification technique. 
3 3.1 Membership functions of inputs and outputs 
A membership function (MF) is a curve that defines how each point in the input 
space is mapped to a membership value (or degree of membership) between O and 1. The 
input space is sometimes referred to as the universe of discourse, a fancy name for a 
simple concept. 
A fuvy set may be represented by a membership function. This function assigns 
the degree of membership within the set to any element of the universe of discourse. The 
membership function maps the elements of the universe ont0 numericd values in the 
interval [O, 11. As Silva (1995) points out, it is important to note that a membership 
function is a possibility function and not a probability function. For exarnple, a 
membership value of zero implies that the corresponding element is definitely not an 
element of the fuvy set. On the other hand, a membership function value of unity means 
that the corresponding element is definitely an element of the fuzzy set. 
Moreover, as pointed out by Terano et al. (1994), the formulation of membership 
fiinctions is a critical issue and source of much criticism, in the development of fuzzy 
systems. Severai approaches have been suggested for the formulation of rnembership 
functions. However, this study was based on the approach suggested by Hnisctika ( 1 988). 
This approach assumes that five basic triangular membership functions, corresponding to 
the iinguistic qualifiers are associated with a variable: Very Low, Low, Medium. High, 
and Very High. As a result, six parameters were elicited for each variable such that a 
(Figure 3.2): 
(Pl) maximum value for a variable to be unambiguously classified as very Iow; 
(P2) maximum value for a variable to be unambiguousIy classified as low; 
(P3) maximum value for a variable to be unambiguously classified as medium; 
(P4) maximum value for a variable to be unambiguously classified as high; 
(P5) maximum value for a variable to be unambiguously classified as very high. 
Figure 3.2 An example of a membership function 
These parameters speci& ranges of the original input and output variables. Based 
on them, the triplets defining each of the fuPy sets can be derived. 
As discussed previously, a problem &ses when dealing with variables for which 
these parameters cannot be easily identified. In this case, the approach was to treat these 
concepts as intermediate variables and identify associated measurement variables. 
A final issue that was addressed is the development of overall membership 
fùnctions fkom those of each expert. This study used a conservative aggregation method. 
That is, a method based on the minimum and maximum of individual parameters. As a 
result, the nomalised triplets represent the aggregate membership functions (Hnischka, 
1988): 
Very Low: {O, rnin(PI), rnin(P2)) 
Low: {min(P 1 ), min(P2), (max(P4)-min(P3))/2 } 
Medium: (min(P3), (max(P4)-min(P3))/2, max(P4)) 
High: {min(PS). (max(P6)-min(P5))/2, max(P6) } 
Very High { (max(P6)-min(P5))/2, max(P6), 1 ) 
3.3 -2 Developing a fuzzy associative rnemory system 
The information elicited using Repertory Gnd was used to generate a list of fuvy 
variables. As proposed by Simpson (1 990) and Kosko (1992), an effective method of 
implementing this fiarnework is the Funy Associative Memory 0. Unlike systems 
based on prepositional and predicate calculus in their reasoning, FAM's reason through 
the manipulation of fuey sets. While both paradigms can encode smictured knowledge 
in linguistic form, the funy approach translates it into a Linguistic score rather than the 
symbolic fiamework of conventional expert systems (Kosko, 1992). 
In general, a FAM maps inputs to outputs, encoding the association (xi. Yi), which 
associates the m-dimensional output set, Y, with the n-dimensional input set, X. An 
advantage of this approach is that stnichired knowledge can be directly encoded in the 
FAM, rernoving the requirement of training the system as in neural network applications 
(Kosko, 1992). While this knowledge is encoded into a FAM correlation matrix, in 
practice the need to manipulate a large numencal matrix can be replaced with a linguistic 
representation scheme. This is accomplished by encoding the fuuy set association 
between matrix elements (xi, Yi) as a single linguistic entry in a FAM linguistic ma& 
(Kosko, 1992). 
This study implemented a FAM system based on a "FAM bank" consisting of 16 
FAM d e s ,  an example of one of these FAMs is shown in Figure 3.3. In this architecture, 
each input to the FAM system activates each stored FAM rule to a different degree. For 
instance, the degree of activation of each FAM rule generating output Y*, increases as 
the actual input, X*, more closely resembles the ideal input, X. 
The overall output of a FAM bank consisted of the weighted sum of these 
partially activated fuzzy sets. As discussed by Kosko (1992), these weights may reflect 
the strength, fiequency or credibility of the fiilzy association. Once the output, Y, has 
been detemllned it is common for it to be defuaified to a single numerical value (Kosko, 

3 -3 -3 Fuzzy-rule sets of input and output variables 
Table 3.1 shows a sampIe nile subset based on the assessrnent questions to 
business plans proposed by ( S h a n ,  1997). This is an example of a rule-set used in the 
deveiopment of a techology-based assessrnent methodology. 
Table 3.1 Business Plan Assessrnent Rule Set 
I 
I Condition 
Education of founders is high 
Consequent 
Business plan is Acceptable 
Fairly good description of cost to acquire a 
customer 
Business plan is Moderately Acceptable 
Good description of the context 
1 opportunity, and context as a rnoving target 
Business plan is Acceptable 
Very good description of the people, 
From this table, it c m  be seen that some of the concepts are inexact and vague; 
that is, the rules are fuzzy. Therefore, a srnail subset of fuzzy variables and their 
associated term set can be identified, as shown in Table 3.2. Further, each of the values in 
the term sets associated with the fuzzy variables can be thought of as describing a 
membership function. 
Business plan is Acceptable 




Description of cost to acquire a 
customer 
- - 
~ e s c r i ~ t i o n  f the context 
Description of the people, 
opporhmity, and context as a 
moving target 
- 
Term ~ e t  
Unacceptable, Acceptable with Modifications, 
Acceptable 
Low, Somewhat Low, Acceptable, Somewhat High. 
-- -- 
Very bad, Bad, Fairly Good, Good, Very Good 
Very bad, Bad, Fairly Good, Good, Very Good 
Very bad, Bad, Fairly Good, Good, Very Good 
The information presented above was used to develop a simple F A .   Since the 
rules exarnined are of the form IF A is x THEN B is y, the resulting FAM matrices were 
reduced to vectors, and an architecture similar to scaled monotonie chaining approach 
discussed by Cox (1994). While it is possible to aggregate the various rules into higher 
order FAM architectures, this approach would be very inefficient. For this reason, only 
FAM matrices smaller than four dimensions were used. Conversely, if d e s  were 
encountered having propositions with greater than five variables, they were decomposed 
into lower order rules. 
As can be seen in Figure 3.2, each of the input variables, for example quaIity of 
the business plan, was mapped to a fiim set representhg the associated term set for that 
fuzzy variable. In this example, the niny sets represent: L - low quality of business plan 
to H - high quaiity of business plan. Associated with each input is a FAM representing 
the mapping fiom the input fuzy set to the associated "investment opportunity'? output 
fuvy set. In each of the FAM cells, the value of the investment oppomuiity fuay set for 
that rule is indicated by L - low investment opportunity to H - high investment 
opportunity. Therefore, if an input corresponding to high opportunity communication, H, 
was presented to FAM rule 2, then the associated investment oppomullty would be high, 
H. 
Once dl FAM d e s  have been evaluated, their outputs were aggregated and 
defuzzified. The de-cation procedure resdted in a linguistic rating of each of the 
fuvy outputs, which in turn operated as funy inputs for the next FAM. In addition, this 
approach allowed investigation of individual niles to provide the user with insights into 
poteritid opportunities identified for each of the areas considered. 
"The statistical method shows the facts in the light of the average, but does aot give a picture of their 
empincal reality. While reflecting a n  indisputable aspect of reality, it can falsify the actual truth in a 
most misleading way.. . The distinctive thing about real facts, however, is their individuality. Not to 
put too fine a point on iî, one could Say that the reat picture consists of nothing but exceptions to the 
nile, and that, in consequence, reality has predominate the characteristic of irregularity." 
(C.G. Jung, 1957 on individual personalities) 
Chapter 4 
Results 
This chapter describes the analyses perfomed on the data collected, and presents 
the results obtained fiom the three stages of this shidy. During the fust stage twelve 
participants were interviewed and given a small open-ended questionnaire. The objectives 
of this first stage were to elicit experts' vocabulary and fmd evidence of the need to 
comrnunicate intangibles. In the second stage, data from a poll of 30 Canadian 
researchers were analysed with the objective of understanding the role that intangibles 
play during the assessrnent of new investment opporhmities. Also, during the second 
stage, £ive venture capitalists and five entrepreneurs were interviewed in depth to elicit 
some of the intangibles used when assessing or communicating business plans. The third 
stage consisted of the implementation of a concept fuuy expert system proposed as a 
fiamework for merging expertise fkom both investors and entrepreneurs (Diaz de Leon, 
1997). Data collected in the previous stages was incorporated into the fuzzy expert 
system. The system was validated by five venture capitalists in Canada. 
4.1 Phase 1 
During this phase it was found that venture capitaiists and entrepreneurs are 
approachable when they are contacted within a network. This study benefited fiom a 
network created through the completion of previous studies at the Institute of Innovation 
Research in the University of Waterloo. 
One of the objectives of this stage was to identify some degree of correspondence 
between the terms used in academia and those used by practitioners. It was a concern of 
this study to find dzerences in understanding of t ems  originally developed in academia. 
For example, some researcbers, in an effort to characterise strategic ideologies for 
cornpetitive advantage, have coined terms such as strategic intent (Harnel and Prahalad, 
1989), core competence (Prahalad and Harnel, 1990), or absorptive capacity (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990). In an effort to find evidence for correspondence in understanding of 
such terms, we asked the participants questions related to some of the concepts 
mentioned above. For example, the capacity of the entrepreneur to acquire new and 
extemal knowledge is strictly related to the co~lcept of absorptive capacity. Also, the 
ability of entrepreneurs to use their knowledge for creating new products and services is 
somewhat related to concepts such as core competence and strategic intent. 
Additionally, through the application of this questionnaire we looked for evidence 
of the ability of expert practitioners to assess strategic concepts in business plans. In other 
words, researchers in academia have reported on the importance of managing 
corporations using different strategies to achieve sustained cornpetitive advantage. 
However, it still remained a question for us whether such strategies were applied during 
the early stages of new ventures. 
Six open-ended questions were presented tu the participants. From the twelve 
participants, only ten agreed to be recorded. Appendix B includes the transcription of 
those ten interviews. The following sections describe the most relevant hdings  fkom this 
first stage of the study: 
4.1.1 Importance and consideration of intangibles 
The first question was as foliows: 
When assessing (or creating) a business plan for a technology-based new venture: 
1. Do you consider any intangible aspects? 
Could you give me some examples? 
How do you measure them? 
Investors and entrepreneurs of technology-based ventures are fiequently 
challenged by the difficuit task of assessing and comrnunicating new ideas. The objective 
of this question was to obtain an idea of current methods used by experts to assess 
intangibles. 
The answers to this question were consistent with the conclusion that intuition and 
experience play a big role. For example, when describing the process that he usually 
follows, one of the respondents characterized it as "a little bit intuitive, so 1 would cal1 
this intangible because it is hard to measure at the first cut" Generally, respondents agree 
that assessing the team of the venture is a difficult challenge. For instance, one 
respondent explained, "[We consider] primarily intangible assets, and by intangible assets 
[we mean] its people and their histoncal background. We love companies who have 
failed and individuals who have failed because they've learned so much and we love 
people who have succeeded because they know a lot too." When asked more specifically 
about the method followed by their firmf he responded, "Well that is the best question, 
because [itl is very hard to measure. We corne fiddling around with different ways and 
seeing whether or not we c m  qualify thern, but we haven't been able to do it so fa." 
Then, he added, "We look at the market f i s t ,  whether or not there is a market with the 
right Pace of growth, not to busy but not too small or not too big. Secondly, we do look at 
the technology, what do they own, if anything? The vast majority of companies we're 
seeing today don? have anything except ideas and perhaps an access point to an 
oppomuiity. The third thing we look at is the current tearn, who they are and what's their 
background. And the fourdi thing we look at is a box, which we just cal1 'question mark.' 
Are they people we want to work with? Do we mist them? Do we have a good feeling? 
Do we like the name of the Company? Are they inclined to listen? Do they talk more than 
they should? Are they arrogant? Do they put 'billion' too many times in the business 
plan? AL1 the intangible aspects are good or bad and whether or not they will succeed and 
we can work with them." 
Moreover, when speaking of the nature of early stage ventures, one investor 
mentioned, "1 guess the other intangible factor that we could t ak  about here is the market 
place itself. A lot of the eariy stage ventures may be creating the market, so the market 
isn't something where 1 can go and get some forward studies or reports. I've got to 
essentidly decide whether they are going to be able to create it." 
4.1.2 Knowledge of the management team 
When assessing a business plan for a new venture, the recognition of tacit 
knowledge and its importance has a number of crucial implications. For example, it gives 
rise to a whole different view of the new venture-not as a machine for processing 
information but as a living organism. Within this context, the objective of the second 
question was intended to obtain an idea of how investors and entrepreneurs consider the 
knowledge of the new team. The question was as follows: * 
2. Do you consider the knowledge of the managing team? 
What about the capacity of the entrepreneur to create new knowledge? 
How do you measure this? 
Participants recognized that knowledge is an asset In fact, some of them 
mentioned the implications of knowledge as an important characteristic of the 
entrepreneur. One investor summed it up, "[The knowledge of the entrepreneur] is a very 
important aspect, it is key. For example, if the person is very good at delegating they have 
to understand what they are delegating. They have to be able to assess new products or 
services, dthough in a business proposal this is difficult to find. However, it cm be 
measured by having communication with the entrepreneur." In addition, some of them 
rnentioned a caveat that there is a problem sometimes when entrepreneurs feeI they 
ccknow it ail." This seems to be a major problem, according to some investors. One of the 
participants expressed it in a few words, T h a t  is often a challenge for entrepreneurs 
because sornetimes they feel that they can conquer the world and they can be everyttiing 
and tell the market they are great, with no interest in sharing the spotlight. You have to be 
careful about those kind of people because it is pretty tough for only one person to run a 
successful company." 
When asked about a method to measure knowiedge participants were not specific. 
However, some investors acknowledged that they fiequently hire a third party consultant 
from their network to make an assessment. 
4.1.3 Ability to create new products or services 
The research area of this thesis is in Management of Technologicai Innovation 
and Change, thus our interest in understanding how investors of technology ventures 
regard the entrepreneur's capacity to innovate. Innovation-the successfid exploitation of 
new ideas-is considered by researchers to be key to sustained competitiveness. The third 
question was related to this topic: 
3. Do you consider the capability of the team to create new products or services? 
How do you measure this? 
Participants answered this question in several ways. An investor, for exarnple. 
explained this with an analogy, "Frankly, we are looking for people who have the ability 
to go sideways, go laterally as well as they can go forward. Just like in technology we are 
looking for open architecture systems, so we are looking for people with 'open 
architecture attitudes.' We like people who are prepared to overcome change and rapid 
change, people who c m  restart al1 over very quickly, re-hvent themselves, especially 
with web related ventures. Be able to adapt to their market." 
Additionaily, investors consider that entrepreneurs should not only be innovators 
but also need to anticipate füture changes in technology in order to remain cornpetitive. 
An investor summarised this need in a few words, "Yes, 1 think the team will need to 
convince us that they are already thinking about a next generation of products. This is 
particularly mie when you are investing at an early stage. Everybody likes to invest in 
some khd of platforni technology, but especially if you are going after an emerging 
market, you are not a 100 per cent sure what is going to emerge or if it's going to 
emerge." On the other hand, several investors mentioned that the entrepreneur's ability to 
innovate is an intangible, which is difficuit to assess. Sometimes, for example, investors 
need to be aware of entrepreneurs' unredistic expectations. One investor summarised this 
caveat saying: "You want people who are visionaries but not dreamers." 
An explicit objective of this question was to investigate the existence of a rnethod 
to assess the entrepreneurs' ability to innovate. Some investors provided details of the 
method they usually follow. For instance, one investor shared a two-step-check-up 
method that he foIIows; "1 look for two things. 1 focus on the entrepreneur's previous 
unique employment and expenence: to what extent have they been in situations before 
where they have been innovative and created new products successfidiy? That's a key 
indicator. Another key indicator is their availability to be market-driven. Ofien, you get 
entrepreneurs who corne in and the plan taks a lot about the technology but not a lot 
about what is the product? What need is it answerhg? Why shodd it be developed? Wfiy 
should it be such a product in order to meet a need? And you can prew quickly get a 
sense of whether an entrepreneur is a technology-driven or market-driven. So, that's 
primarily how 1 do it." 
4.1.4 Absorptive capacity of the entrepreneur 
Cohen and Levinthal (1 990) defined absorptive capacity as the ability to exploit 
external knowledge as a cornpetitive advantage. This study focused on understanding the 
investors' and entrepreneurs' consideration of this important asset for technology-based 
new ventures. Therefore, the fourth question asked: 
4. Ability to assimilate knowledge that is new and external to the new venture? 
How do you measure this? 
Participants regarded this as a very important characteristic of the entrepreneur. In 
fact, one expert put it in the following words, which agrees with most of the answers to 
diis question, 'Tt's very important because if the market is shifting or cornpetitors are 
coming in they have to recognize those changes. If they have a board of directors with 
very good people that are giving input and suggesting changes to be made. they've got to 
be able to sort of learn fiom that in making the changes. You don? want people who 
think, 'This is the way we are going to do it, and I don? care what extemal factors say.' 
So, 1 thuik that's very important. Now, can you quanti@ it? No. But you c m  sort of see. 
based on the previous track record of that individual and their personality, if they are 
really stubbom or don't want to listen to input fiom others. You get a sense for it, it is 
more like an intangible but it is a very important thing." 
4.1 -5 Business plan 
The last two questions of the interview were focused on the business plan. The 
objective of the first question was to identify characteristics of what investors would 
consider an ideal business plan. The objective of the second question was to obtain some 
idea of the number of business plans that get funding after being screened and reviewed. 
What follows is a summary of features fiom an "ideal business plan" according to 
investors: 
Reasonable market andysis 
Attractive market opportunity 
Good description of the management team 
Brief and succinct document 
Good description of the cornpetitive advantages 
Realistic expectations 
From the answers provided by investors to the last question, we learned that they 
invest only in approximately 1 per cent of al1 the business plans that they receive. 
Generally, investors had received around 100 business plans during the six months prior 
to the interview. From those 100 plans, they almost immediately screened out 80 to 90 
per cent. After that, they usually invested in ody one or two. One of the major reasons 
for rejecting business plans, according to the participants of this study, is the lack of 
communication between investor and entrepreneur. 
The purpose of this initial stage was to elicit experts' vocabulaxy and fuid 
evidence of the need to cornmunicate intangibles. Some observations fiom this phase of 
the research indicated the following: 
Intangibles play an important role in the assessrnent process of new 
technology-based ventures. 
There is no curent method used by expert practitioners to assess 
intangibles in new investment opportunities. Moreover, experience, gut 
feeling, and intuition seem to be the driving forces when making decisions 
regarding intangibles. 
There is no shortage of ideas. 
There is apparently no shortage of money. 
There is a need to improve the assessrnent and communication of new 
ideas. 
A better understanding of concepts such as core competence, absorptive 
capacity and strategic intent, could provide a competitive advantage if 
included in the strategic management of new technology-based ventures. 
Expert practitioners use linguistic tems to describe charactenstics of new 
ventures. 
Generally, there is no such thing as an "ideal business plan" in the 
investors' mind. However, experts seem to consider two things to be of 
major importance when assessing new ventures: management team and 
market opportunity. 
A content analysis of the twelve interviews was done in order to summarise the 
results of this phase. Such analysis is presented in Appendix F, which includes the 
following points: 
A) A list of some intangibles mentioned by investors 
B) Current methods used by investors to assess intangibles 
C) Importance of the knowledge of the entrepreneur to investors 
D) Importance of the capability to create new products and services 
E) Importance of the ability to assimilate new knowledge 
F) Charactenstics of an ideal business plan 
Our objective at this stage was not only to obtain vocabulary but also to find 
some support to our assumptions of the importance of intangibles in technology-based 


















Support 1 No 
Question 3 
Consider ability 
to create new 
~ r o  ducts? 
Question 4 
to assimilate new 
4.2 Phase II 
4.2.1 First study 
The first shidy of this phase was focused on obtaining an idea of the "tangibility" 
of investrnent criteria. To this end, a continuation of the study started by Bachher et al 
(2000) was carried out. The study was completed in three steps. In the first step we were 
interested in identwing intangibles fiom a list of 95 critena summarised by Bachher 
(1994). The results were prornising and prompted us to look for further evidence of 
intangibles. Table 4.2 shows a list of intangible criteria, we considered a criterion to be 
clearly intangible when seven or more of the participants agreed on such categorization. 
Only eight out of 95 criteria were considered clearly intangible. Appendix C 
shows a list with the criteria that were either clearly tangible or intangibIe. 
Table 4.2 List of intangible criteria 
Decision-Making Criteria 
Characteristics of the Entrepreneur@) 
beaiistic financiai projections contained in proposal 1 0.3 1 0.7 1 




AbiIity to anticipate need for change 
AbiIity to bring about change 
0.3 
0.2 
Ability to react to changing risk t O. 1 
Market Need 




Ability to attract a viable investor group 
kvestor(s) wiIl not be expected to make subsequent investrnents 
0.2 
0.3 
Characteristics of the Investment f roposal 
Evidence of tnrthfulness in the proposal 0.2 0.8 
The possibility of a misinterpretation of the term "intangibie" motivated us to 
design a second study. This second study repeated the first and replaced the term tangible 
with objective and intangible with subjective. Again, the results indicated that only a few 
items were considered to be subjective. Only three items were regarded as both inrangible 
@y the first group of ten researchers) and subjective @y the second group). Table 4.3 
summarises a list of 15 criteria considered to be clearly subjective. Appendix D includes 
a list of al1 the criteria that were considered either cleariy objective or clearly subjective. 
Table 4.3 List of subjective criteria 
emonsmted Ieadership abiIity in the past 0 -3 1 0.7 
I 
Decision-Making Criteria 
Characteristics of the Entrepreneur(s) 
Persona1 Attributes Objective Subjective 




Ability to accept criticism 
Ability to bring about change 
Ability to react to changing risk 
Personality compatible with investor(s) 
Willingness to work and cooperate with investors 
Fnvestor(s) Requirements 




bbility to attract a viable investor group 1 0.3 1 0.7 1 
Overall Skills 
esearch and development skiffs 1 0.3 1 0.7 
Characteristics of the Venture Offering (Product or Service) 
1 1 I 1 
0 -2 
0 -3 
ash out potential (eg. going public) 0.3 0.7 
I 1 I 
0.8 
0.7 
bverall quantiiy of proposal 1 O. 1 1 0.9 1 
Familiarity with the technology of the venture 
Investor's familiarity with the market targeted by the venture O -2 0.8 
Characteristics of the Investment Proposa1 
vidence of creativity in the proposa1 1 0.2 1 0.8 
0.3 0.7 
The last step of this study consisted of administering the sarne questionnaire to ten 
more people. The objective this time was to obtain an idea of the best timing for assessing 
each criterion. That is, as a result of the previous two seps, we were interested in 
detecting a shift fiom subjective to objective in the cntena. Participants were then asked 
to indicate whether each cnterion could be assessed the first time an investor reviewed a 
business plan, or perhaps it wodd only be assessable in the fiiture. The results of this 
study showed that 5 1 criteria were considered to be assessable in the present, while only 
eight out of the 95 were considered to be assessable ody  in the future. 
The outcome of this study showed interesting resulps. For example, we learned 
that investors considered some criteria to be intangible or subjective. However, these 
results ceaainly discourage using this method as a way to identie intangibles in business 
plans. In other words, there was a need then for a technique that codd elicit fiom experts, 
both investors and entrepreneurs, what they perceive to be the concrete representations of 
the domain "intangibles in technology-based ventures ." Additionally , a technique was 
needed that could elicit from experts some of the repertory of intangibles they typically 
use to assess investment opportunities. Finally, such a technique should assist in the 
translation of this complex and tacit information into more tangible and objective criteria. 
Repertory Grid seemed to be a method that includes al1 these characteristics mentioned 
above. 
4-22 Second study: Repertory Grid 
We elicited a total of 149 constructs from the ten interviewees. Out of those. a 
total of 83 constructs were obtained fiom the five investors. Correspondingiy, the five 
entrepreneurs provided 66 constructs. The constructs were content-anafysed following a 
standard procedure proposed by Honey (1977). TabIe 4.4 summarises the content of the 
constructs classi fied in six main category heading S. 
A two-stage process was used to check the reliability of the classification scheme. 
First, we grouped similar constructs together following a common theme. Once we were 
satisfied with the classification of dl the co~structs as pertaining to common thernes, they 
were randomised, and two researchers (graduate students from the Deparûnent of 
Management Sciences) were asked to reassign the consmicts to the six original 
categories. Their respective success rates were 84 and 73 per cent. Then, we discussed 
and amended the category scheme based on the inaccurate assignments. For example, we 
renamed two of the categories to better reflect the theme of the constructs they were 
grouping. The 1 s t  step consisted of randornising and assigning the constructs to the new 
set of categories. At this stage, the constnicts were successfully reassigned in 89 and 86 
per cent of the cases by two additional researchers (graduate students fiom the 
Department of Management Sciences). 
TABLE 4.4 List of categones and number of cons?ructs fkom respondents 
Category 1 Entrepreneurs 1 Venture Capitalists 
Personality of the entrepreneur 
Background of the management team 
Skills of the management team 
L 
General attributes of the management team 
14 constmcts 
I l  comtructs 
23 constnicts 
1 
13 constructs 1 6 constructs 
l3usiness plan (business model) 
Investor-entrepreneur relationship 
Appendk E presents a list of ail the constnicts, which belong to each of the 
categories in Table 4.4. One noticeable fkding of this study is the similarity between 
investors and entrepreneurs in terms of their assessments of importance of constructs. A 





entrepreneurs regard the management skills of the founder (or management team) to be 
critical. This category includes not only the skills of the management team but also their 
core cornpetencies, abilities, and business acumen. The category thus includes constnicts 
related to the personality of the entrepreneur. Examples of these include honesty, 
integrity , passion, and business etiquette. 
t 
The results s h o w  in this study replicate some of the fmdings of Hisrich and 
Jankowicz (1990) in which management was identified as the most important category. 
Hisrich and Jankowicz (1990) provide a scientific proof of otherwise anecdotal evidence 
with regard to intangibles in investment of technology-based ventures. In our study, 
investors mentioned severai times the importance they usually place in evidence of 







1 construct I 
decisive attribute for some investors. When asked for an elaboration, one investor stated. 
"If they don? show any courtesy with us as partners, how could we expect that they will 
respect and anticipate k i r  customers' needs?" 
Once the surnmary of the general results was cornplete, we analysed each gnd 
following three separate procedures. First, we cluster-analysed the data in order to 
identi@ ways in which the individual respondents stnictured their thinking about 
investment applications. As a second test, we completed a principal component analysis 
on each grid to gain an idea of the cognitive complexity of each respondent. Then we 
calculated the rating extremity, a measure fiequently interpreted as an indication of the 
importance or "rneaningfiilness" to the subject of a given construct or element (Bonarius 
1977). 
4.2.2.1 Cluster analysis 
Using software based on the FOCUS technique (Jankowicz and Thomas, 1982, 
l983), the grids were cluster-analysed. This technique uses a nearest-neighbour distance 
metric. In other words, the algorithm depends on a two-way cluster analysis based on 
pattern recognition, grouping items (elements and constructs) by their interrelationships. 
That is, the FOCUS algorithm computes the summed differences between pairs of ratings 
in each grid, calculating first by colurnns and then by rows. A cluster-analysed grid 
(shown in Figure 4.1) repositions the most similarly rated constructs to appear side by 
side. As mentioned by Shaw (1980)' the result is a graphic representation of patterns of 
groupings of elements on constnicts and constnicts on elements. This technique provides 
a personal theory fiom each respondent employed either when making a fbnding decision 
(venture capitalist) or when presenting a funding proposal (entrepreneurs) (Hisnch and 
Jankowicz, 1990). 
Cluster analysis for venture capitalists 
Respondent 1 shows three principal clusters. That is, one subcluster associates the 
importance of having a competitive strategy with the ability to "make things happen" or 
"bias for action." A second subcluster consists of the entrepreneur's honesty, integrity 
and character in general as opposed to not havhg a "reality orientation." A third 
subcluster groups the entrepreneur's ability to assimilate new competitive information as 
well as marketing core cornpetencies. 
Figure 4.1 shows the corresponding cIuster analysis for Respondent 1. The "tree- 
diagram" at the right shows a link in the respondent's rationale. Constmcts connected 
dong neighbouring "branches" are closer together in the respondent's mind than those 
connected dong non-adjacent branches. The scaie shows the percentage sirnilarity of 
constmcts, calculated fkom the respondent's original ratings: follow any pair of adjacent 
branches to the right until they meet, then, read up from that point ont0 the scale. For 
example, there's a 95 per cent match between "honesty and integrity" and "character in 
general" in this respondent's thinking (lines in bold). Whenever he says "honesty and 
integrity" he dso says "character in general" and vice-versa. 
Leaders do no t have a vision 
Work is a 'necessary evir 
The team is not courteow 
Own interna1 people (entrepreneu~l) 
No ability t o  explain t hings in a simple way 
Asimilating new knowledge is not important 
Lacking financial core compet en oes 
No abitity t o  assmilate new market information 
Core cornpet encies for raising money 
Wnagernent is  nolated from the staff 
Lacking organizational effect iveness 
ïhe team has no corparate strategy 
Talk about it 
Ranning but no action 
No marketing core cornpetencies 
No abilay to assrnihte new cornpetit ive information 
Lacking ability to achieve goals 
The team shows dishonesty and bck of integnty 
No redit y orientation 
Lacking ability to assim ilate new knawledge 
Founders have no technical background 
lndustry background 'get it out and seIl itr 
- Leadership with vision 
Venture Capitalist 1 
Figure 4-1 Cluster Analysis from Venture Capitalist 1 
- Academic experience (but no industrial exparience) 
h x i o n  !O create wealth 
The team has buslliess 'etiquette' 
Team cone ts  o f  key extemal peopla 
Ability to make things srnple (focus Mi essentials) 
Roactivel y assimilate new knowledge 
Finanaal core cornpetencies 
Ability to assrniiate new market infornation 
Lacking core cmpetencies for raising capital 
Teamwork environrnwit across the organizat ion 
Organaatimal eff ect iveness 
Camp e t i t ~ e  corporat e st rategy 
hbke it happen 
Biasfar action 
Marketing core cornpetencies 
Ability to assmilate new corn petitive information 
Abitity to achieve Goals 
The team shows honesty and integrity 
Charade r in g ene rat 
Ability to assrnilate new knowledge 
Fou nders are well technicaltv educated 
Respondent 2 shows three highly matched (100 per cent) clusters. As shown in 
Figure 4.2, the first is a cluster grouping eight constmcts. This reflects the importance 
that this investor places on the entrepreneur's ability to "think outside the box." 
Constmcts in this cluster range from tenacity, cornmitment, innovativeness, and 
confidence, to lack of pretentiousness of the entrepreneur. A second cluster reflects the 
importance the investor places on the desire of the entrepreneur to assimilate new 
knowledge as well as the entrepreneur's openness to opinions and help. A third cluster 
includes two constmcts dealing with the entrepreneur's ability to recognise weaknesses 
and fi11 gaps in the team as well as the entrepreneur's lack of arrogance when recognising 
the need to change his position in the future. 
Venture 
Team lacks t ech nology abilit i t  es 
Lack of understanding of the technology 
Prod uct of fering has only reg ional pote nt ial 
Cop ycat 
Desire for status 
Lack of indust ry knowledge 
Fear of losing their technolog y 
Subborn personalit y 
Low t enacit y 
Mot ivat ed b y greed 
Low commitment of the entrepreneur 
Wmng assumptions about the cornpetit ion 
Limiteci entrepreneunal and business abilit ies 
Forcing entrepreneur 
Closed to  receive opin ions 
R?luctance to  find new information 
Roduct offering is a market push 
Weak at recogniring possible st rat egic alliances 
Founden are arrogant 
Founder wants to be the CE0 forever 
Narrow view 
Fou nder is a loner 
Capitalist 2 
ExcelJen t technolog y abilit ies 
Techno log y understanding 
Roduct offering has globaI patent ial 
Fou nder is innovat ive 
iack o f  pretentiousnes 'down to e a t  hg 
Ind ust ry background 
Confidence in their technology 
Think out of the box (technology) 
H g  h t enacit y 
Company is their baby 
High commitment 
Good understanding of the market - 
Originator is a visionary 
True entrepreneur 
Open to help 
k i r e  to assrnilate new knowledge 
Roduct offering is a market pull 
Abilit y to recognise strat egic al1 iances 
Fècognise weaknesses and fiIl up gaps 
Fou nde r willin g to change his position 
Think outside the box (management) 
Fou nder has t eam-b uilding abilit y 
Figure 4.2 Cluster Analysis ftom Venture Capitalist 2 
- 
Respondent 3 shows a looser structure (Figure 4.3). In other words, the different 
constructs are utilised as rather independent ways of assessing a proposai. One subcluster 
associates the ability for understanding the market opportunity with the importance of 
assimilating new market information as well as the market perceived as a "hot" market or 
as a niche. The entrepreneur's business experience and past successes are somewhat less 
closely related to other constructs and represent factors to which this investor gives 
separate and distinct consideration. 
Venture Capitalist 3 
100 90 80 70 
Fbor technical (technology ) ski1l.s - Good tecfinology çkills 
No previous success experience - Have been successful i n  the past 
No business experience - Experienœ in the business 
B o r  execution on plans - Abilit y t o  execute on plans 
Lack of communication sicilis - Abilit y t o  communicate the investment oppo rtunity 
Msperception o f  the market opportunity - Abiiity t o  understand the market opport unity 
hability t o  assimilate new market information - Abilit y t o  assrnilate new market infomiat ion 
Opportunity is not 'hot' - Market opportunity is pereeived as 'hot' 
Respondent 4 also shows a somewhat loose structure (Figure 4.4). One cluster 
associates three highly matching constmcts (96 per cent). These constmcts relate to the 
responsibility of the entrepreneur as well as to openness to listening and accountability to 
the board by way of corporate governance. 
Venture Capitalist 4 
Autocrat ic leadership 
hequitab le balance of power 
Fuor merger and acquisitions core cornpet encies 
h o t  operating procedures 
The team is not qualifie€! 
Not willing to Iisten to employees 
M y  be aware of  indwtry-trends but does not use it 
Only talk about the vision with no facts 
Team is transaction orienteci 
Mnimum communication among the tean 
Delay to accomplish milestones 
Lack of accoun t abili ty t O the board 
Not willing to listen 
Overly smplist ic 
hconsistency in management decisions 
The t eam kee p b usy w it hout a goal 
timited tradc record 
Pat ernalist ic 
100 90 80 70 
Oem ocrat ic leadership 
-
Quitable balance of power 
Core cornpetencies on merger and acquisitions 
Gaod operat ing procedures 
The team has pmfessionalism 
Founder is open t O IisIening t O emplayees 
Awaw of industry trends and exploit that information 
Live the vision 
hrtnership wit h ail stakeholders 
Atways open 10 communication 
Fesponsible 
Carparate governance 
Ability to Iisten to reason 
Walisticexpectalions 
Consstency in management decisions 
Keep the goal in mind ( focus) 
Good t r ack record 
Acquire personnel based on needs 
Figure 4.4 Cluster Analysis from Venture Capitalist 4 
There are two constnicts slightly related to this subcluster dealing with realistic 
expectations of the entrepreneur and consistency in management decisions. Qualified 
entrepreneurs with good operating procedures constitute independent aspects of this 
investor's decisions. 
Respondent 5 shows hKo tight clusters (Figure 4.9, one of which groups two 
highly matched (100 per cent) constructs related to the ability of the team to overcome 
difficult situations. These constructs are characterised by "surviving when something 
goes wrong" and having a "full team in place," where, in contrast, ventures witb an 
incomplete tearn are more vulnerable to "falling aparty' when things do not happen as 
planned. 
Venture Capitalist 5 
No corporate culture 
Doesn't have a lot of help 
When something goes wrong the company falls apart 
Not able t O make good deciso ns 
Suck i f  a problem shows up 
Can't see the whole picture 
Founder is dder ( l e s  energy ) 
Not good at improvising 
Less pnor ewerience 
Not good at dealing with mmpetition 
Company is their ' baby' 
Founderwants to be the leader forever 
No presentation skills 
100 90 80 70 60 
M 
Ccrporate culture 
Full te am in pl aat 
Ability to ovenome obstacles 
Ability to make good decisians and learn from it 
Capable of reinwnting their buSnes- modelovemight 
Wekounded management team 
Fou d e r  has a lot of e nerg y 
Good at im provising 
Etperienœ starting a business 
Know-how to differentiat e the product offering 
Their motivation in life is to 'make money' 
Founderwants the company to succeed 
Excellent presantat ion skilh 
Figure 4.5 CIuster Analysis from Venture Capitalist 5 
This investor seems to relate survival with the corporate culture of the new 
venture as well as the "tearn's ability to make good decisions and learn fiom [mistakes]," 
and the ability to "reinvent their business mode1 ovemight." A second cluster includes 
another highly matched pair of constructs. These constnicts are charactensed by the 
desire of a founder to succeed and his motivation to make money, as opposed to the 
determination of founders unwilling to relinquish the leadership of a new venture due to a 
feeling of the venture's being "their baby." This cluster includes two somewhat looser 
constructs related to the expenence and know-how of the founder. 
4.2.2.2 Cluster analysis for entrepreneurs 
Respondent 1 shows a loose structure Figure 4.6). This entrepreneur considers as 
an important factor of success the wisdom of the founder to trust the management of the 
new venture to a more qualified manager. This is the opposite of a founder who wants to 
control his venture indefinite1 y. The contrast is interesting, for the construct corresponds 




Invention or idea looking for a market 
Doesn't understand market opponunity 
Business background 
FUunder is Stubbom [knowit-all) 
Enjoy spending tirne outside t ha office 
Founden don't have track record 
Wrsonalit y-cent ric 
Founder wants to  control indefinitely 
Management team has a narrow focus 
The team is  just there for the money 
Able to comrnunicate opportunit y (2 sentences) 
100 90 80 7 0  -
Appreciat ion of ind ust ry trends (foresg ht ) 
kpetienœ in target market 
Understands market opport unit y 
Technical background 
Open t o  advioe 
f ask O rient ed f ocus 
Have been çuccessful in the p s t  
Au1 hent i o t y  of the f ounder 
Founder issue is resolved 
Fb bust and adaptable management t eam 
Passion to  acoornplish something big 
Unable to  communicate opportunit y (2 pages) 
Figure 4.6 Cluster Analysis from Entrepreneur 1 
One could argue that these constructs are part of the respondent's personal theory 
with respect to success of a new venture. In this case, he is associating this issue with two 
highly related constructs, "founder has been successful in the past" and "founder is 
genuine." Having a "robust and adaptable management team" and "passion" are two 
additional constructs that belong to this subcluster. 
Respondent 2 shows a subcluster with three constructs (Figure 4.7). One deals 
with the "health" of the investor. When asked to elaborate, the entrepreneur explained 
this in tems of "being more inmisive / being less intrusive," where an investor with 
financial difficulties would be considered more intrusive, therefore putting unnecessary 
pressure on the management team. This interesting finding would not have surfaced had 
we only considered investors in the study. It wouid seem to have important implications 
for those entrepreneurs looking for financing. 
Entrepreneur 2 
100 90 80 7 0  
Management team has a narrow focus - Well-rounded management team 
Dilut ed management team - St rong instilled management team 
D e c e a d  or weak VC health - Srong investon' health (less intrusive) 
The founder has Iimited technical dept h - Strong technical depth 
Management team uses a 'shotgun" approach - Market foms (niche detection) 
Arrogant (product arrogance) - Ability t O learn from the customer 3- 
1, Figure 4.7 Cluster Analysis fi-orn Entrepreneur 2 
The constmct dealing with "health" of the investors is associated with the strong 
teclmica1 grounding of the founder as well as a "strong instilled" management tearn. On 
the other hand, "niche detection" and the ability to l e m  fiom customers are issues that 
indicate separate cmcern. 
Respondent 3 shows one main cluster (Figure 4.8). A group of six constructs forrn 
a tight (96 per cent) subcluster. A dynarnic business plan "constantly evolving and 
changing" and good credibility are related to the ability to achieve milestones to "keep 
the money happy" as well as to have realistic expectations of "how much capital to raise" 
and "when." Moreover, the team's "ability to expand" seems to be influenced by its 
having a collaborative management team. A group of five constructs dealing mainly with 
the personality of the founder complements this cluster. Issues associated with "business 
etiquette" and "dynamic personality" as well as "genuineness" belong to this group of 
constructs. 
Entrepreneur 3 
UnreaIist ic expectations (tirnewise} 
R o r  infrastnicture (only the originator of  the idea) 
Smple straight forwatd business model 
Vertical organuational hierarch y 
The founder has poor business etiquette 
Ability to make the '2 hrs pitch' 
Çolid persnalit y 
False first impression (What a surprise!) 
Cantrol freak (micm-management) 
Management tearn has no ability to expand 
M t  able to accomplish goals i n  tirne 
ünrealist ic expect ations when raising capital 
No credibility 
Sat ic business concept and mode1 
Fbor quality of the busines plan 
Branching into new emergent markets 
Young 
No experience i n  'old emnomy' business 
Business plan wntten w th  simple uuorck 
malistic ewectations (lime-wise) 
Good i nfraçtructure in place 
Business model is hard to explain 
Flat organuational hierarchy 
The founder has good business etiquett e 
Ability ta  make the'2 min pitch' 
Dynamic peranality ( f  ounder is visionary) 
Genuinenes (first impression v s  outcome) 
Collaborat ive management tsam 
The management team has the ability to e-and 
Ability to achieve milestones 
FBaliiicexpectations when raising capital 
The fwnders have good credibili ty  
Business plan is always evobing and changing 
ûood quality of the business plan 
Çolid mperience in a relevant rnaiket sector 
Founder is malure 
Experienœ in'oid economy' type of business 
Business plan written with elaborate language 
Figure 4.8 Cluster Analysis fiom Entrepreneur 3 
Respondeot 4 shows one tight cluster (Figure 4.9). htegrity and honesty are 
highly related to his concept of "being an entrepreneur," and are also linked to a 
"potential to succeed." Similady, a management team with an ability to make "quick" 
and "good" management decisions is conçidered to be "reasonable" rather than 
"incompetent." "Education of the founders" is explained as "having professional degrees" 
and belongs to this cluster as well. "Strong technical expertise" and the "ability to 
assirnilate new knowledge" are constructs to which this participant gives diEerent 
consideration. 
I Entrepreneur 4 
St rong rnanagemen t team 
Fbtential to sucœed 
Fou nde rç are en t rep ren eurial 
Fou nde rs show int eg r i  ty and h onest y 
Strong educat ion 
Raso nable management team 
Quick decision making 
Good management decisio ns 
A bilit y t O assirnilat e new information 
SCrong t echnical expertise 
100 90 80 70 60 
Weak management t eam 
-
\ 
No potential to  succeed 
Desire t o  get rich wit hout work 
Only looking for self promotion 
m o r  educat ion 
lncompetent management team 
Slow decision making - 
Fbor management decisions 
Unable to assimilat e new information 
k o r  technical expertise 
1 Figure 4.9 Cluster Analysis fkom Entrepreneur 4 
Respondent 5 provided a total of 19 constructs (Figure 4.10) clustered in two 
main groups. An ability to communicate the founder's vision is associated with an ability 
to "think outside the box." Similarly, "being open to advice and suggestions" is linked 
not only to experience but also to proactive reaction to new information as opposed to 
operating with "a closed minci," which is closely related to the ability to "work with 
people." A second group includes constructs açsociated with "inherent passion," 
"dedication," Wear vision," and "handling a f s t  pace." Somewhat linked to this cluster 
are abilities to "fil1 in the gaps in terms of weaknesses or strengths," "be operationally 
focused," "have good drive," and "be operationally organised." Lnterestingly enough, 
team characteristics such as "being creative and innovative" as well as "being originators 
of the idea" are issues of separate concern to this entrepreneur. 
Entrepreneur 5 
Older and Iess energized 
Unable t o  communicate vision 
St ruct ured (limit ed) th inking 
Operates wit h close mind 
Fbor management experience 
Stubborn (not open to advice) 
Unab le t O work with people 
Unen t erp rising and u noriginal 
htrepreneurial background 
Not originator of the idea 
Don't have a clear vision 
New venture is just anot her job 
h o r  dedicat ion (CO mmit men t ) 
Cannot handle the Pace 
No experience i n  big companies 
Lacking abilit y to  fiIl in the gaps 
FborIy operationally foaised 
The team h as poor drive 
Team is not organized 
The tearn is  younger and energued 
Ability to communicate your vision 
Ability t o  think'outside the box' 
k a c t  s p roact ively t O new information 
Seaçon ed experien œd manage ment 
Open t O adviœ and suggestion 
Ability to  work with people 
Creat ive and innovat ive 
Technolog y background 
Orig inat or of the id ea 
Ctear vision of where the Company is going 
inherent passion ' your skin is in  the game' 
Good dedimtion 
Can han dle t h e fast Pace 
bperienœ worlang for big companies 
Abilit y t o  fiIl in the gaps (st rengt hs and weaknesses) 
Operationally focused (planning st rat egy makes sense) 
Team has good drive 
Operational ly organized 
Figure 4.1 O Cluster Analysis fiom Entrepreneur 5 
In general, these descriptions are diverse with several distinct constructs in each 
case. In other words, while investors and entrepreneurs draw on a fairly common set of 
constnicts, they associate them in different ways and form their impressions of a venture 
proposal by focusing on different aspects. 
Some constructs were represented as independent of the main clusters and are 
worthy of separate analysis. A possible explanation of this circumstance is the fact that 
some of the constmcts are unique to each venture and therefore should be assessed on an 
individual basis. In other words, one could hypothesise that when assessing a new venture 
proposal, most investors and entrepreneurs look for the presence of certain characteristics 
(the founder's experience and background, for example). At the same time, there are 
idiosyncrasies particular to each venture. The conclusion might be that, initially, investors 
are matching a venture proposal's characteristics against sornewhat standard critena. 
Mer  an evaluation of certain fundamentals, investors focus on the particulars of such a 
venture. One implication is that, in assessing a new venture, a simple verification of a list 
of criteria would probably result in unredistic understandings of its value. In other words, 
only a comprehensive assessrnent process can produce a more realistic evaluation of a 
new venture proposal. 
4.2.3 Principal component analysis 
A principal cornponent analysis provides a description of the connections between 
elements and constnicts in a grid. It reveals how a large number of individual judgements 
made by the subject in rating al1 the elements on ail the constructs are manifestations of a 
relatively more simple underlying structure. It also shows contrasts between the different 
elements (business plans, in this case). These contrasts are indicated in terms of which 
constmcts are of major importance in the subject's system. 
The principal component andy sis extracts successive c omponents-the fim being 
able to account for the most variation, the second accounting for the most residual 
variation and so on. In most grids, the fist principal component accounts for between 30 
and 50 per cent of total variance, the second for 10 to 25 per cent and subsequent 
components for diminishing proportions (Ryle, 1975). For most practical purposes, the 
fust two or three components provide an adequate picture of the subject's system (Bell, 
1990). 
Our interest in analysing principal components is to obtain an indication of the 
cognitive complexity that investors and entrepreneurs use when assessing proposals. 
Cognitive cornplexity can be summarised in terms of the differences in which subjects 
constme the same issues independentiy of each other (Adams-Webber, 1996). For 
example, a highly complex individual will take into account markedly different aspects of 
an issue when thinking about it, as opposed to viewing it in terms of the one or two 
themes dominating his thinking. As descnbed by Adams-Webber (l970), the proportion 
of total variance accounted for by the largest factor or first principal component provides 
an index of the cognitive complexity. A useful rule of  thumb in repertory grid work is to 
regard a situation in which 60 per cent or more of variance is accounted for by the first 
principal component as an indication of low cognitive complexity (Smith and Stewart 
(1 977); Smith (1  980)). 
Table 4.5 provides a summary of separate principal component analyses of each 
individual grid. The results of these analyses indicate that al1 respondents show a 
relatively low complexity with just one or two themes representing their thinking. After 
analyshg each grid, we labelled the themes corresponding to each participant. Those 
IabeIs were taken fiom the nearest two constnrcts to the frrst principal component axis. 
Table 4.6 shows a summary of these labels for the first principal components. 
TABLE 4.5 Variance accounted for by each principal component of the 10 repertory 
- -  p. 
Principal component No. 
venture caPitali$ 





Labels and correspondent themes for each participant 
(Based on nearest two constructs to principal component axis) 
Label 






Awareness of trends 
Corporate culture 
Full tearn in place 
Label 




Investor' s health 
Collaborative management 





Effective of management team 
Honesty and integrity 
Tenacity, high commitrnent. 
innovativeness 
Knowledge of market potential 
Attractive product offering 
Solid experience and background 
Keep goal in rnind 
Open to communication 
Persistent management team 
Well rounded management tearn 
Task oriented management 
Trustworthy management 
Founder has stmng technical depth 
Less intrusive venture capitalist 
Synergic management 
Alway s evolving and changing 
Desire to succeed 
Founder's integrity and honesty 
Effective management team 
Tearn has drive 
A loose constnict structure is characteristic of high cognitive complexity: an 
example of this kind of structure is shown in Figure 4.1 1. Correspondingly, Figure 4.12 
shows an example of a tight structure characteristic of low cognitive complexity. This 
figure shows most constnicts sketched together neighbouring the first (horizontal) 
principal component. A perusal of Table 4.6 shows that the preponderant themes (eom 
both investors and entrepreneurs) relate to the adequacy of the management team with the 
business proposal. Associating the two main constructs ficm each first component with 
their groups (described in Table 4.4) corroborated this result. We found that most of the 
two main constructs belong to groups two and five (personality of the entrepreneur and 
business proposa1 respectively). In this area, our results correspond to those reported by 
Hisrich and Jankowicz (1990). 
A relatively loose constnict 
Abilit y to cammunicate m a r k t  opportunity (2 sentences) Appreciat ion of indust ry trends 
M d  e s t  and s the market O ppo rt u nit y Experienœ in the target market 
Founder is open t O ad vice Don't have track record 
Management team has technical background hrsonaii iy œntric 
Taslc oriented 
Team is just there for the money 
Founder issue is resoived 
Paslon to  acmmpiish somet hing big 
hbust  and adaptable managem Enjoy spending time outside the office 
Authentiaty of the founder Business backg round 
Founders have been successful in the  past 
Invention or idea looking for a market Doesn't understand the market opportunity 
Management team uses a reactive approach ünableto communicate market opportunity (2 p q e s )  
First two principal components account for 76% of variance 
Figure 4.11 
A relatively tight construct structure 
T m  bcks tedidogy abirfiitesiatthaigh they beiieve they have 1) 
Founders recognize weaknesas and fin up gaps in the te am 
Low eommitrnenl of ths entrepreneur 
Good understanding of the market 
Weak at recognizing possible strat ic alliances 
Foundar ihinks he c m  be the foraver 
Team has excelient te chnokg y abiG t ies Fwnders a n  arrogant 
First two pnncipaI components account for 97% of variance 
Figure 4.12 
Analysis of extremity 
Several studies have defmed rating extremity as an indication of personal 
rneaningfûlness (Shepherd, 1999). For example, Bonarius (1970) has shown that subjects 
rate their close associates (e.g., my best fnend) more extremely than remote 
acquaintances (e.g., my doctor). Also, there is considerable evidence, reviewed by 
Adams-Webber (1 979), that subjects tend to rate themselves and others more extremely 
on elicited constmcts than on suppfied ones. Moreover, as discussed by Adams-Webber 
and Benjafield (1973), rating extremity also corretates with persona1 judgements of the 
relative meaningfulness of supplied constmcts. It has been agreed that the higher the 
extremiw score, the more meanina l  the statement is for the respondent. In other words, 
an extremity score indicates how far a respondent rated the elements h m  the midpoint of 
a scale. Rating extremity is then calculated by subtracting the midpoint of a scale from 
each assigned rating. In our case we used a scale of 1 to 5 with a midpoint of 3. For 
example, a rating of 1 on a scale from 1 to 5 would have an extremity score of Il - 31 = 2. 
The resulting extremity scores for each element (business plans in our study) are added 
up and divided by the number of plans rated (in this study, there were six). 
1 Venture Capitalists 
' Table 4.7 Summary of the two higher extremity scores for each participant and the 












Character in general 
























Experience in "old economy" 
Collaborative management 
tearn 
Founders are entrepreneurid 
Integrity and honesty 
Thinking "out of the boxy' 
Industxy background 
High tenacity 
"Down to earth" 
Not motivated by greed 
Innovative founder 
High cornmitment 
Ability to execute on pians 
Successfid in the past 
Founder has realistic 
expectations 
Merger and acquisitions core 
cornpetencies 
Know-how to differentiate 
product offering 
Excellent ~resentation skills 
J 
J 
Invention or idea looking for 
a market 
Founder has been successful 
in the past 
Strong technical depth 
Less intrusive investor 



























Table 4.7 provides a surnmary of the two higher extremity scores for each 
participant. The 1 s t  column shows a checkmark (J ) indicating those consû-ucts that not 
only have the most extreme values but also correspond to the top two highest weights 
fkom the principal component. These constnicts contribute two characteristics. First, they 
are meaningfd to the participant. Second, by knowing their loading, we can predict the 
participant's ratings with great accuracy (please refer to Table 4.5 to confirm the variance 
accounted for by the first component of each grid). 
Using the previous results, an analysis of the overall correlation between the 
extremity scores and the f rs t  component loadings was calculated. The results of this 
analysis show a statistically significant overall correlation of ,662 @<O). This is an 
interesting finding with general implications for grid structure (Adams-Webber, 1979). In 
other woïds, the evidence considered above lends support to Bannister's (1 962) general 
assumption that the degree of statisticd association between constnicts in repertory grid 
data primarily refiects the level of integration of experts' conceptual structures. 
J 5 
4.3 Phase III 
J Indicates a constnict that is within the two largest weights in the principal component 
During this phase, a fuay concept demonstration system was validated in fiont of 
experts. The objective of such system was to pre-test our Fuzzy Expert System (FES) by 






having a panel of experts, five venture capitalists in this case, evaluating the system 
performance. Based on their feedback, the mode1 will be refined prior to full validation in 
the future. 
The experirnentai design for the system validation was based on a modified 
Turing test (Turban, 1988). In this case, each expert was asked to assess some intangibles 





The participants in this study were experts in the area of investment decision- 
making in early-stage technology-based ventures. The group consisted in five Canadian 
venture capitalists. The sample was identified fkom the curent network at the Institute for 
Innovation Research. Al1 five venture capitalists were contacted in order to validate the 
FES, Each investor was asked to recall a recent investment (not older than six months). 
Some investors preferred to recall an investment o p p o d t y  that they had accepted, 
while some other preferred to assess a venture in which they had already invested some 
capital. That is, by using the expert system to review the characteristics of such 
investment o p p o d t i e s ,  investors were interested in validating what they had aheady 
decided. In other words, the objective of the exercise was to corroborate the outputs of 
the system with their own answers. 
A laptop cornputer with a MS Power Point presentation guided the expert through 
the different levels of assessment. Figure 4.13 shows an exarnple of one of these levels: 
expenence of the management team. The system includes a total of 52 flny variables 
organised in sets of no more than four variables. For example, an assessment of the 
energy of the management team consists on the following f u z q  variables: passion, 
tenacity, innovative skills and cornmitment (see Table 4.8 and Figure 4.13). It is worth 
mentioning that each of these fuPy variables c m  be specified using at least three funy 
qualifiers. For example, experts were asked to evaiuate the experience of the management 
tearn in the target market by spec@ing whether it was limited, somewhat limited, 
medium, somewhat broad, or broad. 
Once the expert had assessed a fuPy variable, the author would input the result 
into the fuvy expert system (designed using Matlab) running in the background. Both the 
investor and the system provided an output. The expert was asked then if there was 
agreement between his answer and the one provided by the system. When the expert 
disagreed with the output provided by the system, w e  considered only his answer in 
further assessments. Such disagreements were noted down and discussed at the end of the 
session with the expert. Most of the tirne, we concluded that the explmation of the 
disagreement was due to a particular characteristic of such investment. Consequently, 
some investors suggested that the final system should have the flexibility of modieing an 
answer provided by the expert system at any tirne. Once the four main areas were 
completed, the system provided an overall assessment of such investment oppominity. 
An important step in the development of a fÛizy expert system is the design of its 
d e s .  The rules in a funy system are a representation of the knowledge elicited from 
experts- In other words, the rules in a fuay system indicate what to do in certain 
situations. For example, Iet's consider the portion of FAM illustrated in bold letters in 
Table 4.8, this is a fuzzy associative mernory that attempts to assess the energy of the 
entrepreneur, an example of one of its d e s  is (see Appendix G for an example of 
representative d e s ) :  
IF Passion is low AND Tenacity is somewhat low AND Innovative Skills are 
weak AND Cornmitment is low THEN Energy is low. 
Table 4.8 shows the stnictural design of the fuzzy expert system (FES). It aIso 
indicates the 52 fuzzy variables as part of the accumulated knowledge from different 
phases of the research. A d indicates that such variable was elicited during the 
corresponding phase. For the particular case of Phase II, the table shows the type of 
analysis fiom which such variable was elicited: Cluster Analysis (CA), Principal 
Component Anaiysis (PCA) or Extremity Anaiysis (EA). The column "Expert" indicates 
when the knowledge was elicited fiom an entrepreneur (E) or fkom an investor (1). The 
colurnn FAM shows the label that characterizes the corresponding Fuzzy Associative 
Memory for those variables. The column "From Content Analysis" shows the four main 
areas of intangibles assessed with the FES, these areas were elicited during the content 
analysis shown in Table 4.4. The last colurnn shows the "Overall. Opportuniq" as the 
final output of the FES. Note that the output of each group of four fuuy variables 
becomes the input to its corresponding FAM, then, the outputs of the FAMs become the 
input to each of the four main areas; hal ly ,  the output of the four main areas become the 
inputs for the "Overall Opportunity." Take for example the fuvy variables shown in bold 
letiers. Once these variables have been assessed, the FES creates an output for each of 
them, such output becomes the 'HiPym assessment of the FAM: "Energy of the 
management tearn." Then, once this va.riable together with "Ethical Qualifications." 
"Respectfilness," and "Opemess" have been assessed, they become the input to one of 
the four main areas: ccPersonality." Next, once "Personality" has been assessed together 
with "Background," "Management S kills," and "hvestment Oppomuiity" the y become 
the input for the last FAM: "Overd1 Opportunity," which provides an overall assessment 
of the intangibles of the investment opportunity. 
I 1 
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Table 4.8 (Continuation) 
Assimilate new market info. l' q 
Assimilate cornpetitive info. d 
Ability to leam fiom the I d (  1 
customer I I I 
Ability to recognize weaknesses 4 4 
Decision makincl .\I .\I d 
Management decisions .\( 4 
Planning decisions 4 d 
Ability to act 1 1 4 1  
Financial core competencies d 
Marketing core comaetencies 1 d 
V 1 
Organizational e ffectiveness d 7- 
Core comp. for raising capital .\I 
Attitude with investors 4 .\( 
Entrepreneur d 4 
Ane of the team 4 .\I - I 1 . I  
Attitude against obstacles I I . \ ( I q  
Communicates vision of 
Communicates investment 
opportuni ty 




Potential of product offering 1.11 
Perceived market opportunity d 
Business plan document 4 4 .\I 












O Smiewhat weak 
O Medium 
O Samwhat stmng 
O Strong 
Figure 4.13 Assessrnent of energy of the management team. 
At the end of the session, each expert was asked to fill-out a small questionnaire 
once the assessrnent of the new venture was completed. The results of the survey are 
reported on Table 4.9, it included a 7-point Likert Scale used for gathering responses on 
22 questions about the method. For example, on the Likert Scale "1" represented 
"Disagree" and "7" represented "Agree." Respondents were also given the option of 
selecting "N/A'" implying the specific investment criteria were not applicable to the new 
venture. 
Table 4.9 Summary of results for validation of FES 









The four major areas identified in the methodology are important for 
assessing some of the intangibles that these ventures have. 
In terms of assessing the expcrience of the entrepreneur the proposed 
methodology is complete. 
4 
5 
In terms of assessing the professional qualifications of the entrepreneur 
the proposed methodology is complete. 
terms of assessing the ethicd quafifications of the entrepreneur the 
oposed methodolow is complete. 
6.20 . 
5-00 
In terms of assessing the background of the entrepreneur the proposed 
methodolop is cornpiete. 
ln terms of assessing the energy of the entrepreneur the pmposed 













In t e m  of assessing the respectfulness of the entrepreneur the 
proposed methodology is complete. 
In tems of assessing the openness of the entrepreneur the proposed 
rnethodology is complete. 
In tems of assessing the personality of the entrepreneur the proposed 





In tems of assessing the strategy skills of the entrepreneur the 







In terms of assessing the absorptive capacity of the entrepreneur the 
proposed methodology is complete. 
In rems of assessing the decision-making skills of the entrepreneur the 









In terms of assessing the cote competencies of the entrepreneur the 
proposed rnethodology is complete. 
In tems of assessing the management skills of the entrepreneur the 
proposed methodology is complete. 





In tems of assessing the communication of the opporninity by the 
entrepreneur the proposed methodology is cornpiete. 
In terms of assessing the quaiity of the business pian the proposed 
rnethodology is complete. 
In terms of assessing the investment opportunity the proposed 
methodology is complete. 
In terms of assessing the overall opportunity the proposed 

















20 h e  waies used with each concept are appropriate. 1 5.60 1 1.14 
1 
The results of this face validation stage show that experts generally agreed with the 
output provided by the system. One of the limitations of this validation phase was the 
availability of  investors to assess more than one technology-based venture. In other 
words, each session took about 45 minutes in order to assess ody one investrnent 
opportunity. However, the resuits shown in Table 4.8 indicate that experts consider t h i s  
tool as useful when assessing technology-based ventures. 
e pmposed methodology would provide a useful assessrnent tool 
en cornidering these ventures- 
The pmposed methodoIogy would be usefiil tool only after significant 





"If A equals success, then the formula is A equals X plus Y plus 2. X is work. Y is play. Z is 
keep your mouth shut." 
Albert Einstein (Recalled on his death 18 A p d  1955) 
Chapter 5 
Conclusions and remarks 
Most of the evidence available today, docurnenting successful uivestments made 
by venture capitdists in technology-based new ventures, is mecdotal. The news media 
and business publications fiequently publicise individual expenences shared by 
entrepreneurs. Such stories may create an unrealistic expectation in terms of the 
availability of large amounts of venture capital, the relative ease to raise capital, and 
en~epreneurship as a ticket to success. However, the reality is that entrepreneurs often 
have difficulty raising capital. For example, venture capitalists daim that there are very 
few deals in which they wish to invest; there is limited amount of capital available for 
new ventures at early stages; and there are more failures than successes of 
technoiogy-based new ventures. Perhaps an explanation of this phenornenon is the 
intangible nature of most of such investrnent opportunities. This study offers an empirical 
first look at the assessment of intangibles in technology-based new ventures. 
The results of this study not only provide evidence of the effectiveness of using 
repertory grids to elicit intangibles but also increase our knowledge of the venture capital 
decision process. A new and innovative approach was used by considering two 
perspectives-the investor's and the entrepreneur's-on this decision-making problem. 
Thus, a new appreciation was gained of the elements in a subjective evaluation of early 
stage technology-based ventures, 
Furthemore, the outcome of the FOCUS based cluster analysis provides 
additionai evidencr of individual differences among venture capitalists with respect to 
their cognitive complexity in terms of their evaluations of entrepreneurs, which 
supplements that derived fiom the principal component analysis. Moreover, while 
investors and entrepreneurs draw on a fairly large set of constructs, they associate them in 
different ways and form their impressions of a venture proposai by focusing on a variev 
of aspects. This is a result of major significance. In other words, it very effectiveiy 
illustrates the fundamental importance of persondly consmcted knowledge in the 
development of high-level expertise. 
AR analysis of the constructs fkom each group reveals that both place high 
importance on the perceived qudifications of the management team. This category 
considers not only the skills of the management team but also their core cornpetencies, 
abilities, and business acurnen. Constmcts related to the personality of the 
entrepreneur-honesty, integrity, passion, and business etiquette, for example-are also 
hcluded. 
Some of the results replicate the findings of Hisrich and Jankowicz (1 990) in 
which management was regarded as the most important category. Furthemore, this rather 
new technique provided a systematic assessrnent of otherwise anecdotai evidence with 
regard to intangibles in investment of technology-based ventures. For example, the 
investors' fiequent mention of honesty confirms how important this intangible is; in the 
same way, "good business etiquette" seemed to be a decisive factor for some investors. 
The fmdings of this study are not fully consistent with research by Hafl and Hofer 
(1993). Their main point was that venture capitalists are not concerned with the 
assessment of human capital when screening new investment proposals. Perhaps their 
frndings were due to the design of their study, which determined only the earliest phase 
of deal screening. This is where venture capitalists are sifting through hundreds of 
proposals by target company managers. One possible assessment method used by 
investors at this time is to screen opportuities by comparing the new proposal's 
characteristics against general working guidelines, such as area of investment, geographic 
location, and stage of the venture. By the t h e  the investors move to the in-depth due 
diligence research phase, it is very clear fiom the results of this dissertation that venture 
capitalists are concerned with an effective assessment of some of the intangibles involved 
in the proposal. 
Another interesting fmding of this study, although mentioned only once by an 
entrepreneur, is the construct related to the "health of the venture capitalist." This is 
worth mentioning since this study, unlike others, includes a consideration of the point of 
view of the entrepreneur. A M e r  investigation of this constnict detailed how a 
"healthy" investor is one without financial troubles. According to this entrepreneur, a 
venture capitalist mgg l ing  with fmancial difficulties is "more intrusive" and puts 
Liunne~e~~ary pressure" on the management team. 
These findings cause us to reconsider o u  earlier efforts to locate a set of filly 
generalised "intangibles." We understand better the contextuai idiosyncratic and dynamic 
nature of these important attributes. 
The results of the third phase of this study show that fuzzy set theory provides a 
c'natural'y fiarnework for the expert assessment of intangibles. Perhaps, this is due to the 
linguistic approach used by experts when assessing investment opporhuiities. The 
experts' use of fuPy terrns was evident dong the different phases of this research. It was 
clear that when assessing technology-based new ventures there are usually no "black and 
white" but mostly "grey zones." This was even more apparent when assessing 
intangibles. For example, when asked to describe an "ideal" business plan during the first 
phase of this dissertation, both investors and entrepreneurs almost always used fuvy 
terms, such as "good", "complete", or "attractive." 
A remarkable contribution of this study is the iink between Repertory Grid, an 
elicitation technique capable of detecting some of the intangibles used by experts, and 
fuzzy set theory, providing a suitable structure for the communication and assessment of 
such intangibles. Some studies have suggested the association of these two techniques 
(Hwang, 1999; Gaines and Shaw, 1980). However, this is the fust study focused on 
applying both techniques to the assessrnent and communication of intangibles in business 
plans of technology-based new ventures. 
"Knowledge-based cornpanies represent this country's best chance to create high-wage jobs, build 
exports and add wealth. .. yet they often have difficulty getting funding because their assets are 
intangible, consisting of people's ideas and innovations" 
Holger Kluge, CIBC President, 1995. 
Chapter 6 
Future research 
Future studies could make a contribution by focushg on early stages of new 
technology-based venwes at various points. In other words, a longitudinal study could 
provide evidence of the dynamisrn as well as the idiosyncratic characteristics of a new 
venture- Technology-based ventures not only experience constant change but also need to 
adjust to this change in order to survive. This situation is even more critical for new 
ventures. Therefore, having a List of cntena to appraise the value of these ventures at only 
one point in t h e  would probably result in an unredistic assessment. Thus our results 
show that an on-going assessment process is probably more appropriate than a one-time 
assessment. We need, then, a method to assess a new venture over different points in 
thne. 
Our investigation suggests that a Longitudinal study should consist of eliciting 
impressions and significance of a new venture fiom a group of entrepreneurs, incubators 
and venture capitalists at three points. The first occurs when an idea is initially presented 
to an investor and curiosity is piqued. The second cornes when the enwepreneur presents 
the idea in the form of a business plan to an incubator. The tbird takes place when the 
new venture is ready for its first round of financing, usually fiom a venture capitalist. A 
longitudinal study wodd allow us to consider three angles of the same problem 1) the 
ideas, which usually come fiorn an entrepreneur, 2) the management, which is usually 
provided by incubators, and 3) the capital, which usudly cornes fiom a venture capitalist. 
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Glossary 
Adaptive fuzzy system A fuvy system that learns its d e s  fkom data. A human expert 
does not tell the system what rules are. A Stream of data feeds 
into a neural or st&istical system and out corne the fiiw d e s .  
An adaptive fuPy system acts as a human expert. It l e m s  from 









Fuzzy cognitive map 
A system that stores data in parallel and searches for data or 
"recalIsn data based on some feature of the data. See also fuzzy 
associative memory (Kosko, 1 992). 
A name for a fuzzy set within a complete system of many f u z q  
sets. 
The range of system input or output values over which the fuPy 
set is mapped. 
A search tree in artificial intelligence. An expert gives 
knowledge as if-then niles and a programmer codes these in 
software. Expert systems consist typically of bvo pieces: the 
knowledge and the inference engine. The knowledge base is just 
the tree or trees of bivalent rules. Fuvy  systems are a type of 
expert system since they too store knowledge as rules - but as 
fuzzy rules. Expert systems work with black-white logic and 
symbols (Kosko, 1993). 
Fuzzy Applied Control Technology. This is the trade name of 
the control program used in this system. 
Fuzzy Associative Memory. This is an array of singleton output 
values representing all combinations of inputs. 
The process of decomposing a system input a d o r  output into 
one or more qualitative groupings called fuvy sets. 
(FCM) A fursr causal picture of the world. A FCM has concept 
nodes and causal edges. The concept nodes are fuvy sets. Each 
event belongs to or excites a concept node to some degree (most 
to zero degree). In the simplest case a concept node is just on or 
off and it acts as a threshold switch. If enough causal juice flows 
into it, it turns on. Else, it tums off or stays off. In general a 
concept node "fies" or activates to some degree. 
Fuzzy logic 
F q  set 
When a concept node fires, it ernits a type of causal juice, which 
flows to the other edge. The edge or arrow is a fuzzy mle 
between fiizzy sets. The edge is fuzzy because it can permit a 
small or large or other amount of causai juice to flow through it. 
The edge acts as a pipe of variable diameter through which the 
causal juice flows. A FCM edge can learn causal patterns by 
changing its effective pipe size as a function of how much 
causal juice flows through it or at what rate. 
In practice an expert draws a FCM or a group of experts draws 
several FCMs. You c m  always combine any number of FCMs 
into one FCM. The final FCM graph of nodes and hedges and 
edges defines a non-linear dynamical system that acts much as a 
neural network acts. Engineers have applied FCMs to plant 
control, medical modelling, circuit analysis, and an array of 
social and political modelling (Kosko, 1992). 
Has two meanings. The fust meaning is multivalued or "vague" 
logic. Everything is a matter of degree including truth and set 
membership. This dates back to the turn of the century. The 
second meaning is reasoning with fuzy sets or with set of fuuy 
rules. This dates back to the fist work on firzzy sets in the 1960s 
and 1970s by Lofti Zadeh at the University of California at 
Berkely. Zadeh chose the adjective "fuzzy" over the traditional 
adjective "vague." 
A conditional of the form IF X is A, THEN Y is B. A and B are 
fuzzy sets: "IF the room air is COOL, THEN set the motor 
speed to SLOW". In math terms a rule is a relation between 
fûzq  d e s .  Each rule defines a fûzzy patch (the product A X B) 
in the system "state space" - the set of al1 possible combinations 
of inputs and outputs. The wider the fuzzy sets A and B, the 
wider and more uncertain the fuzzy patch. More certain 
knowledge leads to smalter patches or more precise rules. Fuzzy 
rules are the knowledge building blocks in a fuzzy system. 
A defined range of measured or calcuiated values. For example, 
a 'positive largey' fuuy set may range fiom 4 inches to 5 inches 
and a "positive medium" fuzzy set may range fiorn 3.5 inches to 
4.5 inches. Each f u u y  set consists of 3 parts: domain, 
membership fùnction, and degree of membership. 
Fuzq system A set of fuzzy mles that converts inputs to outputs. In the 
simplest case an expert states the rules in words or symbols. 
Each input to the fwzy system fires al1 the rules to sorne degree 
as in a massive associative rnemory. The closer the input 
matches the if-part of a fuay nile, the more the then-part fires. 
The fuzzy system ads up al1 these output or then-part fuzzy sets 
and takes their advantage or centroid vaIue. The centroid is the 
output of the firpv system. 
Degree of membership Degree to which a value belongs to a fuzs. set. For example. a 
level measurement may be 40 per cent positive large and 20 per 








Indicates that the criterion can be assessed based on information 
that may be available in the future. 
Implies an aspect of a venture that can NOT be readily 
perceived, or is NOT capable of being appraised at an actual or 
approximate value. 
Curve used in a fuzzy set, triangles in this case, which maps a 
system input or output value to a degree of membership value. 
Implies aspects of ventures that are NOT influenced by persona1 
feelings, attitudes, opinions or beliefs and are thereby unbiased. 
Indicates that the criterion can be assessed on information 
currently available. 
Implies aspects of ventures that are influenced by personal 
feelings, attitudes, opinions or beliefs and are thereby biased. 
Irnplies an aspect of a venture that can be readily perceived, or is 
capable of being appnsed at an actual or approximate value. 
Appendix A 
Introduction to fuzzy set theory 
One way to understand what is fuzzy set theory (or fuzzy logic) is to compare it to 
probability. Consider whether the following questions make sense: "what is the 
probability that a person is competent in a particular field, that he is tall, that a glass is 
fidl or empty or that a car is bzvelling fast?" Although some of the variables in the 
questions can be clearly determined by referring to relevant standard measurements of 
these qualities (e.g. feet, miles per hour etc.) answering the questions requires a deeper 
understanding of the concept of probability. 
If we answer these questions fkom the probability perspective, we first divide 
arbitrarily the probability distribution for each variable reflected in the questions into 
named segments (Cox, 1994). For example, with respect to competence, we may identify 
three sections in the probability distribution: poor, for the lefi-hand side of the 
distribution; medium, for the centre of the distribution; and bright, for the right side of the 
distribution. However, this distribution wili not allow us to answer the questions "what is 
the probability that Maria is competent?" The reason behind this is that the probability 
tells us something about populations, not individual instances. Once we have and 
individual instance, such as Maria, probability evaporates. Probability describes the 
chances that Maria is competent before she is selected fiom the population. Once she is 
selected, the probability is gone. Furthermore, as discussed by Cox (1 994), probability is 
an uncertainty associated with tirne. Once a predicted event &es place, probability 
disappears. Cox (1 994) illustrates this point with the following example "there is a 50 per 
cent chance of rain tomorrow." If we wait until tomorrow, it may rain or it may not. 
Subsequently the uncertainty associated with probability disappears. In addition, 
probability is incapable of capturing any ambiguity or vagueness about the event. In the 
rain example, there still remains some ambiguity about whether the rain is a mist, light, 
moderate or heavy. These are fuuy uncertainties, which c m  be dealt with fuPy logic. 
Fuay  logic can deal with the characteristics and properties of individual cases. 
If we analyse any concept, for example speed, height or competence, it is usually 
clear to notice that it consists of a number of sub-states that range fkom a clear non- 
existence of a charactenstic to a clear existence of the characteristic. Throughout the 
continuum it may be identified various semantic labels that represent various areas of the 
continuum- For the case of the concept of competence, for exarnple the semantic Iabels 
that describe it couid be very incompetent, moderately incompetent, more or less 
competent, moderately competent and very competent. In general, there are areas of 
ambiguity and therefore overlap between the various semantic labels as shown in Figure 
B 1. As discussed by Zadeh (1 965), these overlaps occur naturally and they reflect 
flexibility in the language. 
Figure B 1. Semantic ambiguities between levels of cornpetence 
One of the main strengths of fuzy Iogic is that it allows the semantic partitions to 
overlap as shown above. This is a significant improvement on traditional probability, 
which identifies a group as either having or not having a particular chamctenstic. 
As noted by Zadeh (1965), fuzziness is a rneasure of how well a value conforms 
to a semantic ideal. Hence if a list of criteria for measuring cornpetence in a particular 
area is agreed, fuzzlliess becomes the measure of how well a particular value associated 
with these criteria reflects a semantic ideal, for example very competent. 
Sumrnarising the previous paragraphs, in set theory, also called crisp as opposed 
tofuzzy, an element either belongs to a set or not. On the other hand, in fuzzy set theory, 
the membership of elements in a set is not in the form of yes or no. That is, an entity may 
have a membership ranging fÎom 1 for complete set membership to O for complete set 
non-mernbership. Moreover, the elements have membership values that show the strength 
of their membership in a set. 
This leads to another important aspect of fwzy set theory, specifically the concept 
of membership fiinctions. In order to illustrate this concept, consider for example Figure 
B2. Suppose we ask a group of experts to provide different categories for the concept of 
rivalry as one of the characteristics to be assessed from a business plan. The answers 
could range fiorn "none" to "high." Such categonsation could be based on the H Nidex*, 
defmed by Hirschman (1 975) and Herfindahl(1950) to measure the market share of an 
industry. In other words, an H index of 1 indicates "none" rivalry whereas an H index of O 
(or close to zero) indicates "high" rivalry. 
high none 




Thus if we consider a Company with an Hindex of 0.5, we will find that it has a 
degree of membership of [0.2] which means that it has a low level of compatibility with 
the label "high" and also a low level of compatibility with the label "none." In probability 
theory the company has either "high" or "none" rivdry and we are not completely sure 
whether it is "high" or "low." Also in probability theory, if the probability (or chance) 
that a company 'A' has "high" nvairy is 20 per cent then the probability that it has not 
"none" nvalry m u t  be 80 per cent. 
In fuzzy logic the rnembership degree defines to what extent the company is 
considered to have "high" or "none" rivalry and the related membership does not have to 
total 1 (Turban, 1992). 
As shown in Figure B2, we considered only two categories to detemine the 
boundaries of rivahy. Thus, it can be argued that we should consider more categoncal 
labels in order to improve the perception of rivalry. However, while defining categorical 
variables may improve the problem analysis, the identification problem at the set 
boundary remains. This approach c m  be extended to a fiizzy set approach by defining 
each of the posed categoncal variables as firpy variables. This leads to another important 
aspect of fuuy set theory, specifically the concept of "multi-valued logic." Using multi- 
valued logic permits a proposition to have varying degrees of tmth associated to it, while 
approxùnate reasoning, also commonly referred ta as " f k z y  logic," utilises these true 
levels in the reasoning process. 
Exnemely high high moderate low none 
Concentration ratio 
Figure B3. Linguistic qualifiers for "rivaIryW 
This example also highlights another important feature of fuzzy set theory, its 
ability to deal with linguistic variables. Linguistic variables correspond to the qualitative 
levels of a variable, and are combined according to the mles and operators of fuzzy set 
theory, resulting in linguistic logic. In this case ccrivairy" may be thought as a linguistic 
variabIe, with the descriptors: extremely high, high, moderate, low, and none (Figure B3). 
Referred to as linguistic qualifiers, describing different qualitative levels of the object 
rivalry . 
Appendix B 
Interview # 1 
1. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you 
consider any intangible aspects when assessing the business plan? 
1 check first if there is a market potentid or is it a growing market? A big market? is it a 
replacement?, Do 1 have detailed research? Or is it more intuitive? Kind of feeiing.. . and 
1 also look at.. . is it a crowded market? And again that is a little bit intuitive, so 1 would 
cal1 this intangible because it is hard to measure that.. . at the f i s t  cut.. . 
Could you give some examples? 
Well, that's the starting point, 1 think that as you go through the evduation stage the other 
intangibles are: C m  management do it? Have they done it before? They rnay have done it 
before, can they do it in a new venture? In case they are going to follow fiom a big 
company in the past can the entrepreneur do that? Can they do that transition 5om a big 
Company to a small Company? If you got to entrepreneur can you go beyond the volume 
thing that probably a technical penon c m  do so as the marketing person?, who are you 
brùiging out for help? They al1 Say they will and push concepts a little bit. However. 
when you have to replace them as president they are not going to like that. 
Do you have a way for rneasuring it? 
No, but, I still believe that a good part of investing is a personal thing, and 1 could give 
the same proposal to two different people and get two different answers of whether they 
should invest or not, 
2. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you 
consider the knowledge of the entrepreneur to be an important aspect of the business 
proposal? 
It depends on the stage of the company, 1 mean if it's just a one or two-persons-company 
the answer is yes, now if it's a little bit later-stage when they've got a product corning out 
the market it becomes less an important a factor, and that you know, when you are 
thinking about whether you bring key managers we are trying to identie: 1s that a key 
man? Or, If he dies? Will the company continue? Or not? And that is an intangible.. . 
Do you consider the capacity of the entrepreneur (or the team) to create new knowledge 
(personal knowledge) as an important aspect of a business proposal? 
No, 1 mean, because that is kind of a given. So, is not something I assess. If they are 
entrepreneurs they are going to corne out with new ideas or corning with something to be 
involved all that value is a great new stuff. They have al1 the spin-off opportmities of a 
given technology, yet, I lîke that more of the technology than the entrepreneur. 
3. M e n  making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, how do you 
consider in a business proposal the capabilities of the entrepreneur that will allow him 
or her to create new products or services? 
To a meeting we îry to compare with past experiences that we have had with other 
entrepreneurs, reference checks, md then again 1 am going back to you got to be building 
a team so hopefully you c m  reduce some of over-reliance on a single division quickly. 
Then get to a team approach, and then you look at spin-off opportmities: How is the 
technology as oppose? And whether an individual con do it or not. 
Do you look for these issues in the business plan? 
In a business plan, 1 look for market analysis, and positioning of the product, anything 
after thzt, 1 sort it out face to face, meet with the management, discuss his ideas, get it the 
off board, 1 do my own independent research, 1 do my own fmancial projections. But, 
business plans, they're just there to start my interest in a product in a market place and it 
gives me some insight into an implementation strategy so that 1 corne in and work with 
the company to redefine that in an appropriate manner. 
4. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you 
consider in a business proposal the ability of the entrepreneur to assimilate new 
extemal to the venture knowledge? 
Yes, knowledge and people, he has to be willing to take in new ideas from another people 
around them as well as bring them to people. 
How do you measure this? 
Sometimes in some cases 1 like to Say al1 right: "You c m  be president, you are going to 
be Chief Science Officer" and E see what his reaction is. Often bring in a consultant to 
review the ideas and the consultant has some negative aspects and see how the 
entrepreneur reacts to it. 
Do you look for these issues in the business plan? 
No, again this goes back to the issue of is there a spin-off potential for the technology as 
oppose to business plan that tell you that an entrepreneur has some exciting ideas and 
that's seen face to face, 
When you Say spin-off of the technology, are you implying the ability for the technology 
to take the product to different industries? 
Different industries and different markets. There is nothing worse than one product 
company in one minor market because that doesn't get nothing analyzed. So, you are 
more interested in a.. . ideally in a platform technology you can take up vertical markets 
one at a time or maybe the markets are big enough that you cm. .  . you only have to take 
little pieces of various markets to be successful or are there other opportunities in case 
one fails. 
Technology can always be made to what.. . invest on it whether or not the market wiil 
accept it, if one worked maybe the other one won't.. . 
Do you consider the "core cornpetence" as part of the business plan? 
Not in a formal manner, I don't have a list of core competencies that 1 look for, 1 try to 
look for "Have they done it before?" if6'yes" that is good, if "no" What reason they 
believe that they can do it this time? If "no" what reason do they believe that I can bring a 
new president for the new company? Now chances are that 1 will personalize. 
What is your ideal business plan? Enough for you to be interested and take the plan into 
the due diligence process? 
A Reasonable market analysis as a connotation? So that, although they feel that is a 
growing market that is not served well.. . that it could be serve better with this "addition" 
product. Number one. Number two, that it's a. .. that it's a "crowded" market but that is a 
market that people is starting to pay attention to; and number two see people's resumes 
and O ther details . . . 
So, if a plan has amount of information, that will be enough to proceed to the next stage? 
Yea, telling me how this technology works is a waist of my t h e ,  1 don't care how it 
works, 1 care of the benefits if you like, 1 care about whether the market wants somethrng 
like that. 
And the ideal Iength of a plan probably varies. But, in your opinion what is your target? 
Length is not an issue to me, but, I mean.. . I flip through it 1 look at dl the sections that 1 
want to, ahhh.. . so length is not an issue to me. Big plans don't scare me, smaller plans 
don't scare me. 
But missing information, scares you? 
Yes, 1 mean, the focus is the information. But if the focus of a plan is on the details of the 
technologies, that is waisted on me. 1 am a generalist, 1 am looking more for the benefits 
of the plan. It may be different fiom another individual. I've had other individuals who 
write more technically, who happened to be recent graduates or think like that, they're 
coming out of an industry with a technical capacity, so 1 look at the team. So, fiom my 
case 1 get excited about the market and they get excited about the technology. They're 
still thinking, though, in market in terms of fast and growing penetration. 
1 wonder, though, the challenging mut be when you don? have a way of knowing the 
market. For example with a state-of-the-art-new-product. How can you tell about the 
market? 
1 probably can't and my preference is that if there is interest in a Company that hasn't 
done a sample that has express some interest fiom a.. . what 1 am going to cal1 a strategic 
partner, someone who really knows the industry, it is often really nice to see a corporate 
venture capitalist groups who are Zooking at a Company as a competence level. It is also 
competence down the road but more than anything else is.. . Newbridge "core" programs 
is a good example, Newbridge has this program to focus in a technology trend or a 
market trend. 1 think that generally speaking if you know the trends in markets and if you 
are in a seed Investing working with Universities you are probably more technicdly 
confident than in a data-based-later-stage-investingg So that maybe the guys who see 
these investrnents are a Iittle more tuned with the technology and cm respond to some of 
the market issues 
Interview # 2 
When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you 
consider any intangible aspects when assessing the business plan? 
Primarily intangible assets, and by intangible assets is its people and their historical 
background, we love companies who have failed, individuals who have faiIed because 
they've learned so much and we love people who have succeeded because they know a 
lot too, so 1 mean that is the primarily intangible. 
The intellectud property component and the actual IPR is difficult to put a large value on 
it. In the absence of having a tearn and a rnentality, even if you work with the mentality 
of people is very important, so we have a very cLseparai" force step that we look at: 
We look at the market first, weather or not there is a market first the right Pace of growth 
not to busy but too small not too big. Secondly, we do look at the technology, what do 
they own? If anything. The v a t  majority of companies we're seeing today don't know 
anything except ideas and perhaps an access point to an opportunity. 
The third thing we look at is the current team who they are and what's their background; 
and the fourth thing we look at it's a box which we just called "question mark" Are they 
people we want to work with?, Do we trust them? Do we have a good feeling? Do we like 
the name of the Company? Have they exhibited a market "bisas"? Are they inclined to 
listen? Do they t a k  more than they should? Are they arrogant? Do they put "billion" to 
many times in the business plan? Al1 the intangible aspects are good or bad and whether 
or not they will succeed and we can work with them, so yea! It's huge compounded of 
any review. 
So, how do you go about measuring those intangible aspects? 
Well that is the best question, because is very hard to measure, we corne fiddling vound 
with different "indesia" and seeing whether or not we can qualify them, but we haven't 
been able to do it so far. The best way you rneasure this is by repetition, so instead of 
having.. . you never see a plan and make a decision based on that plan, plans are like 
resumes, so plan is used to Say no, we are never used to Say yes, we used to Say no or 
used to Say yea we're interested, so what we fmd is repetition is the best way. 
We put people quite a few times get to know them over a period of time and take them 
out of different circumstances and then caught around on the 'tertices" of things that we 
think are indicators of success or failure and on their attitudes or their "capdowns" and 
we actudly have.. . we had a retreat last year when we d l  went to Cuba and we sat down 
and said OK what did we learned over the last year and a half? And it was pretty 
interesting; now if you look at the relationship between multiple founders in a company it 
is actually critical it cornes how people really thing? How they act? Are they ethical? Are 
they reasonable? Are they prepared to share any "up-swon7' in a company? 
It's a lot different in Canada that 1 think in the Valley because in the Valley you now deai 
with serial entrepreneurs, they are on their third, fourth, f i  go-round and here there are 
a lot of people who is spinning out from larger organizations or there are doing it for the 
first h c ,  so yea, you have to put a little bit more "evaf" to get out. The big moving 
forward is in formalize in testing the people its some of the can do to the mentality lefi 
fiom the Japanese training companies when everyone is constantiy given this tests, 
character tests, and that is something we are moving towards actually, using testing on 
people we think they can do very good. 1 just used it on myself actually, and found it 
curious how different 1 am from everybody else in here internally and fmd out we are 
people based form various architectures of the mind and personality and character and 
how we interact because that is the other dimension we are getting womed about. 
You mean like psychology tests? 
Yea, yea, now we are not to do push-ups and M. !! Ja Ja Ja Ja.. . We have other things 
to worry. 
So those are the biggest intangibles. The market is tangible, khd of, but it doesn't matter 
where the market is but it matters where the market is going to and that's an intangible, 
right? Speak of perceptions and how they plan. The technology is tangible, but again it 
doesn't matter unless you are going to sel1 the technology too much, where are they going 
to take it to? 
The people is tangible but then again they're going to change over tirne, so how do you 
put together, how do you get a good core nucleus, and probably the most intangible 
important element is the culture which is how do you combine it altogether and say What 
is the culture of this Organization? 
Because the thing that has killed me over the years is you look at a company and you fire 
everybody and then you hire a whole new team and then six months later is the same 
company ! What is that? What has actually happened in that organization? Why if its 
different people? 1 think that what actually happens is that a culture has develop and the 
outside world has used you in a certain way. Even if you put in some new passengers at 
the same vehicle, so everybody sees "this car driving by for some minutes.. . some small 
carter . . . who made too much money somewhere still order?. . . or whatever . . ." and it's 
a perception even if it a different driver, so that's the other thing that is really important 
the fiames with which others look at you. 
How are we doing this, by the way? Am 1 talking too much?. . . Ha ha ha . . . 
When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you 
consider the knowledge of the entrepreneur to be an important aspect of the business 
proposal? 
Yea, because both the technological knowledge and a certain commercial.. . the bais in 
commercial reality, and the.. . 1 think what happens is with the.. . what we perceive or 
what the world perceives to be condensed tirne h e s  means you are acting faster and 
people who don't have the knowledge and steps into knowledge-based markets gets 
"lodged" so yea it is important that the company kind of have both, something like sort of 
a "fmger in the pulse" finding out what happens in the industry and also an assessrnent of 
what are the commercial realities are, but what happens is a lot of things flow from that 
so it's not knowledge in background because.. that it's nice and i f s  usefûl but is more.. . 
you know about an industry is for a reason, therefore you will know the champions, you 
will know the analysts, you will know the supporting.. . you will know the competitors, 
you'll know who went in the industry, and 1 think rather than giving people a very 
expensive ten-million-dollar-crash-course in the industry we prefer to take what went in 
and had that crash-course, makes a huge difference. 
When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture. How do you 
consider in a business proposal the capabilities of the entrepreneur that will allow hirn 
or her to create new products or services? 
Mmm, in the plan- itself? Ahh.. . educational background, business history, the way the 
plan is written, and also what they Say in the plan, so.. . and it's usually a team i f s  rarely 
an individual, so.. . and also what they've done, what the whole idea is, you know, you'll 
see a lot of.. . it's not.. . you are not looking for ideas, you are iooking for opportunities, 
so if there is a lot of novelty in their approach but is so graded in reality, that will corne 
through in a plan quite often, you want people who are visionaries but not dreamers, 
right? Usual through "qedandnun"??? u, you' 11 see . . . 
Even the way people defme a market, would often reflect that somebody is willing to go 
beyond the obvious meta-study they've just read, and it's really fine at what the 
dynamics of the market are, and . . . 1 personally, I believe that the creativity exhibited in 
pretty well any dimension of investigation or analysis will be reflected in the ultimate 
products near the other end, so they got to be.. . you're looking for people who are open 
to that. 
M e n  making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture. do you 
consider in a business proposa1 the ability of the entrepreneur to assimilate new 
extemal to the venture knowledge? 
You never know what to do, because you will find people who will only know, you 
know, one little comer of a city, and will know one littie comer of an induçtry, or one 
little corner of that ccpartner purch???" industry and do phenomenally well, and they are 
so busy they don? know the Second World War is over, and that there already changes 
happening in society. Sometimes there are single-minded-myopic-drive who will build 
phenomenal organizations, on the other hand the tendency maybe it's because its people 
want to deal with it who people who are much more open minded to assimilating and 
capitalizing on external realities and opportunitties what's r e d y  happening in the world. 
How do you taper a plan? 1 don't know, sometimes you tell fiom sitting down having a 
glass of wine with a person, you see how they're like and getting to know them and by 
doing references and references of references and just.. . you get a feel for it over time. 
But, yea, yea, 1 think we are inciined away fiom people who are zealots of they're 
business. 
I have seen that a couple of times, 1 saw one guy who was.. . ah.. . when 1 was being 
interviewed, he was a partner in one of the law firms , 1 was being pitched by the firm, 
and he said, we here at Village.. . 1 can't remember the firm, are lawyers lawyers, and we 
have world experts absolute, wodd you agree with that? Oh yes, world experts in a.. . 
well there are various. .. absoluteiy! For example, take Bill, O yea, Bill is a world expert 
in shopping center leases, and you know, this kind of thought was the hottest thing going 
and 1 cracked out laughuig and obviously, 1 barely fuushed the interview. 
So, yea, you can get people who have phenornenon expertise and precisely in vertical 
areas who do the "due what you want" to have it done which is make money and the 
enterprises feel proud of it, usually not. But will they be open to new influences, 
somebody who comes up and doesn't understand color corrections as well as they do and 
never will and couldn't care Iess but they understand the market for coding change in 
entertainment, you know it's an openness to the new "miracles" that may occur and make 
a couple of them successful, so yea, you want to see it but 1 am not sure how to assess it. 
But the other thing is, you know, you are asking questions about the plan, but I know this 
will corne as a real shock to you, people tend to tell you what they think you want to hear. 
Over t h e  we are getting a very homogenized delivery of information with people. Really 
the way to get to know them is time. I can spend.. . a c t d l y  1 just had a riot, 1 spent two 
weeks traveling isolated with between six to ten Canadian Cornpanies in Asia and 1 got to 
meet the CEO's. 1 saw them making the pictures, 1 saw them.. . we sort were helping each 
other in taking pictures, W to each other, and that was really interesting and at the end 
of that there were two of them that I really want to deal with, and there were a few others 
1 don't. So it cornes pretty clear.. . 
M a t  is the ideal business plan? How would you like to see a business plan so that 
you will feel comfortable investing in it? 
Business plans are sort of like sitting down to a meai, nght? So are sitting down to a meal 
and you want to realIy enjoy yourself, what matters? You know, so let's Say you arrive 
and someone is sitting there and looks clean, Iooks comfortable, so you are already 
creating a h e  in your mind, so, with a plan, some big ugly weight 25 pounds of lunch 
is sitting in your desk and you look at it and its very dificult to manage. So, ideally, you 
may want something that is manageable, you know? Cornfortable.. . because, same when 
there are selling to you in terms O business opportunity their going to have to sel1 
products or services or solutions or whatever it is in the world, so you want someone who 
addresses the opening gap of how do you stirnulate someone with just one cover or in the 
fîrst page. 
The second thing is, you ofien get, people who want to show off that they have master 
itself or they have an accounting package that fits their 25-year projections. 1 think that 
ideally, you know, quantitative side, you want someone who understands their business 
and can convey that in a simple but persuasive way. 
For example if you are selling software, you tell me how many employees you have 1'11 
tell you what your burn-rate is, if you tell me what though-line is and 1'11 tell you what 
you bottom line is on a normalized basis. You don? deviate 10 to 20 % but basically if 
you invest in a Company they got to be crazy if they deviate 10% fiom the north, so you 
don? need to see every little detail but you dor't want to see them take through but you 
want to see a distilled analysis. So, if you sit down with them and ask "Why do you need 
10 million dollars?" or "Why do you need 5 million dollars", Well, "we're going to do X 
million in PR." or "we are going to do X million in advertising on TV". You want to see 
the way they're thinking, so behind the quantitative element, you want to see the fact 
process. Probably the most signifiant two sections are the definition of the opportmity 
and the description of the people. There's got to be enough detail to be able to pick on the 
edges and do the reference checks quickly, there's nothing worse than "so and so was a 
partner in a major business in a major city and a big industry.. ." those fnistrating generic 
big nonsense references. 
Idedly, it's relatively brief and succinct, it reflects an analytical process, it has a decent 
quantitative element, and also talks a lot about the people and the way they define the 
opportunity. One way 1 have found with opportunities that have become really interesting 
is in the defintion to tell a story. Everybody uses the same framework. Now, 1 think that 
people could be brain-washed, you know, when you have fourteen-years-old or nineteen- 
years-old corne to you and explauiing " We'll grow the market significance and here's 
this piece and we did a prke point and here's where you see the c w e  and . . ." you know. 
everybody is thinking in the same way. 
You want people who understand mechanics of business, but also can approach it on a 
more creative basis so whatever they can do to reflect that. Then everybody says forget 
them, let's Look for what they have actually done.. . Ha ha ha ha ha . . . it's al! a bunch of 
drearns but it doesn't make sense, it just doesn't make sense.. . 
And, in terms of length? 
You know it's funny, if the fist.. . if it is twenty pages and it7s fantastic, then it is a VC 
bargain and you want more and you know, you leave them al1 of them wanting more. If 
it's crap then it doesn't matter if it's one page or a hundred pages, it's crap! The 
substance should really shine early on. They have to have a summary, to give you a very 
mundane pragrnatic.. . they have to have a good summary as to what they are trying to 
do; and any. .. the need.. . when we are setting information.. . imagine.. . ahh.. . the 
entrepreneur should imagine that they are in the other person's shoes, which we did in 
this trip, so, al1 the guys were sitting and 1 would ask the guy, "OK, critique the guy's 
presentation" and find out what are you really doing and it was great! What you need to 
know if you were sitting in this shoes and you were tu make an investment. 
The other thing that happens a lot in plans is that people don't believe what they are 
putting in them or throwing in them. That is a new revolutionary idea that they think that 
VC's have a due  of what they are doing and îhey have some idea knowing of what is 
going to succeed or fail and that is not true. VC's are just people guessing a crystal bal1 
just like everybody else. But 1.. . quite a few times 1 have had people corne in and they 
give their presentation and you sit there and you can tell that they are really asking a 
question rather than making statements, and then they tell me "Do you think is crap?'and 
1 go: "I'm glad to hear you said that, we are going to pull a 10A, we're not sure" it is 
ridiculous! So, you want people to be honest about where they are also in the fact 
process. If it's a brand new idea. -. But often enough they Say: "Oh, we have to make sure 
how we defme idea and you are the precise steps we're taking" 
From the last six months how many business plans have you rejected? 
Just one. Ha ha ha, No, no we as a firm look at probably.. . Oh, we get al1 sort of plans, 
by the way, which is a fair question to ask VC's, Do they use a plan? And What to put in 
it? We were onginally getting around 500 a year and in the last six months stepped up 
considerably, so let's Say 500 in the last six months. We would have rejected.. . we have a 
filtenng process, so in the fint cut we reject 90%, so let's say we reject 400 or 450 in the 
last six months and that's everything from a very bnef conversation "1 want to do this" 
"Are you interested?" to "here is the plan would you take a look at it?" "Give us feedback 
fast" now, probably about 10% make it to the "1s there an opportunity here?" and then it 
is still put down in categories, you now, "hot". cccold", whatever.. . 
Thank you, that was my last question.. . 
Interview # 3 
1. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you 
consider any intangible aspects when assessing the business plan? 
Absolutely, and the very nature of.. . I think obviously the most important one off the top 
of my head is the quality management team 1 don? have any tangible ways of sizing that 
up part of it is just the way the corne across their attitudes, How well I make a comection 
with them?, Do 1 think they are sincere? Do 1 think they are selling me a line? 1 mean, 
some of those are characteristics of the management tearn, 1s what you are interested?. . . 
Some of those tangibles.. . 1 ody mentioned a few but, 1 guess their experience is 
somewhat tangible, by what is in the resume, but also somewhat intangible, I got to make 
a judgement on their effectiveness off their previous rolls and their success and how do 
they measured themselves, their personalities is certainly a very intangible, I have to 
work with these people and they are my partners, so that is very important to me. Who do 
they know?, and What their networks themselves are like? That's probably tangible partly 
intangible, 1 thînk that covers it for the most part in terms of the management team. 
Other intangibles that 1 think are probably the next most important thing is the market 
place, one phrase that you may have heard in our indusûy is " The dogs eat the dog food 
" and that again is partly tangible I mean there is some tangible ways, and some empirical 
ways that you can go about looking at that, but a lot of that is just what 1 cal1 a "paint 
fresh hole" Which is very intangible, 1 mean, How badly do the customers or potential 
customers need this? What is got to motivate thern to decide to buy this? 1s this really 
something that resolves a critical need? Or is it something that is some kind of an 
enhancement to some issue that already exists? 
There are intangibles that relate to the product and the technology itself. There is certain 
amount of intangibles, again, I am going to throw in some keywords that are here in the 
industry, are they "paradigm shifts" or 'Yen times factor7', 'Yen x factor" is it t - y  a
"monumental breakthrough" again there is a certain arnount of tangibility. 1 mean, you 
c m  look at the cornpetitors, you cm look at what else is out there, you can look at the 
market place as a whole, but at the end of the day there is a certain intangibility as to my 
judgement as whether they are going to be able to: a) Make it or if they have made it just 
How big a deal was it? How is the market place going to react? If you are taking about 
seed stage investments 1 guess the other intangible factor that we could talking here is the 
market place itself. A lot of the early stage ventures.. . they may be creating the market so 
the market isn't something where 1 c m  go get some forward studies or reports 1 got to 
essentially decide whether they are going to be able to create it, and then we go back to 
some of the other points. 
Do you have a way of measuring them? 
No, often 1 don't, 1 think the ody  way you c m  measure it is through our own expenences 
and our own.. . just general knowledge of what is going on out there. We spend a lot of 
time just trying to cover the technology universe at a "32,000 foot view point7' and 
sometimes is just the knowledge of what is going on other related sectors that rnay not be 
direct competi~ors but rnay have an impact or an influence or rnay have some sort of.. . 
impact of on what the Company is talking about- So, the earlier the Company is, fi-ankly. 
the more intangibles you get into. MM Venture Partners doesn't tend to do seed stage 
investments so specifically to us 1 don't run into some of this questions as much. QX 
where 1 was before. I worked at the Silicon Valley for about three years, we did a lot of 
more of that touchy feeling type of work. So 1 think that captures most of the intangibles 
that 1 can make up right now. 
When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you consider 
the knowledge of the entrepreneur to be an important aspect of the business proposal? 
Let me make sure I understand your question properly, this knowledge in terms of l i s  
experiences his ski11 the leverage? 
Yes. 
Well 1 mean, people are everything nght? in the technology world. Absolutely their 
expenence, their knowledge, their networks. In not just on the entrepreneurs is important, 
their ability to fmd the right people, build the nght team, straighten the right relationships 
across ail kinds of dimensions is.. . that's everything, at the end of the day that is in what 
you are investing in. 
Do you have a way of measuring them? 
The things that you can't measure or size up to a some degree are: a). Taking to them, 
that is intangible but that is a rneasurement, I mean, 1 take notes and form an opinion 
fiom the actual conversation with him. You certaidy check references, fmd out if they 
are telling the û-uth, and that other people perceive them as they are representing 
themselves. You also do other reference checks with their potential customers with theu 
potential cornpetitors and get a view point on them fkom that. In some cases you rnay get 
a little bit more specific, they rnay have a patent or they rnay have the actual code so you 
can have a demonstration or you cm.. . if they have a patent you c m  have a sense of 
whether somebody else has validated that it is in fact propnetary 1 know some Venture 
Capital f m s  that do personal forensic audits to individuals, 1 mean that is done. it is not 
a practice that we do here in MM Venture Partners, other Venture Capital partners quite 
often.. . when we see companies here that have been.. . to another Venture Capital has 
been involved in the company we talk to them and feed in their experiences and if the 
question was more to the actual founder or the CE0 I think that the references of the 
previous companies looking into that are the most direct ways.. . Often is not the founder 
that is the technology person or at least there is another technology person, so, just try to 
make sure 1 understand your question we are talking about the technology side of it, or 
the person side of it? Some times they are not always the same. 
Yes, is the person, the persond knowledge. 
The best way to find that about is through the people he knows and using your own 
networks to see if people you know have come across him and try to get their perspective. 
2. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture. How do you 
consider in a business proposal the capabilities of the entrepreneur that will allow hirn 
or her to create new products or services? 
MM, Ah.. . 1 appreciated most when an entrepreneur cornes to me with a complete 
management team, if he says that he is going to do everythhg on his own or with two 
other people 1 cast doubts very quickly and again in Venture Partners Iikes to get into 
companies who are iund of one stage after the seed stage. So there are venture 
capitalists.. . and 1 have been in this position before where they are willing to make a bet 
just on the individual and just take on the faith that this person will be able to hire the 
proper team and bring in the capabilities it needs. Again in Venture Partners our 
prtference is to see, you know, a either very complete management team or a 
management team that is 90% complete. 
You know, they have been an unrealistic to Say " we need to hire this person for boss for 
our capabilities" there is a lot different skills that go into running a company, and that is 
what is what the titles come fiom, we want to see a good CFO, a good CEO, a good 
COO, we want to see a good Chief Technology OEcer and again, that is our preference, 
and again that is the people at the end. 
We want to make sure that they bring new people with the righi capabilities across al1 
funds, sales and marketing is one example that a Iot of companies, 1 think, particuiarly if 
they come fiom a kind of a technology background they have this.. . if you build the 
customers what kind of attitude which doesn't work so.. . Do they have the right 
connections? . . .and then the capabilities as well come through in the business plan, what 
are their strategies, Do they have a business model that 1 think will work, because if the 
business model doesn't work I don't care how great they are, it is not going to happen, so 
their strategic thoughts and experience that goes into the business plan and the history 
îhat goes out as well is important in terms of reflecting their capabilities. At the end of the 
day we are pretty much betting on the expenence and the business model, things change 
so quickly these days that the expenence they have is worth a lot so we put a lot of value 
on that, the previous experience of the team in terms of judgement and capabilities. 
3 .  When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you 
consider in a business proposa1 the ability of the entrepreneur to assimilate new 
extemal to the venture knowledge? 
1s the question their ability to adapt in change to the environment around them? 
Yes, to assimilate new knowledge. 
Absolutely, today's product circle, you know, lasts six months and competitors are 
involved and that's always more and more important. It is a stniggle as well as a Venture 
Capitalist you want to see a well thought through plan and you want to have some 
milestones according to which you want to guide the company so you can't let the 
company to go changing the plan every three weeks at the same time there's got to be 
some reality that, you know, the business plan may not be appropriate a year from now. 
So, that's a very tough thing to judge, 1 think that aI1 the Venture Capitalist have a very 
hard time with that. 1 thirk one of the real struggles fiom m a t  Venture Capitalist is 
knowing when to give up fkom a Company and throwing the towel and a lot of Venture 
Capitalists is probably one of their weakest trades they continue putting money in to a 
company thinking the business plan will work, thinking they'll be able to adapt and in 
some cases is kind of a "pull the plug" So that's a real stniggle and 1 don't have any silver 
buiiets as to when the appropnate time is to stick with management, realize that there h a  
been a change and when the appropnate time is to "pull the plug" 1 don? really don't 
have a lot of answers to that, a lot of that cornes back to some of the intangibles and the 
gut-feel and you know "who's fault was it?" get a major cornpetitor to come out with 
something that put the Company in this position? Or did they just screw-up didn't manage 
their expenses properly and ran out of money and some factors in a company are a M e  
easier to put your hands around them but others aren't. The fact of the matter is that the 
technology things do change and they can be cataclysmic competitive reactions and 
sometimes the company does need to change and at the end of the day that is probably 
just as much the venture capitalist's fadt  to continue to put money in there and not 
foreseen that as it is the entrepreneur's fault. Again, back to management if you got 
somebody you believe in and is strong and has new experience they are probably more 
able to adapt to that situation. But you never know, 1 don? have a good answer for that 
one, you know things are going to change and you got to take on a case by case basis. 
What is your ideal business pian? 
That's a pretty tough one to answer. 1 mean, 1 don't think there is an ideal one, 1 think it 
depending on which sectors you are looking at an technology is one way of dividing it up 
and obviously if it is an internet related play and if they are successfül companies and 
makuig it great in a nine-month-period that's more of a traditional s o k a r e  company or a 
telecommunications company and may take several years for the business pian to work 
out. Again, this goes back to some of the earlier questions you asked you look at the 
business plan, make an assessment as to what are the realistic milestones are, understand 
that they may have some burnps in the road as that happens just tries to solve them.. . 1 
don? really thinks there's an answer to that. 
Any particular length? 
Yea, historically a Venture Capital Fund is got a five-to-seven-year-time horizon by the 
time you have the money in your fùnd, fmd the appropriate investments, invest in the 
companies, take them through some sort of liquidation event. Histoncally it has been five 
to seven years, now, with al1 this internet phenornenon some companies are getting 
investments and going public in a nine-month-horizon and 1 don? think that is 
sustainable. 
But 1 mean length in a business plan. 
Oh, you mean the actual number of pages? WeII at the first meeting is rare that you read 
more than the executive summary. 1 rather have a slightly longer executive surnrnary and 
if that goes well then you read the rest of the plan, but I don? have time to read a sixty- 
page-business-plan and 1 don? think many other people do, there maybe a few sections 
that you flip through, for a little bit of clarifications, 1 think a Company has to put one 
together because if you get pass the first meeting that is when you get more into the 
business plan. 
So, the fxst thing you look at in a business plan is the executive surnmary, What would 
be the next thing? 
That depends what intrigues me fiom the business plan, if 1 think is a really neat concept 
or if 1 have some questions about the technology 1 go there, if 1 am already familiar with 
the market place they are in, 1'11 probably go more to management, and probably one of 
the 1 s t  things 1'11 go to is the financiais section, they al1 kind of Iook the same, the 
hockey stick approach, and you know, 1 don? tend to get as much value out of the 
hancials in most of these companies. Except for that it is helpful to get a sense for where 
they are now if they got any revenues, if they got a few million on revenues fiom that 
perspective it is a very high level 1 am not going to check the balance sheet and figuring 
out profitability ratios or anything like that, 
From the last six months. How many business plans have you received? In how many did 
you invest? 
How many.. . Sorry 1 am not sure that 1 a m  understanding you question, How many times 
did we invest in them? Or how many business plans did 1 read? 
No, in how many plans have you rejected? 
Well probably 300 hundred business plans and we made only three investments. So, 
297.. . yea, one percent is probably . . . 1 thinks that's fkom what 1 have heard pretty much 
what happens . . . 
Are those three the ones you decided to invest? Or just keep them.. . 
Three were the ones that we invested in, out of those other 300 Say there are 20 business 
plans that 1 am looking right now, 1 haven't made a decision one way or the other. We 
move pretty quickiy here, we make a decision usually within the first couple of weeks we 
get a business plan look at ail, meet with the management and get back to them usually 
within the first week so between the time we get it and the tirne we make a decision is 
probably no more than a couple of weeks so that's why I said the we look at probably 20 
business plans or so, but.. . maybe another twenty more that things could change anc! I'd 
be more interested on waiing on something. So we mck them, we keep details pipelines 
off al1 of companies here. There are 230 companies right now in our pipelines that 1 met 
reasonably that there was some point of discussion that 1 looked at their business plan, 
rejected it something is on the go, and then after we tum it over it goes into a basically a 
revisit list that we keep just so that we are always aware of the companies that have corne 
through the door and there is probably 300 companies on that and then there is hundreds 
of companies that just never make it to the list and either they cal1 up on the phone, and 1 
just, you know, right at the bat I know that it doesn't make sense for us, because is either 
not technology or doesn't have sort of the prerequisites. Probably I said 300 business 
plans that came in, but there is probably at least another 400 or 500 of companies who 
knock at our door that just don? go anywhere. 
So, do you take only technology based? 
Yea, that is al1 we do, mostly information technology, we do some biotechnology. 
Early stage? 
Relatively early.. . ah we don't do typically peer seed stage, 1 mean if there is an 
entrepreneur with just a concept we probably will not invest on that. But we have two 
deals, we have made six investments since we started a year ago two of them were pre- 
revenue, pre-customer, pre-product, product is on development 1 should say. So, yea we 
codd do eady stage sometimes. 
Interview- # 4 
1 .  When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you 
consider any intangible aspects when assessing the business plan? 
I guess the key intangible aspect is the history of the management team, have they been 
involved with previous start-up that eventually evolved into a successful businesses that 
were exited and now they are going back in again. so they have been there and have done 
it. Because you may have a very good scientist or a very good technologist who develops 
the product but the challenge is to make it a business around it to hirn it into a business 
that is going to make money, and there is an exit for them and there is an exit to the 
venture capitalist. So, I think that surroundingly the start-up individual with a 
management team, maybe a CO0 or a good CF0 who's been around and done it and cm 
put a business box around the technology is key. 
Do you have some more examples of intangibles aspects? 
Market potential is another important factor, 1 mean you look at a market that has a 
hundred million dollar sales potential versus a market that has a five million dollar 
market potential, you start to quanti.@, but you sort estimate that potential so that is very 
much a key that you need in a business p h .  You c m  estimate the market potential but in 
the end I think is the science, or s the environment and the technology. 
Do you look for these aspects in the business plan? 
To nie the two key things are market potential for the product or service and the depth 
and breath of management expenence to turn the product or service into a viable "dulis". 
Because there are a lot of technologies that are great but they never make money and we 
are not in the business of investing on the potentiai to make a business of it. 
How do you measure it? 
I think you try to do sensitivity analysis in the projections. You are going to see the 
financial forecasts and you are going to do you your own independent research as to what 
you think the market potentiai is and whether the nght management team is already in 
charge and what is your best case, worst case, likely case in the area and hopefully 
somebo&y in there you have the confidence level that if the Company does the following 
things right over the first two or three years and they revenue and they "evet the area in 
the inical potential" for the business is this, that tells you that you have qualified. but it is 
a very iterative process. 1s almost building your own model, you do a mode! for the 
entrepreneur but you want to build your own model so that you test your assumptions. 
2. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you 
consider the knowledge of the entrepreneur to be an important aspect of the business 
proposal? 
Persona1 knowledge? Personal knowledge about what, sorry? 
His personal knowledge, do you consider it to be an important aspect of the business 
proposal? 
Personal knowledge of the industry? Or product? Or his personal knowledge? 
In generd, his personal knowledge. 
Yea, 1 guess there is two sides out ofit, 1 mean, the personal knowledge could be sort the 
scientist, the technology, the ability to develop products the market needs, and the other 
side is the knowledge and the ability to develop the business, 1 mean these are two 
different things and if you c m  find someone to combine those two things together you 
got a very dangerous person because typically you get one but not the other you get 
someone who is very science oriented, they are good at developing the product based on 
the needs of the market but they don't know how to capitalize on that to build the 
business, or you find a very good business man but doesn't have the technology side, 
sometimes you have two separate people who are thinking in doing a business together 
but if you get those people together.. . 1 think Bill gates is probably a very good example, 
there is a guy who understands the technology and the needs of the market and is a 
brilliant business man. So yau combine those two together and you got a whack! 
3. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, How do you 
consider in a business proposa1 the capabilities of the entrepreneur that will allow him 
or her to create new products or services? 
Ah.. . 1 don? thk that.. . 1 mean, if he is coming to you with a certain products or 
service, and you are giving them the capital, 1 think they wifl use that to hire people or 
maybe take an acquisition of other technologies or businesses, you want to keep the 
entrepreneur very focus on doing one or two things right initially. Because if they are 
trying to do so many things up-fiont none of them will work-out, the company will grow 
up, so over time the company may develop its own new technologies its own new 
inventions or they may hire people to develop that ability nght now, or make an 
acquisition of their cornpetitor to do that, is something that I think that will grow after the 
f k t  two three years of incubation of the company so it is not that important, you got to 
know the potential right there, for the market but not necessary know that the ski11 set is 
there when you make the acquisition. 
So you don't measure this? 
No. 
4. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you 
consider in a business proposal the ability of the entrepreneur to assimilate new 
external to the venture knowledge? 
When we Say extenial knowledge is it.. .? 
New external to venture knowledge 
Changes to the market place? Or Changes to the technology? 
Yes 
That's right, it's very important because if the market is shifting or competitors me 
coming in they have to recognize the changes and make those changes within the 
organization and if they have a board of directors with very good people that are giving 
input and suggesting changes be made, they've got to be able to sort of learn from that in 
making the changes. You don't want people who think "This is the way we are going to 
do it, and 1 don't care about what do extemal factors say" So 1 think that's very 
important. Now, Can you quant@ it? No. but you can sort see based on the previous 
track record of that individual and their personality are they really stubbom or don't want 
to listen input fiom others , you get a sense for it, it is more like an intangible but it is a 
very important thing. 
What is your ideal business plan? 
It is not a marketing document, it doesn't try to over sel1 me, it is not full of "ratitudes" 
and "godyyy wording, 1 rnean, it is straight, it is to the point. "Here is the market 
opportunity", "here is what we have in place", "here is how we are going to capture the 
market opportunity", and these are some projections that we feel we can hit. Think of 
service that is a good word for use, they are realistic, they are conservative, they are 
concise, the shorter the better- Because we are going to get into a lot of that detail later, 
so, "give me the highlights of the business plan", a nice executive summary, a few 
appendices, maybe a bit of financial rnodeling, and then we will work it out later. We get 
business plans that technicdly a). We don't have the time to read them, and b). you c m  
fa11 sleep after ?en pages, because they are kind of seliing, people get into a sales mode 
and ail their trying is to get the attention of the venture capitalist. 
In tems of length, is there any preference? 
20 to 25 pages 
From the last six months how many business plans have you rejected? 
We get thousands every year, because we are one of the biggest f h d s  in Canada and a lot 
of start-up entrepreneurs or people looking for an expansion capital send their business 
plan to us. 1 can ask Lisa, she can probably tell us, she iç my assistant. But.. . I'd Say that 
last year maybe we got.. . 1s it the last year or the last six months? 
Six months 
Now, out of those 3000, How many got rejected? 
Maybe 80%. 
Right at the first screen? 
Yea, the first screen or after the.. . the first screen is reading the executive summary, talk 
to somebody on the phone, you'll probably screen about 70 % of them, and then we may 
have some meetings and then you'll screen another 10 or 15 %. Then we have some 
preliminary due diligence to screen another 10% or so, so the " d e  of thumb" is for every 
hundred business plans you get, you may do one or two. 
That concludes my questions. 
Interview #5 
1. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you consider 
any intangible aspects when assessing the business plan? 
And by intangible aspects you mean.. . technology? or characteristics of the management 
team? Or.. any of those things? 
Yes, any of those things. 
Some of the key intangible aspects, if that is what we mean, would be proprietary nature 
of the technology, how proprietary is it? How much of a sustainable cornpetitive 
advantage? 1s it going to be.. . How easy is it?.. or is it not going to be to replicate? 
Another key intangible aspect is the management team's track record, that is quite 
intangible, because you can read somebody's resume but it is not measurable, is not some 
measurement trough per se, in terms that you are not going to.. . you are not going to 
have some sort of weighting assign to it to a management but you want to have a sense 
for it, to an extend of: Have they operated an entrepreneurial venture before? How big 
did they grow it? How successfiil were they? 
Those are sort two key intangible aspects. 
Do you look for these aspects in a business plan? 
Yea, particularIy when you are talking about investing in technology-based business, you 
defuritively look for those aspects. Because those are the main assets that you are 
investing on it, as oppose to sort of a Iater-stage-business, let's say a management buy- 
out or investing in a company that has already got substantial revenue where at that point 
you are looking for the management team as well but you are also looking for quality of 
the underlined business which is more measurable, right? You know, profit rnargins, 
expand ratios, market size . . . 
How do you measure the intangible aspects. 
I think you look for key idenming factors, key i d e n e h g  items, so in case of 
management like 1 said, it's related to previous experience, have they had anaiogous 
previous expenences, How analogous was it? You know, where was it different, Was it in 
the same industry? Have they grown a company fiom the similar point to the next point. 
Do they have substantial technology expertise? 1s it in the same area? Or in different 
area? How long has the management team been together? In terms of the technology 1 
du& you're getîing a look for either call them."red flags" or call thern "key identiQing 
markers" but, you know, the number of years you man in minc! is going to Uivest in the 
technology, that is more measurable, assessing proprietary nature, if they thought.. . they 
may have buy it or try-out a pile of customers or speaking to them to get a sense for how 
significant is the technology, try to measure its order of magnitude of improvement over 
existing technology, so How big is the gap? How significant is the change they are 
making? How large is it? Because the larger.. . the bigger the order of magnitude of 
improvement, obviously the more thne you have to commercialize the technology and 
develop it and get it launched to market place before the existing cornpetitors catch-up. 
You look at, you know, patents, patents are a key thing, specially with the new risk U.S. 
patent d e  changes, about being able to patent software, so probably patents are more 
important. Those are some of the key items. 
2. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you consider 
the knowledge of the entrepreneur to be an important aspect of the business proposal? 
Yes. 
So, How do you measure it? 
How do you measure the knowledge of the entrepreneur? Well to some extent the 
entrepreneur's knowledge is reflected in the business plan. Because usually is the main 
input source for the business plan so, the degree to which the business plan is 
comprehensive and deals with not just the product description or the technology 
description, but aIso the market potentid, and the market positionhg and the cornpetitor's 
position is al1 reflecting how much does the entrepreneur knows. The other key thing is 
when you are meeting with the person and in discussions with him you are asking him 
questions the ability to respond intelligently and promptly is also an indication of their 
knowledge level. The other thing is their track record and the previous experiences. If 
were to give an example, it's probably not a great example but, we were investing in a 
very early stage company that was in a optical networking area and 1 know zero about 
opticd networking, well 1 mean, a little more than zero, but not very much, and it was a 
highly secretive company, very technical information disclosure but they did not have 
any try-out with the customers yet. So how are you going to assess "passing it to???" the 
technology as well, it so happened that of the core R&D team of 15 people they al1 came 
out of Nortel and they al1 came out of one of Nortel optical networking divisions, and 
they had previously develop Nortel's previous "significant???" optical product, and they 
were.. . came over as a team, so, 1 guess you rely mainly on their experience base, in the 
sense for.. . what their saying sounds like that it makes sense and obviously they have the 
track record of having previously develop products, so, if they tell me that theirs is ten 
times better than the one they develop for Nortel before then, you hope is there and you 
are relying on their experience base to make some sort of assessment. 
3. When making a decision to invest in a new technoiogy-based venture, How do you 
consider in a business proposal the capabilities of the entrepreneur that will allow him or 
her to create new products or services? 
1 think two things, again focusing on entrepreneur's previous unique employment and 
experience so, to what extend have they been in situations before where they have been 
innovative and creating new products successfirlly, and to what extend have they not 
done that, that's key indicator, another key indicator is their availability to be market 
driven often you get entrepreneurs who come in and the plan talks a lot about the 
technology but not a lot of what the product is and what the need is answering is, and 
why it should be developed or why it should be such a product in order to meet a need 
and you can pretty quickly get a sense of whether an entrepreneur is a technology driven 
or market drîven because the plan analysis has compulsations??? That's when the people 
talking about the technology those are the technology driven ones, the market driven ones 
talk a lot about "here is the need", "here is the problem" solve it.. . 'Vis is why this is a 
great technology to solve the problem" But they start with the problem first, they start 
with the need and go backwards. So, that's primarily how 1 do it. 
4. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you consider 
in a business proposa1 the ability of the entrepreneur to assirnilate new external to the 
venture knowledge? 
Absolutely, my manager Iikes two types of investing, people who invest pnmarily in 
technology with the management basically being optional or replaceable and they are 
interested to invest because they like the technology its proprietary and it has certain 
potentid and are very easy to change the management team. The other type of investor 
are people who rely more substantially on management, you know, technology is 
significant but management is as equal a factor in their investment decision, and those 
people rely very heavily on management stability to, as you said, to assimilate new 
information and make the changes in the corporate strategy , so my . . . y ou know, it 
interests me particulariy 1 definitively reIy on management because 1 tend to invest in 
management and technology as oppose to just technology and that might be a fiinction of 
my experience base 1 don? have an awful lot of operating experience so 1 am not able to 
jump in an operate the Company rnyself whereas other people that have more operating 
expenence and may be more tempting to do that. The other thing is, no matter how 
significant.. . no matter how proprietq the technology if the market place changes 
dynamicdly, changes very fast, and is up to management who are closest to the market to 
summary al1 the information and basically propose strategy changes so if you look at very 
successful technology companies, is hard to guess but is just a guest but 1 would think 
that.. . some proportion of them like 80% or 90% actudly change their strategy before 
they were successful. 
5. What is your ideal business plan? 
Of course the ideal business plan is the plan that makes me a lot of money with no risk. 
That by definition is the ideal business plan. 
1 mean in terms of content.. . 
There is two factors that drives investing in technology oriented knowledge-based 
businesses, one is greed and the other is feu. So, people u s d y  invests when greed 
exceeds fear, when fear exceeds greed then they don? invest. The whole point of the plan 
is to minimize the fears and maximize the greed potential, and that's tme, in the sense 
that practically the content is the opportunity.. . the market opportunity has to be well 
descrïbed, OK? And again the problem is.. . or the need is.. . How are you going to 
answer t5e need? How significant.. . what topology are you going to use to solve the 
problem? to provide the need? And What kind of sustainable competitive advantage do 
you have?, so, the more proprietary of the technology the more sustainable is the 
advantage. So that dl deals with the greed side of things, right? 
The fear side is, well for example the management's track record, you know?, Have they 
done it before? Have they not done it before? The fear side looks at exclusively at what 
the risk items are and having risk mitigation strategies, that's aiways nice to see in a 
business plan. A reasonable and thoughtful competitive andysis which is just competitors 
positioning is also good to see in a business plan because that deais with the fear side of 
things, you know?, Why am 1 going to be.. . ? Why is this Company.. .? Why is this 
opportunity going to be sustainable? How is it going to compete with its competitors? So, 
I think the ideal business plans needs to thoughtfully presents what the market 
opportunity is? Iiow is it going to be attacked? and exploited and also on the nsk 
mitigation side, How is risk going to be mitigated? What is the cornpetitor's positioning? 
What's the financial resources required? That answers your question? 
Yes. The last question is: From the last six months how plans have you received? Out of 
those, How many did you rejected? How many did you invest? 
The last six months, 1 would have seen, probably on the order of about 30 to 50 business 
plans, t h i s  codd be vague, we have a tracking work sheet, we have tracking data base that 
1 could probably check if that is.. . It is probably in the order of 40 plus or minus five. 
How many of those have 1 rejected? That is like a decision tree is a senes a decisions of 
"go", "no go" decision, so if the business plan is a reject out of hand at the screening 
stage, and then fkom those who continue on the table some of them are rejected later on. 
Easily two thirds are rejected "out of hand" and of the one third that goes forward out of 
those 40 business plans or 50 business plans 1 invested in one company actually, and 1 am 
considering in investing seriously in three or four others, so sort of £ive out of fifty, are 
sort of getting serious consideration. 
Interview # 6 
1. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you consider 
any intangible aspects when assessing the business plan? 
Yes, typically look for a management team with a track record, that is my first and 
foremost criteria 1 use. 1s to see have the management tearn done this before? Or if not, 
What kind of focus am 1 getting fiom them? Like, Are they focus on the o p p o d t y  
itself? Or Are they "d over the map"? Are they just trying to take on too much? Do they 
know exactly where are they going to head? So, that' s probably intangible, you don' t get 
that fiom nurnbers or anything like that. So that is one of the ones 1 look for. 
1 also Iook for How is their interact? How is their understanding of the opportunity they 
have in ftont of them? In other words, What kind of vision do they have? Are they being 
son of realistic about that? Responsive to changes? The level of determination that they 
may demonstrate, 1 think those are some diings that doesn't corne out in a business plan, 1 
mean you have to be putting down with those guys to understand how are they coming 
across of what is listed on a paper. To me, 1 use the business plan for.. like a resume, to 
get a sense of what are they taking about but nothing compare to actually meeting with 
them and letting them refer it to you. 
How do you rneasure those intangible aspects? 
1 think a lot of this is intangible.. . ahmmm.. . is gut feeling so it is more.. . Probably 1 
mentioned that, so.. . when I am.. . Ok, there is not clear cut rneasure. So in other words, 
when 1 need.. . Ok, 1'11 give an example and 1 use that on rny survey (Jagdeep's). One of 
my recent investments is a Company, which doesn't have failed yet, they developed its 
product but the guy.. . At that time, I see the management team, when 1 am trying to 
measure it, 1 am trying to understand, you know, Have they done by themselves.. . Have 
they explore what the total opportunity potential is? Two, What are the risks taking that 
opportunity and three What changes he can make if that happens that needs changing? 
I was leaned more towards an anecdotal evidence rather than saying this is a five-on-a- 
scale-of-ten kind of thing, so its more anecdotal. So, probing him on that front, that is 
how 1 wouid do it. So, 1 would ask him.. . Aha ! ! . . . questions such as "Why a customer is 
a potential custo.. . Who are going to be your customer base? Or which aspect of the 
market are you going after? or Which segment of the market are you going after? And 
then going into How is he or she going to be developing that strategy of going d e r  that 
particuiar market place? In this particular instinct that 1 used, they were developing a gas 
saturation technology for depending gas industrial applications that has tremendous 
potential, so when 1 was trying to understand this management team, I wanted to 
understand what had they done to firstly, technically in terms of developing a product, so 
that is easily enough. From that to get into things that he knew on the technicd side. 
Secondly, when he is, in this particular case, tell me, How are you going to reduce this 
risk? He has sign off an agreement with a gas large-multimillion-dollar-company that is a 
strategic partner for them, that gives me a lot of cornfort that someone so large form a 
strategic.. . form the market standpoint has willing to sign such agreement. So, mine is 
more anecdotal, rather than "show me a piece of paper" or something, we don? get on 
that basis.. . 
When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you consider 
the knowledge of the entrepreneur to be an important aspect of the business proposal? 
Hugely important, because at the end of the day, know your product, or know your 
service or know your.. and su therefore.. . 1 spend a lot of time actually getting to know 
his or hers product or technology through the entrepreneur and if he or she does not know 
it, to me that is extremely negative, because at the end of the day the entrepreneur must 
know, so 1 place a lot of importance to that. 
How do you measure it? 
Again, in terms of measurement a lot of it is through.. . My whole due diligence process 
or rny whole time that I am spending in deciding if 1 am going to invest is an exploratory 
trip, is an anecdotal trip, for me at least So what 1 do is 1 ask a lot, but behind that there is 
a purpose of why am 1 asking such things. So in other words, they come out and is not so 
much the factual st&F the due diligence process is not.. . is eveIything complaint.. . is 
more an understanding of the management team which is my first and foremost thing 1 
told you. . . that is the most important thing for me, more than the techno logy . 
The opportunity is more tangible to see.. . or the technology is more tangible.. . you can 
actually measure it much easier than the management team, but at the sarne tirne 1 think 
things like understanding what's the knowledge base of an entrepreneur gives you a great 
attempt or concept of has he or she got an understanding of the market place, the 
oppominity, the potential.. . you know, the nsk, the rewards that could come out. Its not a 
five-one-ten of scaie but that is the way 1 would do it. 
2. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, How do you 
consider in a business proposa1 the capabilities of the entrepreneur that will allow him or 
her to create new products or services? 
To me the business plan as 1 said.. . 1 take it fiom the point of view.. . as a base to decide 
whether 1 actually want to meet with this Company or will they meet or whatever way you 
want to look at it. I really assess that fiom actually meeting with the management tearn, 
the only level of comfort I get is through the biographies really of the management team. 
Have they the technical skiils? If you will, or if they do not have that. Have they done 
sornething like this before? It could be experience, it could be technical skills that they 
picked up. 
That's al1 1 get fiom the plan, beyond that it is pretty much more of face to face that gives 
that. 
When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you consider in 
a business proposa1 the ability of the entrepreneur to assimilate new external to the 
venture knowledge? 
Sorry, 1 didn't get that, the ability to get?. . . 
New extemal knowledge, new to the venture knowledge. 
Yes, 1 said that. Yes, 1 will see that as very intangible, fiom my standpoint, you may get a 
different views fiom others, but yes 1 find that very intangible at that stage, other than the 
questioning of, you know, 1 am going back to that whole issue, my little experience is I 
spend.. 1 don? read the business for the time duration that 1 am being the vent.. . during 
the due diligence. 1 think 1 rnentioned earlier that to me the due diligence is an obligated 
to cornplaint.. . is really for me to get a business so that I can participate rnuch better at a 
board level, and to understand that behind that are people, for me the nurnber one critena 
is the management team and you really learn that through the due diligence process. You 
leam that you can get dong with them and you leam that they c m  get dong with you. So 
a lot of this is, you know, again this more of a soft base.. .ahh.. . of.. . but if they can 
stimulate.. . you know, the information out there.. . or the opportunities out there.. . 1 
think a way to know that by probing or questioning but do 1 have a sense of you know, is 
this a strong skill that they have or is it a weaker skiil that they have, 1 wouldn't Say that I 
do that in an organized way? 1 am cornfortable about them having that or not, so is a Iittle 
bit of that . . . 
What is your ideal business plan in tems of content? 
Sure.. . 1 really fmd.. . An ideal business plan to me is one that begins with the 
opportunity. What is the opportunity.. .? To tell a story.. . To me.. . 1 have always 
believed in a simple thoughtfül business plan. That's what they start with.. . so it should 
be that.. . So it outlines the opportuxrity, the benefit or the.. . you know, the potential 
index, as well as the part time "????? that they feel" . It's a h o s t  part of it but.. . we'll 
take "noid???" so to keep ît out of a busi.. . 1 hate this business plans that is partial 
document, that, you know? Kind of either tight it on the road or when you talk about it 
they kind of Ieave it.. . mitigate it in a way that either is unrealistic or it just doesn't make 
sense. So, to me a business plan that ... you know,. . is redistic, concise.. . you know.. . in 
terms of form and then there is content, in terms of content, explains the opportunity, the 
product.. . al1 kinds of opportunities, but definitively outlines the opportunities, outiines 
the nsks involved, the payback and al1 that other stuff and gives a description of.. . 
justifies why is thiit an opportunity?, why is it worth it to look at that business plan. 
In terms of form, fkom my standpoint I personally as a preference 1 like one that has a 
very weil laid out executive summary, because that's where you can really make out 
this.. . that something you can understand often, 1 mean not that often but 1 use that as my 
clearing process really. If 1 am not getting it doesn't mean.. . to me the criter.. . a business 
plan is sort of a ???? so 1 don7 judge a business by a poor quality business plan, because 
1 have found that ???? some times??? that the business plan wasn't.. . they didn't have 
proper financial or intermediary advise or you know, they didn't really have a good CF0 
that just couldn't get an office with him??? 
So, but in terms.. . 1 would prefer to.. . personal the village??? form is doesn't get 
rounding around, you know, the fifty pages and thirty pages of them are.. . you know, 
core competence. So those are some of the things that I like to see in a business plan. 
Recently, actually about a year ago, 1 saw this business plan that was a Power Point 
presentation, about ten pages, at the most that captured everything that you would ever 
want, and 1 found that excellent f?om a VC standpoint this is like a dream come m e ,  you 
know, expending ... the whole thing was very good. The management team that came out 
of that validated that. 1 think if you corne back to the quality of the business plan it is 
important that.. . that who you get it fiom.. . that the people behind that should be able to 
back up that. Sometïmes you see a very well written plan but finally when you meet with 
the people and they are totdly . . . 1 don? know.. . they surprise you.. . And so you get the 
crappy ones.. . 
On that particular case that you just mentioned, Did you invest on them? 
We where looking to invest. What happened was that they got an offer fkorn a strategic 
investor that just. .. was widely higher than what you could even think of offenng, 1 rnean 
there was al1 kinds of due diligence, so went away but.. . we where ready to, because we 
had a good management team, good opportunity, everythuig fitted in place. 
Do you know how they are doing? 
Very well, very well. 
From the last six rnonths how many business plans have you received and out of those 
rejected? 
Probably 3 business plans a week, so that's twelve.. . about 72 roughly, and that includes 
al1 you know, whichever form 1 am gening in it, you know, so, it could be.. . we get a lot 
of emailing of business plans, some come through contacts, or references. 
Actually 80 1 mean roughly, and I'd Say about 60 of those get rejected on the first screen, 
of the next screen 1 meet with the management, so of that 20 1 have done about 2 deals, so 
that is the final successful outcome. Now for the other 18,I would have met with the 
management team, and got into either some pause.. . either 1 don? feel comfortable with 
the management or.. . and that's most of the t h e ,  that management didn't come out 
strmg enough and there is always gaps in management specially on entrepreneurid 
companies, so it is difficult to find the perfect management team. they feel comfortable 
when al1 the aspects of the management are represented strongly, but you want to make 
sure that your entrepreneurKE0 have got that vision, ability to understand the product 
and d l  that SM.. . 
Interview # 7 
1. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you consider 
any intangible aspects when assessing the business plan? 
Clarity, logic and presentation shown on the business case. 
A lot of strategy speak or technology speak and also h d i n g  an indication of whether the 
entrepreneur is or is not a business person. However, can't put a number on it. It 
renovates within, at the beginning it is either in the business plan or not. 
2. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you consider 
the knowledge of the entrepreneur to be an important aspect of the business proposal? 
How do you measure that? 
Personal knowledge.. . yes! That is a very important aspect, it is key. For exarnple, if the 
person is very good at delegating they have to understand what they are delegating. They 
have to be able to assess new products or services, although in a business proposal is 
difficult to frnd. However, can be measured by having communication with the 
entrepreneur. As weli, measuring by challenging the entrepreneur, do they have the 
experience? Do they know how to develop new products or services? Assimilate new 
knowledge, they look for new knowledge extemal? 
3. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, How do you 
consider in a business proposal the capabilities of the entrepreneur that will allow him or 
her to create new products or services? 
I usudy do not worry about that.. . 
4. When m a h g  a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you consider 
in a business proposal the ability of the entrepreneur to assimilate new extemai to the 
venture knowledge? 
I think this question is very similar to the last one. 1 usually look for two things, the 
management tearn and the market. If those two thuigs please me, then 1 am interested in 
îhem. 
Interview # 8 
1. When making a decisi ewt  echnology-based venture, do 
any intangible aspects when assessing the business plan? 
bu consider 
Yes. 
Can you give an example? 
Oh, management, always management team, charactenstics of the management, that's ail 
there is to it. 
How do you go about measuring those? 
Oh! in a rigorous way? Boy! Good question, I think 1 did mention it earlier that these 
deals corne as a reference. So, usuaIly at Ieast one member of the management team is 
known to a member of our network, so beyond checking cross references on the resume. 
and checkhg references that way, but we don? have a ngorous method. We end up 
spending fair bit of time taking to the mariagement team, and probing them, with respect 
to, How do they feeI about working with the management? You know? Supervising 50 or 
60 or 160 people. If they are able to execute on the business plan, How do they feel about 
having a Company that big. Those are the things that we like to know about to give us a 
sense of the kind of flexibility that they may have going forward. We find sornetimes 
honestly, that the flexibility that appear in a business pian is not necessarily the one they 
will have with the management, and that is problems. 
2. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you consider 
the knowledge of the entrepreneur to be an important aspect of the business proposal? 
Do you consider the capacity of the entrepreneur (or the team) to create new knowledge 
as an important aspect of a business proposal? 
Yes, very important. 
And do you have a way of measuring it? 
What we do is we typically go and hire a third party to help us assess that, as part of our 
network, we pay for that third-party-consultant to help us assess the technological merits 
of the proposal. 
3.When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, How do you 
consider in a business proposal the capabilities of the entrepreneur that will allow him or 
her to create new products or services? 
Look at the resume of the people involved. We do that al1 the time before we choose to 
go ahead. We look at what they have done before. Frankly, what we are looking for is 
people who has the ability to go sideways go Iaterally as well that they c m  go fonvard. 
We are looking for.. . just like in technoiogy we are looking for open architecture 
systems, so we are looking for people with "open architecture attitudes" We like people 
who is prepared to overcome change and rapid change. People who can restart al1 over 
very quickly, re-invent yourself, especially with web related ventures. Be able to adapt to 
your market. 
Do you look for these issues in a business plan? 
Well, these things, these intangibles I mean, hopefiilly we get a sense of them in the 
business pian, but most of this cornes by talking to the entrepreneur. 
4. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you consider 
in a business proposa1 the abilit- of the entrepreneur to assimilate new extemal to the 
venture knowledge? 
Yes. 
Do you have a way measuring it? 
No, I'm sorry. But again, this takes us back to the previous point 1 was making. It is 
really a whole investor's individual process. We have no way of measuring these things. 
How is your ided business plan? 
One that has spent a fair bit of time discussing the skills and the background of the team 
of entrepreneurs. Also, it has a credible growing market a strategy. 
And, Do you usually fïnd those issues on the business plans that you receive? 
No. In fact the ones.. . It is very interesting, people spend a lot of time creating a concept 
and identiGing the prey the want to go after. Often that is enough in itself, so the work is 
done, nght? For example, if it a web related deal "1 have identify a killer application" , or 
a killer niche if you will and they concentrate in having a nice web site. That is not good 
enough for us. So if we like it we hire someone to go and help the team, if we don? like 
it, then we ask the tearn to go back re-think the concept- 
From the last six rnonths, How many business plans have you rejected in the screening 
stage? 
Because of how we work here, we look at many more plans than the one we invest in. So, 
to give you an idea in the Last six months we probably looked at about fifty business plans 
and we have invested in only two or three of them. 
Interview # 9 
1. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you consider 
any intangible aspects when assessing the business plan? 
I guess we would. We have a screening process that's maybe a little bit different than 
other people and you mentioned "growtech" they have design, I guess a questionnaire 
that we largely use, we use this questionnaire that is based on Progrid methodology and 
that is what we use as our initial screening process. So, that's what we often do, we read 
the business plan, uniess we want to go M e r ,  because you can read for half an hour to a 
couple of hours to complete it. It asks key questions that we are interested in, and they 
develop a gradhg methodology that gives a score, which we don? rely on exclusively, 
but it is a factor in our decision. It enables two or three people to look at it, usudly one or 
two people in "growtech"?? and one or two people in "tentro" to look at it takes about 20 
min to read the questionnaire that we ask people to complete so we rnake our prelirninary 
decision based on this so that. So that's the initial decision, based on that. There may be 
some other intangible factors that somebody may be aware of because of their own 
background or expenence or something else. 
1s there anything in particular that you consider to be intangible? 
Yea, our process is usudly to review that application file, but if we decide to go m e r  
then the next thing we decide is probably to have a meeting with the Company, and ah.. . 1 
guess, chemistry with the people, Do they have the passion? Does the team believe that 
they are able to do it? Are they on a good track? 
1 think the chemistry of the first meeting is very important. 
Are there any ways in which you measure that? Or look for that? 
1 don't think we have any way to measure that scientificalIy. We as a group compare note 
afterwards, M a t  was your impression? And that's it.. . 
2. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you consider 
the knowledge of the entrepreneur to be an important aspect of the business proposai? 
I guess it depends on what do you mean by knowledge. If the entrepreneur is going to be 
the CEO.. . 
Personal knowledge 
You mean their education? Person knowledge about the market? Or the technology? 
Yeç, the persona1 knowledge about the market, the technology, just their persona1 
knowledge-base. 
Oh! Yea. It is very important, 1 think you have to be able to recognize what the strengdis 
and weaknesses are. That is often a challenge for entrepreneurs because sometimes they 
feel that they can conquer the world and they c m  be everything and tell the market they 
are great, share the spotlight. You have to be carefûl about those kind of people because 
is pretty tough for only one person to nin a successfid company. So 1 would Say that the 
more involved they are.. . Sometimes the founder, 1 guess, maybe cornes with this great 
technology, and got some people who are willing to join the team but then later are going 
to be leaving it, which then makes me think that their personal knowledge will not be that 
important, but they are going to be part of at least the start-up, which is quite important. I 
think. 
Do you consider the capacity of the entrepreneur (or the team) to create new knowledge 
(personal knowledge) as an important aspect of a business proposal? 
Yes, 1 think the team will need to convince us that they are already thinking about a next 
generation of products or other market that can think of taken products. When you are 
specially investing into early stage, we, if we can, everybody likes to invest in some kind 
of platform technology, but specially if you are going after an emerging market, you are 
not a 100% sure whether is going to emerge or if it's going to emerge. If there is any 
other face you c m  take this core knowledge or technology to another market that is a key 
thing for us. 
But at the early stage, if you don't see the platform technology, do you still feel 
comfortable to move forward with the hope that there will be a platform? 
It could be, 1 actually talked about that a bit this morning. 1 talked about platform 
technology. I talked ideally proprietary (or in its way to be patented) In any case, if you 
see a technology that isn't patentable or maybe it is not wise to patent, or if you don't 
want to disclose what is that you are doing. In that case we are probably looking for some 
evidence that there is a technology lead and you got a team which is capable of 
maintaining that iead. So, we have a couple of companies that we consider to be in that 
category. We have a couple of other companies that probably, could be small or we can 
make smaller investments. We have a couple of companies that 1 don't think are ever 
going to be an IPO candidates because they are not big enough, but the way we structure 
the investment, they have, we think a really good position in what we see as a clearly 
defrned niche market. There may not be a lot of reasons of why a whole bunch of other 
people would want to try to get into that market, but overall we think that we c m  make a 
decent profit by participating, so we have done a couple like that as well. 
So, are they potential acquisitions? 
Yes. You know? One case is a company where we think that they c m  have a pretty stable 
revenue stream. It is likely that.. . Quite possibly that somebody will buy them and even 
if they didn't, in the structure we have an option that we can get equity or receive royalty 
basically on this one transaction and we think we can make a very good r e t m  on the 
investment of the company. It is a kind of business mode1 where they were going to have 
recurrent revenue stream for a period of years, we hope, so we probably are going to 
make a pretty good return on the investmenf even if nobody bought it, or even if they 
don't go public. 
1s such a unique situation in which they have a niche market. It is a software-based. 
3. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, How do you 
consider in a business proposai the capabilities of the entrepreneur that will ailow hirn or 
her to create new products or services? 
Well, because we are a technology-focused funding we are investing at the early stage for 
the most part. That is why we get this largely technology people and not business people 
coming to us as the entrepreneur initially, some of them want to continue in that capacity 
and some of them are prepared to step aside right away, some want to lead it for a period 
of time. 1 will make a judgement cali based on whatever the scenario is. Usually is their 
ability or the team's ability to be able to continue to innovate. Although that also depends 
on the markets they are in too. If you &er a more established or mature market where is 
not growuig as fast or maybe not as many people targeting that, doesn't have high grow 
rates perhaps. We have a company like that, with a ver-  large market but we are not as 
concemed about the paste of innovation as there might be in a software or in a 
teiecommunications kind of situation where you know you have to provide next 
generation products on a regular bases. 
So, Do you look for these issues 1 a business plan? 
Yes. 
And the way you measure them is by . . . 
We have as 1 said the face to face meeting and one of the processes that we go through in 
Growtech is to.. . Are you familiar with the Progrid methodology? 
Yea 
What we have is we start fxst with a questionnaire with 15 questions that gives us a 
preliminary screehg.  Then we have a meeting with the company and we make some 
assessments based on that, chernistry, gut feel. Are we impressed by these people? 
Sometimes they don? always communicate what it is that they are trying to do? Very 
clear on the business plan or even on the questionnaire and if we go beyond that then we 
go into something that we cal1 the QA technology assessment. Really is just a more 
detailed questionnaire. Something like an add if you want. Involves one or two people 
from Growtech and one or two people form ccKincode" plus al1 of the key people fiom the 
investee company. The entrepreneur and his team and maybe his board or whoever. We 
al1 go through al1 these questions and we ask the tearn to corne up with a consensus 
answer to that question and that deals anythuig fiom market to technology to building a 
management tearn. That is done at the meeting. So it is the best leaming expenence that 
we can have because it is very comprehensive. The questions are not rocket science but it 
is a comprehensive test. Sometimes we fmd that between the management team they are 
not on the same wavelength on a certain issue because they are debating "OK, what is the 
answer to that question?" It has been helpfbl, for some companies you go through that 
process, and it is very helpful, for us to watch the interaction with other people. It is not 
very effective if they have only one person, but if they have a tearn, and there is a team 
present it has been very helpful. 
4. When making a decision to invest in a new technoIogy-based venture, do you consider 
in a business proposa1 the ability of the entrepreneur to assimilate new external to the 
venture knowledge? 
1 would Say that we spend a lot of tirne on that. It depends, you know? We want to make 
sure that the entrepreneur is focused on the business opportunity. We have a couple of 
situations and I have seen other where it was the desired of the entrepreneur to be focused 
on another thing as well and that was of concern to us because this requires a 100 % plus 
cornmitment. So, they need to balance the team and we want to see that they are focused 
on the venture. 
M a t  would your ideal business plan be? 
My ideal business plan would include an indication of Who the management people are 
now? who are the management? What is the plan to buiId the management tearn? Have 
they thought about that? 
We see a lot of plans that sort of dismiss the competition, "this is the greatest product, 
there is no competition" a cornpetitive analysis is pretty important "what are we going up 
against?" 
A realistic assessment of how long is going to take to achieve things that are mentioned 
in the business plan. 1 like to Say that an entrepreneur really isn't an entrepreneur if he is 
pessimistic in order to predict how long is that going to take to make things happen. That 
is typically what you see . . . 
If somebody has been through a start-up or has been present, even though they have their 
eyes 1 the sky, they know how tough it is, but they are realistic about it. The are still 
committed but realistic to understand how difficult it is, How long is this going to be? 
And sit back and think of the problem they are going to face, get on the drive, be on the 
road.. . Gone! 
How many proposais have you rejected in the 1 s t  six months? 
Well, we are in the middle of an interested situation because being a.. . One of the 
challenges of ninning a Iabor sponsor fund is that it is not like an institutional flow of 
capital where you are starting off with X dollars and you make cash calls. We raise 
money fiorn individuals al1 year long but the majority cornes in January and February, 
and you never have any idea whether you are going to raise nothing or a Lot. So, you have 
to be cautious on your investments planning, also, the legislation provides d e s  about 
how fast you have to invest that money. In Ontario, a Iabor sponsor fund for example, any 
money we raise in a twelve month penod from Marchl, 1999 to March 1,2000 and 90 % 
of that money wouId come in February of 2000 we have to invest 50% of that money by 
the end of the following December by December 2000. So, that is a very aggressive 
schedule and then we have to invest the rest 20 % on the next 12 months. So, it's not just 
the way you may want to nin the business, there is extra challenge for the labor sponsor 
fimd which legislation puts in place. So, if you ask me how many plans did we reject in 
the Iast six months, 1 guess we rejected everyone we looked at except for one because we 
have seventeen companies in our portfolio we are making sure that we have enough 
capital to participate in another one keeping on reserve that we have no idea of what is 
going to happen in the upcoming season. Our chance of being an early stage investor is to 
make small bets early and then to put bigger on them on the ones that are executing near 
to what they announce on the plan that they put out, So we don't want to be out of capital 
to put the next million bucks into those companies. So, we are very cautious about 
entering new deals- 
Interview #10 
1. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you consider 
any intangible aspects when assessing the business plan? 
Well everything you can measure, he he. The nurnber one question you have to ask 
yourself is (and this may be my own box, for exarnple the President of Delrina), he made 
20 million bucks, he had what he called the Stapinker d e s  to nia. in a business. It is 
actually very smart, it is very very simple but most entrepreneurs wouldn't even think 
about it. So, here are the three d e s .  The key point is that al1 three conditions must be met 
if one of the conditions is not met. 1s it two out of three? Walk! 
This advice is good for starting a Company, for joining a company if you want to come in 
fiom outside or for investing in a company. Remember, if it doesn't match al1 of the 
d e s ,  Walk away! Because eventually you are going to loose the war. 
So here are the rules: 
Rule nurnber one: "lt is got to be a new market". There has to be a new market, right? Or 
any of those existing markets that hasn't been saturated or isn't absorbed. 
Rule number two: "A market whether is no incorne in it or is well suited to be able to 
enter it into the market place" so it has to be something to barrier the venture or to the 
first person there. 
Rule number three: "There must be a real want need or desire" A basic one that is not 
filled today. 
So, if ail three conditions are met, again, that's when the luck cornes in at right spot at the 
right tirne then there is a chance to be very very successful. If any of those conditions are 
not met, w a k  away fiom i t  So I don? know id that answers your question but that's 
generally a good advice. 
Like here, it is a new market, he has technology which might not be outstanding but al1 
you need is another four or six months to be like that and there is a real need or desire for 
something to fil1 today. 1 believe that people is looking for better service to be able to 
manage their money more, 
So, al1 three basic conditions are met which makes it more interesting. If for example 
there is a ton of people who want to be in this business, forget it! 1 am a huge fan of Jack 
Wells who you shodd probably study. Jack Wells is. .. it's fiuiny, he is a very interesting 
guy. Here is a guy who is CE0 of this enormously huge business, one of the biggest 
companies in the world that makes from nuclear reactors to light bulbs. It is kind of a 
wide range, right? How do you manage something like that? I mean, you can ask a really 
basic question, How somebody writing them with al1 these different markets. He has this 
very simple model, which I think is applicable to high tech, "If you are not number one, 
or number MO, sel1 the business ! ! or divest". Because you are not going to stay and 
grow. You are always going to be chasing someone. You can be a g o d a  or can be a 
chimpanzee or you can chase the big guy wherever the crums are. But, you know there is 
going to be a littie room lefi for whoever is going to be number three piayer, right? 
2. When making a decision to invest in a new technology-based venture, do you consider 
the knowledge of the entrepreneur to be an important aspect of the business proposal? 
First of d l ,  nothing replaces customer, nght? These guys can talk to the cows somehow, 
this doesn't make a difference. But is what customers are talking about. 1s what 
customers are saying, is what analysts are saying. 1s got to be an exhaustive cornpetitive 
analysis, to proof credibility. Whether the competition is weak or not existent or he has 
already a solution. The way you demonstrate some intangible value is by showing that 
there is some reasonabIe market from where you cm attach. If he can not define the 
market he is going after, then 1 Say 1 want a reasonable 1% of the market or 2% of the 
market or 3% of the market, 1 want to face it within one or two years a kind of a practica! 
thing. That's what actually add good will and intangible value. Because you Say, OK, it 
is going to add this much power and is going to have these many eye balls (if it is in the 
internet is going to have this kind of eye bal1 or this kind of presence) and you can apply 
multiple choice. 1s pretty much like doing DPS, you can do that kind of stuff, but you 
have to be able to understand that base mark. Anything fiom there you just multiply fiom 
that. 
Let me put it this way. E s  knowiedge, How c m  you put it in a business plan as one of 
his assets? 
From his mind cornes the delivery of a product. And the product has some vaiue to it. He 
is nothing more than a slave to the product. To be honest. So the evaluation is based upon 
this market, this market segment, this market is attached. This is going to get 5% of the 
market or whatever. 1'11 put a multiple against it and that is assuming that he is part of it. 
Other wise he wouldn't be in this place in the first place. 
1 am not a big fan of putting a value on starts. Because specially in high tech "today is 
starts tomorrow is go" You turn it off tomorrow, he gets hit by a bus tonorrow, what is 
the good will? The answer is nothing. 
It is the same in the software business. The value is directly what it gets to the people, 
and the people is directly related to the product. In high tech you can not make the 
assumption that a guy is working for you fiom twelve to 24 months, that is a fact. So, it is 
dangerous to put a value on a superstar, it is very dangerous. These people come and go. 
So, you have to put a value to the company based on its market. 
How would you consider the ideal business plan? 
The person is credible. They understand the market better than anyone. Every question 
any can ask they can answer it fkom a position of authority. They can do it fiom a rnacro 
market perspective, and understand that market that they are going after. Shey can 
understand it from a micro market perspective which is I understand what this customer 
is saying this, this customer is saying thk, this customer is saying this, right? So the have 
to show that kind of authority first of all. 
That is much fkom a technology perspective, fiankly is secondary. I want to see 
credibility and competency no question about that from a technical perspective, but that is 
not what I am interested in, that is the initid ramp. What 1 want to see is that this guy is 
passionate about his business understand the business cold, has the people to make the 
job get done and they are always going to get it done. 
So, anyway he is a business man. In the business plan he says, this what is going to cost 
me to run the business, this is what 1 think is the market that 1 am going after, here is 
what 1 need, here are the risks (the comment you made earlier). Then, 1 have credibility, 
then 1 can feel that the person is credible, but if he can't answer those questions, he s just 
a "techie" guy fiankly . And they come and go. 
These things are fundamental. 1 can tell by reading a business plan within five minutes if 
this company is going to be successful or not. Not necessarily on what the business plan 
is there or not is if the person understands. Most business plans are garbage, they show 
you this great technology and have this great idea that they want to turn into a business. 
No, no, no, What market? How are you going to get to the market? What happens if 
Microsofi enters your market? These are fiindamental questions you have to ask. I f  they 
can't answer the questions, guess what? The cornpetition will. 
How many business plans have you put together that have been successful? 
I've looked at hundreds. 1 look them for people, for VC's- I've written five myself. I've 
never been rejected, is very simple, once you understand the mechanics for writing a 
business plan it is not difflcult. It is like 1 was making a comment, you have to do it step 
by step. 1s like mything if you understand the process then it becomes very simple. 
What's market? Who is doing what? What's the hole? And if you can answer those 
questions.. . I have seen a lot of plans. There is a total gap for doing these things in 
Canada, it is Iike.. . Oh! May 1 turn this off! 
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Decision-Making Criteria 
- - - - - - - 
~nvironrnegal Conditions 
There is a well-established distribution system for product 0.8 1 O -2 .\ 
Competitors are not yet established 
Venture is brotected bv effective barriers to entrv 
1 Technology factors are changing rapidly 1 0.6 1 0.4 1 






/Financial provisions for investor(s) nghts 1 0.7 1 O -3 
0.5 
0.5 
Market factors are changing rapidly 1 0.5 
Higher quality compared to competing products 
Technical aspects are very clear 
INVESTOR(S) REQUIREMENTS 
Expected rate of r e m  on investment 
Geographic location of the venture seeking venture capital 
It is the first r oud  of investment 
Percentage equity share of venture held by - -  the -- investor(s) 
The venme's stage of development (e-g. seed) 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VENTURE 
O F F E W G  (PRODUCT OR SERVICE) 
fiI O 
First of its type in the market 0.9 O, 1 
Functioning prototype has already been developed 0.9 O. 1 
Specifications are very clear 0.9 O. 1 
Can be protected by a patent 0.8 1 0.2 








Investor(s) will have a minonty position in the venture 1 0.7 
venture 
Proposa1 recommended by someone known to the 
investor(s) 
Track record of CO-investors in the deal 
Expected technology risk to the investor(s) 








Cash out potential (e.g. going public) 
Familiarity with the technology of the venture 
Familiarity with the venture offering 
. Size of investment expected fiom the investor(s) 
There are other CO-investors present in the invesûnent 
Expected market risk to the investor(s) 
-- 
Familiarity with the industry of th;venture 
Venture performance after first round of investment 




























1 Decision-Making Criteria 1 Tangible 1 Intangible 1 
I 
- - 
Characteristics of the Investment Pro~osal 1 1 
[ Quality of customer analysis 1 0.7 1 O -3 1 
- - 
Cl- of communication in proposal 
Clear emphasis on key points 
Effectiveness of graphies, tables and figures in the proposal 
Quality of cornpetitor analysis 
[~vidence of creativity in the proposal 1 0.5 1 0.5 1 
Quality of product analy sis 
Overall quality of proposal 
Overall quantity of proposai 
Quality of financial analysis 
Qudity of market analysis 
Speed to evaluate proposa1 by investor(s) 


























Characteristics of the Entrepreneur(s) 
Personal Attributes 
Ability to react to changing risk 
Ability to bring about change 
Ability to anticipate need for change 
Abilitv to acce~t cnticism 
Cornmitment to success 
Willinpess to work and cooperate with investors 
Ability to sustain intense effort 
Personality compatible with investor(s) 
Ability to attend to detail 
Fatniliarity with business drivers 
Familiarity with customer requirements 
Demonstrated leadership ability in the past 
Familiaritv with ~roduct and market 
Objective 1 Subjective 
Managerial capabilities and business awareness 
Success at starting previous business 
Track record relevant to the venture 
Farniliarity with technology enablers 
Background & Experience 
Abiiity to put a balanced management team in place 
Investor(s) familiarity with the entrepreneurs' reputation 











Marketing research skills 
Research and development skills 
Advertising and promotion skills 
Financial skills 
Sales force and distribution skilis 
Engineering skills 
Production skills 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MAlUU3T 















Attractive growth potential 
Attractive existing market size 







































Proposed venture will stimulate an existin&m&t 
- 
Proposed venture is satisfiing an existing market need 
Competition 
There is little threat of competition d&g the first three 
Ob'ective Su b 'ective 
2cHF 
years I I 
Cornpetition is present or anticipated in fust two years 1 0.5 1 0.5 
Venture is motected bv effective barriers to entw 1 0.7 / 0.3 * 4 d 
Corn~etitors are not vet established 1 0.6 f O .4 
- - - - 
The proposed venture has many competitors 0.8 1 0 2  
share 1 1 
There is intense price competition in the market 
There is a strong dominant competitor with a large market 
Environmental Conditions 1 





CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VENTURI2 
OFFERING (PRODUCT OR SERVICE) 
-- 
Customer needfactors are changing rapidly 
Technology factors are changing rapidly 




Demonstrate a defendable cornpetitive position 
Highly innovative 
Superîor and unique 
Higher quality compared to competing products 




Ability to attract a viable investor group 
Investor(s) influence upon management decisions of the 





















Can be protected by a patent 
Proprietary 
First of its type in the market 
Functioning prototype has already been developed 
Specifications are very clear 





Venture's long-term sales will impact investor's 
~erforrnance 









Expected kchnology nsk to the investor(s) 
Have the option to be the controlling investor(s) in the 






I Decision-Making Criteria 
venture 
Proposal recommended by someone known to the 
investor(s) 
Track record of CO-investors in the deal 
Expected market risk to the investor(s) 
Familiarity with the industry of the venture 
Financiai provisions for investor(s) rights 
Investor(s) will have a minority position in the venture 
Venture perfomance after fnst round of investment 
Cash out potential (e.g. going public) 
Familiarity with the technology of the venture 
Familiarity with the venture oflering 
Size of investment expected f?om the investor(s) 
There are other CO-investors present in the investrnent 
Expected rate of return on investment 
Geographic location of the venture seeking venture capital 
It is the fïrst round of investment 
Percentage equity share of venture held by the investor(s) 
The venture's stage of development (e.g. seed) 
Characteristics of the Investment Proposa1 
Evidence of truthfuiness in the proposal 
Realistic financial projections contained in proposai 
Completeness of venture proposal 
Effectiveness of executive surnrnary in the proposal 
Ease to evaluate proposal by investor(s) I 
Evidence of creativity in the proposai 
1 Overall qudity of proposa1 
Overall quantity of proposal 
Quality of financial analysis 
Quality of market analysis 
Speed to evaluate proposal by investor(s) 
[Clarity of communication in proposal 
Clear ernphasis on key points 
Effectiveness of graphies, tables and figures in the 
proposa1 
1 Quality of cornpetitor analysis 
Quality of custimer anaiysis 
Quality of product analysis 
Objective Subjective 
Appendix E 
List of al1 the constnicts for each category fkom investors and entrepreneurs: 
List of categoxîes and nurnber of constnicts fiom respondents I 
Category 1 Entrepreneurs 1 Investors 1 
1 1 1 Personality of the entrepreneur 1 14 constnicts 1 24 consûucts 1 
2 
1 4 1 General amibutes of the management team 
3 
1 13 constmcts 
Background of the management team 
1 6 constructs 1 
Skills of the management team 











Category 1 for Entrepreneurs: Personality of the entrepreneur 
I3ig I lit 1 Average 1 Average 1 hiilurc 
# 1 
Founder issue i s  resolvcd 3 
Foundcr is open to rcceivc advicc 4 
Thc team has passion to accomplish sornctliing bigger than 4 
themsclves 
The inembers of the i e m  enjoy spcnding tirne ouiside Ihc 2 The tcam is only insk oricntcd (work) focus 
oflice 
Charactcr centric (authcniicity of thc foiindcr) 2 
Maturity (foundcr) I 
I'crsonality ccntric (foiindcr) 1 
Y O U ~ ~  (foundcr) 
-- 
Dynamic persondity (founder is visionary) 5 
The folinder has good business ctiqucttc (presentnblc) 3 
l'crsonnlity is  solid (fouiidcr) 
'The foundcr hns poor busincss etiqucttc 
Genuineness (first impression vs. how i t  rictually placcd 1 5 f à l se  f in i  impression (Whnt n surprise!) 
Founders are entrcprcncurial 1 
Founders show intcgrity and honcsty 1 
Management team is operntionully focuscd (planning 4 
strategy makes sense) 
Foundcrs nn: open to advisc und suggestion 3 
f+.wndcrs show "lnhercnt passion," "your skiii is in i l ie  5 
1:oundcrs are stubhorn (not iis opcn io iidvisc) 
'I'hç foiinders considcr thc ncw venture cis jus1 niiollicr job 
Category 2 for Entrepreneurs: Background of the management team 
Foundcrs have becn successfiil in ilie nasi 1:oundcrs don7 have trnck record 
lnvciition or idca loaking for n inurkçt Expericnce in the iargct murkct 
,Management team has technical background 
I'hc foundcr has strong icchnical dcpth 
Managcmenl ieiiiii has busincss background 
#1 
2 




?lie t'oundcr doçsn't Iiave expcrience in "old cconomy" 
#2 
5 



















Strong technical cxpertisc (foundcrs) 
Fou~ider has seasoncd managernent expericncc 
'The t c m  conies frotn u "rcal enircprcncurinl background" 
The founder has background in a big compnny 
5 
3 














































'I'he management tcoin is hriinching iiiio new 
2 
Poor technicnl cxperiise (foundcrs) 
Foundcr hm poor munagciiiciii cxpcricncc 
Foiindçr hns tcclinology background "teçliic" 






Poar educaiian (founders wiih no profcssional dsgrccs) 

Category 4 for Entrepreneurs: General attributes of the management team 
Robust and adaptable nlanagemcnt tcarn 
Well roundcd inanngemcni ieum 
l~easonable rnanagcmcnt icam I I I 5 1  4 1 3  1 1  1 2  
Strong instillcd managcmcnt t c m  
Good infrastructure in place (expandcd tenm) 








Strong m;inagemcni l c m  
Team is originaior of thc idcn 
The team is youngcr and encrgized 
Managcincni icnrn hns n nnrrow focus 
The teum is crcativc and innovativc 3 
Thc ieam has good dedicaiion 5 
The tcnm has good drive 5 
The terni is operntionally orgnnizcd 5 




















































1 ~ c u k  inunngcnicni icnm 
"t'lie teuin has paor drive 
C 






























'The business plan is always evolving and changirig 4 
Complcxity o f  the business mode1 (hard to cxplnin) 3 
Good quality of the business plan (check spclling, 4 
organization, etc.) 
Business plan wrotc with clûboratc langunge 2 
5 for Entrepreneurs: Business Plan 
#2 # I # I # 2 
5 4 5 1 I Sintic biisiticss conccpi iincl modcl 
1 1 1 1 1 
3 1  5 1 4  1 I 1 2 Isiinple straiglii forwiird business modcl 
5 1 4 1 4 1 3 1 2 IPoor quoliiy oftbr businriss plan (carclcss writing m d  1 
preparinp) 
2 4 4 2 5 Business pliin wrotc witli simple words 
Category 6 for Entrepreneurs: Investor-entrepreneur relationship 
Strong venture capiialisi health (less intrusive) 



















Category 1 for Investors: Personality of the entrepreneur 
1 Big l l i t  ( Uig l li t  ( Averngc 1 Averugc 1 Pailure ( Failurc 1 1 
Tlic tcani shows Iionesty nnd iiitcgrity 
Teamwork environmcnt across the organization - 
Characier in gencml 







The tcam has busiiicss "eiiq\ictte" 
Originator is a visionary 
Foundcrs have confidcncc i t i  thcir icchiiology 
Founder is kecn at recognizing the nccd to change his 
position in the future 









Management team has high ienncity 
Founder lias lack of  prctcniiousncss ("down 10 carihN) 
The company is their baby 
Founder is innovaiive 
Foiinder is a tnic entrepreneur 
Iligh cornmitiiient of  thc cnireprcncur 
'The !cilm hus nbiliiy Io listcn Io rcason 
Autocratie leadership 









I~quitahlc balnncc o f  powcr 
1:oundcrs live the vision 
Foundcr has n lot of'energy 
l'hcir moiivaiion in lifc is ta "~rinke rnoncy" (ïoundcrs) 







































































'I'hc tcaiii is no[ courtcous 
'I'hc tcani has limiled cnircprcncurinl niid hiisincss iibilitics 
1:oiindcrs show fciir of  loosing Ihcir îcchnology 



















'I'hc tearii sliciws dishonçsty nnd lack of  intcgrity 










'I'hc tcuiii hus no rcality oricntulian 




























'ICnrn hiis low icnuciiy 
I:oiiiidcr lias ii dcsirc Tor siuiiis or ii~oncy 
The l e m  is iiiotivulcd by grced 
Fourider i s  copyciii 
I~oundcr is ri forcing cntrcl)rciiciir 
1,ow coiiiiiiitriiciii o f  tlic cntrcprcnciir 
'I'hc inimgcincni tcnin is not willing to listcii 
1)cinoçriiiiç leridcrsliip 







Incquitahle balrince of' powcr 
I:oundcrs only irilk uboiii i l ic vision witli no lhcls 
I:uiindcr is oldcr (less ciicrgy) 
'I'hc ~oiiipiii iy i s  "llicir biihy" (fiiiintlcrs) 
1:ouridcr wiiiiis io tic ttic Iciidcr Ibrcvcr 
Category 2 for Investors: Background of the management team 
l'hc teain has acadcinic cxpcricncc (bu1 iio industrial 1 2 1 I 1 2 1 5 1 4 1 l 
Big liit 
# 1  
Foundcrs arc well tcchnically educatcd 5 





Tearn has industry background 
Averngc Average M u r e  1:nilurc 
# 1 #2 # 1 # 2 
4 5 4 I 
The founder has more expcricncc starîing a business 1 5 1 5 1 4 1 4 1 2 1 1 
5 
The team hm been successful in ihc past 
The tearn has professionalism (high qualifications) 
Founder hris good track record 
Foundcrs have no tcchiiicril bnckgroiind 






I m k  of industry knowledgc (tcnm) 1 





















not use it 
1:oundcr is not willing to listen to crnployecs 
l'tic teaiii shows lnconsistency in mnnngeiiient dçcisioris 
'l'liç tenm kccps busy witliout a goal 
lxndcrs o f  ilic company arc not good al iinprovising 
'The ienin is not being iiblc to inükc good decisions 
Pounder hns poor tcchnical (iechnology) skills 
'l'hc îcüm is  poor rit ussimilating new innrkct information 
'l'lie icam delays to nccomplisli milcstoncs 
I'hcrc is iiiiniiiiuin coininunication timoiig the tcniii 
'I'he foiindcr is overly simplistic 
Poor nicrgcr and acquisitions corc coinpctencics 
1.iick of  acco\intability Io the board 
'I'hc managcincnt teain has poor opcrating procedurcs 
'I'hc foundcr is mnyk awrire o f  indusiry trends but docs 
information 
The foundcr is open to listcn to employees (get ncw ideas) 
The t ç m  shows consiskncy iri mnnagcmcnt dccisions 
The team kecps the goal in mind (focus) 
1,eaders o f  the company arc good ai iniprovisiiig 















and l e m  from it 




























I~ouiidcr hns good technical (teclinology) skills 
l'hc icnin i s  good at nssimilating ricw market information 
'i'hc tcam is responsible 
The teain is ~lways open to communication 
The foundcr has rcalistic expcctations 
Teain has good mergcr and acquisitions core compclcncics 
Corporatc govcmance 
The management tcam hns good opcratiiig procedures 
The founder is awnrc o f  indusiry trends a id  exploits ihat 
ovemight 






















































2 'The tcaiii is stuck i f  a problcin sliows iip (obsliiclc) 
1 'I'he bundcr docsn't huvc prcscnintion skills 
Category 4 for Investors: General attributes of the management team 
ll'rofessionnl management team (formed with cxtemal key 
people) 
Thc founder considers important to have a partnersliip 
wiih al! stakeholders 
Full teani in place 
Well roundcd managenient team 
The tcam has a corporntc culturc 
When somcthing gocs wrong the Company "survives" 
Big Ilit Avcragc Averiigc Mure Fnilure 
.~ 
Own intcriinl people (cnlrcprcrieuriul) 
'Termi is trmaciion oricnicd 
'I'hc icurii docsn'i have u loi of hclp 
'I'hc icuiii can'i sec ilic whole piciurc 
Thc tcam daesn'i hiivc a corporüle culture 
Wticii somcihinn ROCS wroiig the Company fnlls ~ptiri" 1 
Category 5 for Investors: Business Plan 
Competiiivc corporaic siratcgy 




# 1  
Market opporîuniiy is pcrceivcd ns "hot" or niche 
































No corporiilc strnlegy 
I'roduct offering lins only rcgionnl poicnlid (limitcd) 
3 
I 
Mnrkct opporîunity is not pcrccivcd us "hot" or niclic 
1:oiindcr is noi good iit denling with campetilion 
Appendix F 
Elicited vocabulary fiorn interviews with experts 









People (historical background) 
Companies (individuals) who have failed 
Companies (individuals) who have succeeded 
Mentaiity of the management team 
Do we (as a VC) trust them (the management team)? 
Do we have a good feeling? 
Do we like the narne of the Company? 
Are they inclined to Iisten? 
Do they talk more than they should? 
Are they arrogant? 
Are they ethical? 
Are they reasonable? 
What is the culture of that team? 
Do they put '<billion" too many times in the business plan 
Can management do it? 
Have they done it before? 
Can they do it in a new venture? (if they have done it before) 
Can they do that transition fiom a big company to a small company? 
If you got to entrepreneur c m  you go beyond what a technical person can do so as the 
marketing person? 
Who are you bringing out for help? 
B) Measurement of intangibles 
It is a personal thing. 
By repetition 
Test them. "We put people quite a few times to get to know each other over a period of 
tirne" 
1 could give the same proposal to two different people and get two different answers of 
whether they should invest or not. 
C) Knowledge of the entrepreneur 
It depends on the stage of the company 
It is very important to have ''the fmger in pulse" to fmd out what is going on 
When you are thinking about whether you bring key managers we are trying to identiS: 
1s that a key man? 
If the founder dies? WiIl the company continue? 
Or not? And that is an intangible.. . 
O) Capability to create new producl or seMces 
Compare with past experiences that we have had with other entrepreneurs 
Reference checks 
Reduce some over-reliance on a single person (or division) 
Get to a team approach 
E) Ability to assirnilate new knowledge 
Entrepreneur has to be willing to take in new ideas 
F) The ideal business plan 
Market 
Reasonable market analysis 
Positioning of the product 
Oppomuiity for taking the product to different markets (or industries) 




An example of typical niles of the fuzzy expert system. 
Fuzzy variable: Energy of the management team. 
